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This thesis examines some of the most important policies encompassed within
Mikhail Gorbachev's "new thinking." The author explores the economic incentives and
shifting Soviet view of international relations which led Gorbachev to introduce his
groundbreaking reforms. Primary emphasis is given to an in-depth analysis of the
"defensive doctrine" and how the issues surrounding that doctrine will impact upon the
future U.S.-Soviet security relationship. Special topics include: increasing evidence of
changes under way in the structure of Soviet forces stationed in Eastern Europe; possible
future Soviet force deployments inside the USSR, including the construction of "fortified
regions," and the evolving U.S.-Soviet relationship in the most important theater of
relations between the two countries—Europe. It is the author's contention that the central
driving force behind all of Gorbachev's reforms was, and remains, a resuscitation of the
Soviet economy. The author concludes that ultimate Soviet objectives under "new
thinking" will remain uncertain, and that the only prudent U.S. policy is to bargain in a
vigorous but businesslike manner with Gorbachev to further reduce the Soviet threat, while
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A. STEPS LEADING TO THE SELECTION OF THIS TOPIC
Within months of Mikhail Gorbachev's ascendancy to the post of General Secretary,
the Soviet press was deluged with a flood of information dealing with topics which varied
from loosening the bonds of secrecy surrounding Stalin's purges to open discussions of
drug abuse and prostitution. A dominant theme which emerged during this period was
a revolutionary new Soviet outlook on domestic and international affairs. This broad range
of political, economic and military reforms has become known both within the Soviet
Union and abroad as Gorbachev's "new political thinking," or simply "new thinking."
From the outset, this new program triggered intense debate as to its origins, its validity,
and its implications, both for the USSR and for the West.
An in-depth analysis of the overall phenomenon of "new thinking" is beyond the
scope of this thesis Instead, in these pages I will concentrate on what I consider the most
prominent implications of Gorbachev's military objectives within "new thinking," and
address the most significant economic and political factors which in turn affect and result
from those military issues. Particular emphasis will be given to examining the hotly
debated "defensive doctrine," which was declared by the Warsaw Pact in May 1987.
B. THE PROBLEM
The purposes of this thesis are to:
• examine the origins of economic and military objectives within Gorbachev's "new
thinking" and the controversy surrounding those issues;
• investigate changes in force structure now under way in Soviet forces in Europe as
well as possible future deployments of Soviet forces inside the USSR;
• and to analyze the evolving superpower relationship in Europe in an attempt to
determine its impact on future western, especially American, security policies.
C. METHODOLOGY
In preparing this study, I have drawn materials from a wide variety of books, journal
articles and newspaper accounts. I also relied heavily on Soviet articles which were
translated and published by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), as well as
those which I read and translated myself from original Soviet sources. I interpreted the
information from those sources and blended them with my own experiences from almost
ten years of studying the Soviet Union, to construct this thesis.
Two final notes of explanation are necessary at this point. The reader will note that
I address only changes in the Soviet Army force structure, and not those directly affecting
either the Soviet Air Forces or Soviet Navy. 1 chose to do so in order to restrict the
research for this work to a manageable amount of material, and al? o because the Soviet
Union is primarily a land power. Simply put, with the notable exception of strategic
nuclear delivery systems, the majority of Soviet air force and naval assets primarily support
the nation's ground forces, and the nation's military doctrine is therefore centrally focused
on land warfare. Finally, in Chapter Seven, I examine the evolving U.S-Soviet relationship
not on a worldwide basis, but in the context of Europe. Again, my purpose in doing so
was to make the amount of research material manageable and to highlight the European
Continent as the most crucial arena of U.S.-Soviet relations.
II. THE SOVIET SETTING IN 1985
A. THE LEGACY INHERITED BY GORBACHEV
Since he took over the helm of the Soviet Union in March 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev '
has gone to great lengths to overcome the barriers which he initially faced. Noted
Sovietologist Seweryn Bialer observes,
The universe in which Gorbachev took the reins of the Soviet Union was one in
which his country had no major friends and was strapped with an unruly and
economically and politically sick 'alliance' of satellites and semisatellites. The
evaluation of the existing situation by the new leadership led to the beginning of
major revisions and Soviet thought and actions with regard to their security and
foreign policy. 2
This major policy revision aJminated in a revolutionary new Soviet outlook on
domestic and international affairs. The resulting broad range of reforms has become
known inside the USSR and abroad »s Gorbachev's "new political thinking" or simply "new
thinking.'' This program cannot be easily defined, but is perhaps best characterized as a
fundamentally more flexible approach to dealing with a wide range of domestic and
international concerns. Most western scholars emphasize Gorbachev's work to resuscitate
the lagging Soviet economy as the central driving force to all of his efforts. Dr. Seweryn
Bialer believes this economic explanation to be oversimplified. In his article entitled '"New
'Author's Note: At the time he assumed power in March 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev
became the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In March 1990,
a new post of "Executive President" was established in the USSR and Gorbachev was
elected to that post. As such, he now holds the title of "President of the USSR."
Seweryn Bialer, "The Soviet Union and the West: Security and Foreign Policy," in
Gorbachev's Russia and American Foreign Policy (Boulder: Westview Press, Inc., 1988), 457.
Thinking' and Soviet Foreign Policy," Bialer argues that the entire Soviet system-politically,
socially, economically, and even culturally-was in crisis. While the West was making
astounding gains in minicomputers and microcircuitry, the USSR could not even meet basic
consumer needs. A feeling emerged that, if the Soviet economic base were not revived,
the USSR would not enter the twenty-first century as a superpower worthy of the name.
Seweryn Bialer notes that this perceived external crisis "...gave a sense of urgency to Soviet
reform plans and reinforced the conviction of the necessity to concentrate on domestic
tasks." 3
In March 1985, it fell to Mikhail Gorbachev to deal with the deepening domestic
crisis. In the beginning of his tenure, it was far from certain just how Gorbachev would
go about trying to resolve the problems which he faced. Since the reforms which have
emerged in the past five years have now been so closely linked personally with Gorbachev,
I believe it necessary to briefly explore just how Gorbachev was selected, among a number
of possible successors, to carry forward the CPSU's program.
Although the full story may forever remain a mystery, Gorbachev's rise to
prominence is most often linked to his sponsorship by longtime KGB chief and former
CPSU general secretary Yuri Andropov. Gorbachev biographer Thomas Butson writes
that, during the waning years of Leonid Brezhnev's tenure in office, Yuri Andropov
became increasingly upset with the widespread corruption and inefficiency in the Soviet
system. In his positions of KGB chief and Politburo member and in his brief tenure as
general secretary, Andropov repeatedly sought to combat corruption and inefficiency,
especially in agriculture. His concerns in this area were shared by the charismatic young
^weryn Bialer, '"New Thinking' and Soviet Foreign Policy," Survival (July/August
1988): 293.
party boss from Andropov's home region of Stavropol-Mikhail Gorbachev~and Andropov
was so impressed by Gorbachev that he became his political sponsor. 4 Author Dusko
Doder writes of how Andropov arranged to have Gorbachev introduced to Leonid
Brezhnev in August 1978 while Brezhnev was en route to a vacation in the southern USSR.
Brezhnev must have been favorably impressed because in the following November Mikhail
Gorbachev was summoned to Moscow and elected as a secretary of the Central
Committee.5
During Yuri Andropov's short reign as general secretary, Gorbachev emerged as
Andropov's trusted adviser and chosen successor. Upon Andropov's death in February,
1984, however, Brezhnev protege Konstantin Chernenko was elected general secretary
instead of Gorbachev, and the latter's meteoric rise to power seemed for a moment to
fizzle. Although passed over for the party's top post, Gorbachev is reported to have
remained in good stead with the CPSU leadership and was widely acknowledged to be the
so-called "second secretary," an unofficial title indicating that Gorbachev was second in
stature only to Chernenko. 6 Even so, in the list days of Chernenko's reign it seemed
increasingly doubtful that Gorbachev would receive the party's nod to succeed Chernenko.
As Chernenko lay on his deathbed, rumors began to circulate in Moscow that either former
Leningrad party leader Grigori Romanov or former Moscow party boss Viktor Grishin was
4Thomas Butson, Gorbachev: A Biography (New York: Stein and Day, Publishers, 1985),
15-16.
5Dusko Doder and Louise Branson, Gorbachev: Heretic in the Kremlin (New York:
Viking Press, 1990), 39.
'Thomas Butson, Gorbachev: A Biography (New York: Stein and Day, 1985), 115.
Chernenko's designated successor. 7 According to author Dusko Doder, in the leadership
struggle which ensued after Chernenko's death, the crucial swing vote in choosing between
Grishin and Gorbachev fell to the party's elder statesman, Foreign Minister Andrei
Gromyko. Other key supporters for Gorbachev's candidacy reportedly included one of
the membership's more conservative members, Yegor Ligachev, and KGB chief Victor
Chebrikov. 8 In his memoirs, Gromyko noted that he had been strongly impressed by
Gorbachev's outstanding statesmanship, his farsightedness and his strong conviction for
what he believed was best for his country.9 Whether for these or other reasons, Gromyko
was apparently convinced that the ideas expressed by Gorbachev represented the best
hopes for the USSR, and he backed Gorbachev's candidacy. (Gorbachev also likely offered
to support Gromyko as a candidate for the presidency of the USSR, in return for the
latter's support.) Perhaps seeking to reassure some of the other leaders who might still
have doubts about Gorbachev's capabilities, Gromyko in his nominating speech for
Gorbachev spoke glowingly of the younger man and said of him, "Comrades, this man has
a nice smile, but he's got iron teeth." 10 Gromyko is said to have later remarked to
another high official that he was sincerely concerned that the USSR was drifting
7Dusko Doder and Louise Branson, Gorbachev: Heretic in the Kremlin (New York:
Viking Press, 1990), 60-61.
'Ibid., 62.
'Andrei Gromyko, Memoirs (New York: Doubleday Publishers, 1989), 341-42.
10Dusko Doder, Shadows and Whispers: Power Politics Inside the Kremlin from
Brezhnev to Gorbachev (New York: Random House Publishers, 1986), 266-67.
dangerously and that he felt that his siding with the younger and more vigorous
Gorbachev was an act of great patriotism. "
Perhaps even more intriguing than the story of Gorbachev's rise to power is some
of the speculation on the origins of his political philosophy and why he chose to adopt as
his own the comparatively revolutionary reform programs which have emerged under
"new thinking.'' One Gorbachev biographer, Dusko Doder, asserts that Gorbachev's deep
concerns for his country's problems, especially in the economic realm, are rooted in
Gorbachev's upbringing in the largely agricultural district of Stavropol. n Writer David
Remnick claims that the era of political and ideological thaw under Nikita Khrushchev had
an even more profound influence on the young Gorbachev and his entire generation. 13
Gorbachev's college friend, Zdenek Mlynar, states that even before Khrushchev came to
power, Gorbachev had already begun to privately criticize the harsh Stalinist system and
the political dogma which they were required to study. 14 After Gorbachev arrived in
Moscow in late 1978, he was closely associated with the anti-corruption and other reform
campaigns backed by his patron Yuri Andropov both before and during the latter' c reign
as general secretary. 15 Since then, Gorbachev has become most famous for his adoption
"Dusko Doder and Louise Branson, Gorbachev: Heretic in the Kremlin (New York:
Viking Press, 1990), 64-65.
12
Ibid., 5-7.
13David Remnick, "The Pioneers of Perestroika," Washington Post National Weekly
Edition, 19-25 March 1990, 8-9.
uZdenek Mlynar, n an interview in L' Unita, 9 April 1985. Quoted in Dusko Doder
and Louise Branson, Gorbachev: Heretic in the Kremlin (New York: Viking Publishers, Inc.,
1990), 11.
15See Chapters 1-3 of Dusko Doder and Louise Branson, Gorbachev: Heretic in the
Kremlin (New York: Viking Publishers, 1990).
of the reform programs which fall under the broad umbrella of "new thinking." As it
happens, Gorbachev did not develop these theories himself, but adopted as his own
programs originated by others. For example, many of the principles which later formed
the heart of "perestroika" were pioneered by a small group of economists working in the
Siberian city of Akademgorodok. This team, which included such notables as Tatyana
Zaslavskaya and Abel Aganbegyan, first became famous in 1983 when it released the so-
called "Novosibirsk Report." This report, initially sponsored by Yuri Andropov, provided
the essential framework for "perestroika." 16 Gorbachev, then, did not originate these
programs, but he still must be given credit for recognizing their potential and backing
them. Granted, it may be argued that he did not have too much of a choice; nothing else
seemed to be working at the time, and his country was rapidly approaching an economic
collapse.
As if the dismal domestic situation did not pose enough problems for Gorbachev, he
found Soviet foreign affairs in equally dire straits. During the 1970s, the Soviet Union had
emerged as a world superpower and had been recognized as an equal to the United States
during the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, or SALT negotiations, of that era. Moscow had
assumed this superpower status, according to Soviet claims, since by the end of the 1960s
a concept known as the "correlation of forces" had moved irreversibly in the favor of
socialism To understand why the "correlation of forces" had, by the time Mikhail
Gorbachev assumed power only fifteen years later, once again shifted away from the favor
of socialism, entails a closer examination of this principle.
16David Remnick, "The Pioneers of Perestroika," Washington Post National Weekly
Edition, 19-25 March 1990, 8-9. See also "Z" (pseud.), 'To the Stalin Mausoleum," Daedalus
(Winter 1989/90): 322.
As explained by Dr. Robert Legvold, Director of Columbia University's Harriman
Institute, the concept of the "correlation of forces" is "...an essentially economic, rather than
military, notion of power." 17 The "correlation of forces" encompasses a vast array of
components, incorporating such diverse factors as the momentum of the worldwide
struggle for national liberation, the tenor of the world peace movement, and even the
militancy of capitalist trade unions. In addition, the four traditionally recognized track's
of a nation's foreign policy—political, cultural, military and economic—are core elements of
this panorama of forces. Under Leonid Brezhnev, the military had dominated the
Kremlin's foreign policy. Before Brezhnev, Khrushchev had boasted of the superiority of
Soviet science and had even proclaimed that the USSR's economy would quickly overtake
and surpass that of the United States. By the time Gorbachev took power, however, all this
had changed. Although the military component of Soviet power had remained intact and
had in fact expanded throughout the 1970s, the same could not be said of the economic
factor.
B. ECONOMIC RISE AND FALL
During his tenure, Nikita Khrushchev had good reason to be optimistic about the
Soviet economy, which seemed to boom during the late 1950s and the 1960s. The country's
gross national product, or GNP, grew 4.5 times between the mid-1950s and the mid-1980s. 18
This statement is somewhat misleading, though. During the same period, growth rates
continually declined from a high of seven percent in the 1960s to under two percent in the
17Robert Legvold, "War, Weapons, and Soviet Foreign Policy," in Gorbachev's Russia
and American Foreign Policy, ed. Seweryn Bialer and Michael Mandelbaum (Boulder:
Westview Press, Inc., 1988), 101.
18Richard Parker, "Assessing Perestroika," World Policy Journal 6 (Spring 1989): 268.
early 1980s. The decline in overall growth has been accompanied by a parallel decline in
productivity growth. 19 According to a 1989 study published in the Federal Reserve Bank
of San Francisco's FRBSF Weekly Letter, the annual growth in labor productivity fell from
6.2 percent in the period from 1966-78 to only three percent in the period 1981-84. As a
result, total factor productivity growth fell from a high of 3.2 percent from 1966-78 to a low
of 1.1 percent in the early 1980s. 20 Other western economists have painted an even
bleaker picture; according to economist Anders Aslund, the overall Soviet economic
growth rate plummeted to zero perhaps as early as 1978. 21
The resulting economic situation is bleak. Shortages are endemic. The few consumer
goods which are available are poor in quality and are usually overpriced. The typical
Soviet mother is estimated to have to stand in shopping lines for two to three hours each
day. Basic commodities and even simple foods are often hard to find. Medications like
aspirin-considered everyday household items in the West—are scarce, and goods such as
antibiotics are generally available only to the privileged or through the black market.
There is a tremendous housing shortage. The list of problems seems endless. In short, to
characterize the Soviet economic situation as gloomy is to risk grossly understating the
issue.
The sense of decline created by the economic stagnation lies at the heart of
Gorbachev's impetus for revolutionary reform. In his book Perestroika, Mikhail Gorbachev
described his country's alarming economic plunge in strikingly pessimistic terms. He
19
Tbid., 269.
20Ramon Moreno, "Why Perestroika?", FRBSF Weekly Letter, 3 March 1989, 3.
21Anders Aslund, Gorbachev's Struggle for Economic Reform (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1989), 15.
10
observed, "A country that was once quickly closing on the world's advanced nations began
to lose one position after another." n Thomas Naylor, of Duke University, contends that
the world situation has convinced Gorbachev to reevaluate the relative priority of military
policy over economic factors. Naylor writes,
Gorbachev seems to have learned from Japan that the rules of international
politics have changed and that the number of nuclear warheads in a nation's arsenal
is not nearly so important a measure of political power as it once was. Economic
clout has become a more important indicator of political influence than military
might.23
According to Robert Legvold, Gorbachev sees the national security of the USSR tied
directly to the future vigor of the domestic economy. Dr. Legvold proclaims that
Gorbachev's domestic reform program is his most important foreign policy statement.
Legvold notes,
Gorbachev has said since he came to prominence that, unless something is done
to correct economic trends, the Soviet Union will not enter the twenty-first century
? great power worthy of the name. Military might will not do it al me. 24
C. GORBACHEV'S RESPONSE: 'TERESTROIKA"
To resuscitate the staggering Soviet economy, Gorbachev in 1987 unveiled his bold
new program of economic reforms called "perestroika," or "restructuring." The large
^Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World (New
York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1987), 19.
"Thomas H. Naylor, The Gorbachev Strategy: Opening the Closed Society (Lexington,
MA: DC Heath and Company, Inc., 1988), ix.
"Robert Legvold, "War, Weapons, and Soviet Foreign Policy," in Gorbachev's Russia
and American Foreign Policy, ed. Seweryn Bialer and Michael Mandelbaum (Boulder:
Westview Press, Inc., 1988), 102.
11
majority of the original program became effective in June 1987 when the Supreme Soviet
approved by decree two laws, "The Basic Provisions for Fundamentally Reorganizing
Economic Management" and the "Law on State Enterprise." " According to Richard
Ericson, six intermediate objectives can be discerned in this sweeping package of reforms:
• an emphasis on technological modernization, raising the level of Soviet technology
to developed world standards;
• modernizing organizational structures and management methods;
• eliminating the inherently wasteful nature of Soviet production and distribution
activity;
• modernizing the sectoral structure of the economy;
• modifying the structure of consumption and raising the standard of living for
common people, and
• bringing the USSR into the mainstream of the world economy in the direct sense of
participation commensurate with its size and importance. 26
Ericson believes that achieving these highly ambitious intermediate goals demands that,
in the short term, Gorbachev acquires a breathing space to allow the reforms to work, that
he gains and maintains political support for those leaders who favor reform, and that he
releases or acquires resources to devote to "perestroika."
Where will Gorbachev find the vast quantities of resources required for "perestroika"
to succeed? Economist Robert Campbell has conducted a survey of Mikhail Gorbachev's
writings and speeches in an effort to determine what those sources will be. According to
"Anders Aslund, Gorbachev's Struggle for Economic Reform (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1989), 111.
"Richard E. Ericson, "Soviet Economic Reforms: The Motivation and Content of
Perestroika," journal of International Affairs 42 (Spring 1989): 318.
12
Campbell, the initial source of the needed intensive growth must come through either
resource savings or increased productivity. 27 Toward these goals, Gorbachev had
instituted, as early as 1986, campaigns aimed at improving worker discipline, combatting
corruption and discouraging the use of alcohol. All these programs have received mixed
reviews.
As a second means to gain more inputs, Gorbachev emphasized that productivity
improvements can be accomplished by renovating the economy's huge capital stock.
Campbell observes that "...existing productive facilities embody obsolete technologies that
waste labor and intermediate inputs and bind the economy to the production of outdated
products." 28 To improve productivity, planners must increase the ratio of labor to
capital and design more energy-efficient production facilities. Four technologies and their
associated hardware—microelectronics, computers, measuring and control instrumentation,
and information processing—have been identified by planners as having special catalytic
properties for transforming the technology of all the other equipment-producing branches.
Production of these kinds of hard' /are therefore must grow faster than the average rate
for all other machinery. 29 It is no coincidence that all four of the specialized technologies
crucial to rapid economic transformation are derived from the economic sector which was
consolidated in 1987 under the new Bureau of Machine-building. This bureau was set up
under the Council of Ministers in July of that year after two pairs of similar ministries were
27Robert W. Campbell, "The Soviet Future: Gorbachev and the Economy," in Gorbachev





merged 30 Gorbachev himself has proclaimed that the new macrdne-building sector will
be "...the most vital and urgent task for us, even a top priority." 31
D. THE MILITARY FACTOR
The rapid modernization of capital stock, and especially drawing of resources from
the machine-building sector, is bound to cause friction between Gorbachev and the
traditional chief benefactor of the machine-building sector, the Soviet military. Soviet
consumers and the nation's economy as a whole have for decades taken a back seat to
military interests. Furthermore, military interests have long dominated the USSR's foreign
policy priorities as well. Soviet leaders have generally placed inordinate weight on military
objectives and strongly heeded the advice of top Soviet military men.
Under Gorbachev, the Soviet Armed Forces have not enjoyed the preeminent position
which they did under previous Kremlin leaders. One likely contributing factor is that
Gorbachev believes that Soviet military adventurism in the 1970s was largely responsible
for the dismal economic situation which he inherited. Military ventures in Angola and in
the Horn of Africa had gained little for the USSR and had almost certainly further
destabilized the international environment. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in
December 1979 had finally pushed the U.S. too far; after a decade of hopeful strategic arms
negotiations under the umbrella of detente, U.S.-Soviet relations in 1985 seemed at an
impasse. As Robert Legvold notes, "Nowhere in the fusion of arms and Soviet policy was
'"Anders Aslund, Gorbachev's Struggle for Economic Reform (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1989), 114.
3,Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World (New
York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1987), 93.
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more damage done to U.S.-Soviet relations over the last fifteen years than in the Soviet
exploitation of force in Third World crises." 32
Gorbachev's evaluation of the grim domestic and foreign policy situation led him to
adopt an unprecedented outlook on internal and foreign affairs. He is the first Soviet
leader to say and to think that his country cannot pursue its own security at the expense
of others, particularly that of the United States. M By introducing "new thinking," which
encapsulates all of these revolutionary ideas, Gorbachev hoped to break the domestic and
foreign policy deadlock which he inherited. He laid the groundwork for his new policies
in his report to the Twenty-Seventh CPSU Party Congress in February 1986.
An excellent analysis of Gorbachev's speech is offered by Charles Glickham of Radio
Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Mr. Glickham details five major points he derived from
Gorbachev's address:
• a recognition of the existence of "global problems" that could only be resolved by
"cooperation on a worldwide scale;"
• a new, and surprising, stress on the interdependence of states;
• the elaboration of a set of "principled considerations" derived from an examination
of the present world situation;
• a recognition that if the nuclear arms race were to continue, "...even parity will cease
to be a factor of political-military restraint...;" and
• a harsh condemnation of the rigidity of previous Soviet foreign policy 34
"Robert Legvold, "War, Weapons, and Soviet Foreign Policy," in Gorbachev's Russia
and American Foreign Policy, ed. Seweryn Bialer and Michael Mandelbaum (Boulder:
Westview Press, Inc., 1988), 125.
33
Ibid., 103.
^Charles Glickham, "Sources of Security Reconsidered," in Soviet-East European Survey
1986-87, ed. Vojtech Masrny (Boulder: Westview Press, Inc., 1988), 120.
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From his analysis, Mr. Glickham determined that "new thinking" consisted of three
basic components. The first was a revitalization of foreign policy by explicitly rejecting
certain aspects of policy under Brezhnev and emphasizing flexibility in the implementation
of policy objectives. Second, two innovative concepts—global problems and
interdependence—had been placed on the highest political agenda. And third, a
reevaluation had occurred at the highest level on the sources of national security.35 This
reevaluation had yielded the basic conclusions which Gorbachev presented to the Twenty-
Seventh CPSU Party Congress. Gorbachev's central points were that the Soviet Union
could not in a modern world imperiled by nuclear war achieve its own security at the
expense of other nations, and that Soviet foreign policy must henceforth present a
multifaceted approach, with more emphasis placed on political rather than military
objectives. Glickham interprets Gorbachev's call for a multifaceted approach as a tacit
admission that, under Brezhnev, "...the USSR had relied too heavily on the military factor
alone in its foreign policy." 36
It is no coincidence that the Soviet military under Gorbachev has not enjoyed the
dominant role which it did under previous leaders. Even at Konstantin Chernenko's
funeral, only a few military officials were included in the government delegation. The new
general secretary has also dealt with the military in far less subtle ways. When West
German pilot Mathias Rust landed his Cessna 172 in Red Square on 28 May 1987,
Gorbachev lost no time in sacking the defense minister, Marshal Sergei Sokolov, and the






opportunity to peacefully purge the military command structure of Brezhnev holdovers,
Gorbachev named Army General Dmitri Yazov as the new defense minister. Yazov,
although generally an ally to Gorbachev, was only recently promoted to the rank of
marshal, and still has not been given full membership in the Politburo, as have some
previous defense ministers. Many western analysts interpret this non-granting of higher
status as further evidence that the Soviet commander-in-chief is seeking to dinunish the
military's role. Even though it was delayed for almost three years, Yazov's promotion on
28 April 1990 37 will likely be interpreted by some observers as evidence of a resurgence
of the military's influence. At least two respected analysts disagree. Stephen Foye asserts
that Yazov's promotion "...represents another effort by Gorbachev to placate his disgruntled
High Command." 38 Stephen Meyer concurs with Foye's assessment, describing Yazov's
promotion not as a sign of rising influence, but one of tokenism. Meyer claims that the
promotion of the defense minister is "...more likely a gold watch for an impending
retirement." 39 As of this writing, no convincing evidence has emerged which would
suggest a reversal in Gorbachev's efforts to reduce the profile of the military.
But the controversy surrounding today's Soviet military does not end there. A great
debate has arisen inside the USSR and abroad regarding what role Gorbachev intends for
the Soviet Armed Forces to play in the future, the nature of revolutionary new military
concepts, and how the military-industrial complex can contribute to Gorbachev's planned
37Radio Liberty Daily Report, 30 April 1990. Yazov, although now a Marshal, will be
referred to in these pages as Army General, since that was the rank he held at the time.
M
lbid.
39Stephen M. Meyer, "The Army Isn't Running Gorbachev," New York Times, 8 May
1990, A19.
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reforms. The next chapter will examine some of the methods through which Gorbachev
is attempting to divert military resources into the lagging civilian economy.
18
III. THE MAIN OBJECTIVE: CONVERSION OF DEFENSE RESOURCES INTO THE
CIVILIAN ECONOMY
A. GORBACHEV'S MILITARY-RELATED OBJECTIVES IN 'TERESTROIKA"
The previous chapter described the increasingly abysmal condition of the Soviet
domestic economy and explained how economic concerns are a central driving force to
Gorbachev's reform programs. This chapter will describe how Gorbachev intends to divert
resources from the economy's military and military-industrial sectors in an effort to
stimulate the civilian sector. Other issues addressed will include the dependence of the
success of these measures on that of the overall economy, and how these programs may
impact the Soviet military establishment.
Central to Gorbachev's plans to acquire resources for rebuilding the Soviet domestic
economy are two security policies--"reasonable sufficiency" and the "defensive doctrine"—
which will be examined at length in Chapter Five. These two programs will serve a
number of purposes simultaneously. A primary goal will be to reduce defensive
commitments abroad and decrease military expenditures in order to make available
additional resources to the process of economic modernization. These new principles will
also serve as potent propaganda tools for convincing foreign leaders and their publics of
the Kremlin's peaceful intentions. Gorbachev also undoubtedly wishes to buy time for his
domestic reforms to take effect by decreasing international tensions. More directly
connected with his economic reforms, however, are Gorbachev's appeals to Soviet military
leaders that they, too, will benefit from new technological developments as the economic
modernization program begins to bear fruit. During the first three years of the Gorbachev
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era, most Soviet commanders seemed to have supported Gorbachev's reforms. According
to F. Stephen Larrabee of the Institute for East-West Security Studies, the Soviet military
recognizes that a strong economy is a prerequisite for the maintenance of the Soviet
Union's status as a first-class power. They acknowledge that the crucial issue "...is not
gross output but technological change and innovation, particularly the acceleration of
progress in high-technology areas such as computers, microprocessors and electronics." *°
These sectors are considered critical in ensuring that the Soviet Union will be able to
compete with the United States in "leading technologies" such as precision-guided
munitions, sensors and electronic guidance systems, which will dominate tomorrow's high-
technology battlefields.
B. THE BURDEN OF DEFENSE
Since the first days of his administration, Gorbachev has continually warned his
military leaders that the staggering economy must be attended to if the base of Soviet
militar) power is to be preserved. It is rumored that Gorbachev flew to Minsk in July
1985, just four months after taking office, to hold a secret meeting with his key military
leaders. The exact details of that meeting remain a mystery, but Gorbachev reportedly
warned the military chiefs not to expect large increases in the defense budget. 41
Defense spending continues to be a key bone of contention. Western analysts
estimate that between 1965 and 1976, Soviet military spending increased by nearly three
percent annually. A Central Intelligence Agency report presented to the Joint Economic





Committee of Congress in 1976 claimed that Moscow was spending fifteen percent of its
$900 billion annual GNP on defense expenditures. a This staggering sum was roughly
double the amount invested in the civilian sector (about 26 percent of GNP). *3 Although
the annual growth rate decreased in the late 1970s to just over two percent, the share of
GNP devoted to defense actually increased, accounting for between fifteen and seventeen
percent of GNP by the early 1980s, compared to about twelve percent earlier. ** (More
recent statistics on Soviet defense spending are also considered in Chapter Five in relation
to indications of a change in overall Soviet military doctrine.)
Defense outlays have traditionally been a tremendous drain on the Soviet economy
in more than simply monetary terms. It is estimated that weapons procurement consumes
about one-third of machinery production and even larger shares of the high-technology
sectors, such as precision instruments and electronics. w The disproportionately large
share of industrial and high-technology production allocated to defense has diverted
resources from other sectors, has sacrificed capital which might have otherwise been
devoted to future innovation, and helps to account for the low growth of productivity.
Large amounts of the highest-quality materials have been diverted to the military sector,
along with some of the most talented workers. The military's priority claim on the nation's
most productive and valuable resources has deprived the civilian side of the economy of
*2The Soviet Union (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1982), 69.
43U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Estimated Soviet Defense Spending: Trends and
Prospects (Washington, D.C.: CIA, SR-78-10121, 1985), 1.
"U.S. Congress, Subcommittee on Nationa' Security Economics of the Joint Economic
Committee, Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and China-1986, 6. Report given




key inputs needed for rapid technological advance. Vital components such as
microelectronics, computers and information-processing equipment, have before gone
mostly to defense industries.
C. THE MILITARY LINKAGE TO 'TERESTROIKA"
Since he assumed power in 1985, there have been growing signs that Gorbachev sees
a deep interconnection between his program of economic modernization and the need to
restructure the military. Not only has Gorbachev reduced the profile of the military in
important forums, but he also apparently intends to shift vast resources from the defense
establishment into the faltering civilian economy. Dale Herspring observes,
In addition to downplaying public support for the military budget, the Gorbachev
regime has taken the unprecedented step of calling on the armed forces to make a
major contribution—out of their own budgets—in upgrading the civilian economy.46
The significance of this move is underscored by the fact that some of the most powerful
men in the USSR have called for direct military support to implement "perestroika." Prime
Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov, speaking on 18 June 1986, noted that the leadership is
determined to involve all machine-building industries, including the defense industries, in
the building-up of light industry. 47 Another Politburo member, Lev Zaikov, reiterated
Ryzhkov's message while in Irkutsk in July 1986:
46Dale Herspring, "Gorbachev and the Soviet Military," Soviet Foreign Policy (New
York: The Academy of Political Science, 1987): 49.
47
Nikolai Ryzhkov, "Concerning the State Plan for Economic and Social Development
from 1986-90," Pravda, 19 Nov 1986. Quoted in Dale Herspring, "Gorbachev and the Soviet
Military," Soviet Foreign Policy (New York: The Academy of Political Science, 1987): 49.
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It has been decided that the military sector of industry will not only take an active
part in the production of civilian production and nationally needed goods, but also
cooperate in the technical reequipping of light and food industries, public services
and trade. "
Gorbachev intends, therefore, for the military-industrial sector to play a vital role in
economic restructuring. Since he was impressed that the Soviet defense sector has
traditionally performed so much better than the civilian sector, Gorbachev originally
wanted to use the defense sector as a model against which the civilian economy's
performance could be judged. In a book published in 1988, Sergei Zamascikov described
his findings from extensive research on the Soviet reform movement. He outlined three
major ways in which defense industries were intended by Gorbachev to be used to
transform the civilian sector:
• Nikolai Ryzhkov, a former top defense manager, was made the chairman of the
Council of Ministers and put in charge of economic restructuring;
• the system of independent quality-control bodies formerly used only in defense
sectors was introduced into civilian industries; and
• two new "super ministries," the Agricultural-Industrial Complex and the Bureau of
Machine-building, were patterned after a military-industrial organizational model. 49
For reasons that will be explained in a later section of this chapter, the original plan
was largely abandoned in 1988. However, a review of Soviet goals under this program is
"Lev Zaikov, "A Tribute to the Motherland—Stimulus for New Progress," Pravda, 29
June 1986. Quoted in Dale Herspring, "Gorbachev and the Soviet Military," Soviet Foreign
Policy (New York: The Academy of Political Science, 1987): 49.
49Sergei Zamascikov, "Gorbachev and the Soviet Military," in Gorbachev and the Soviet
Future (Boulder: Westview Press, Inc., 1988), 66-67.
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instructive in understanding some of the major factors which will determine the ultimate
success or failure of "perestroika."
A central element in Gorbachev's reform campaign was to have been sharply
upgrading those crucial industries which produce machinery and equipment that in turn
would modernize a host of other industries. This proved to be a gargantuan, and
apparently largely futile, task. To accomplish what Nikolai Ryzhkov called the "retooling
and reconstruction of existing production," the Soviet leaders intended to double the
retirement rate of capital stock and increase capital investment in the machine-building
sector by eighty percent during the Twelfth Five-Year Plan, in relation to the preceding
five-year period. The magnitude of this effort can be appreciated when you realize that
it would have required replacing up to one-half of the nation's machinery stock with new
equipment by 1990. w Soviet planners established lofty targets for raising product quality
during the period from 1986-90; they claimed that by 1990 eighty-five to ninety percent of
all machinery would meet world standards. 51 The newly installed equipment was to have
included doubling the use of lasers, plasmas and other "progressive" technologies, and
adopting digital electronics, robots and a whole host of other highly productive devices
and techniques. K By implementing this wide range of reforms and installing vast
quantities of new capital, the USSR hoped to increase factor productivity, to sharply
increase labor productivity and to encourage domestic production of high-quality, high-
50Alan B. Sherr, The Other Side of Arms Control: Soviet Objectives in the Gorbachev
Era (Boston: Unwin Hyman, Inc., 1988), 50.
51U.S. Congress, Subcommittee on National Security Economics of the Joint Economic
Committee, Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and China-1986, 23. Report by the




technology machines and equipment. A compelling reason for this effort was to halt the
deterioration of Soviet research and development, or R&D, which had occurred at least in
part due to the massive imports of foreign technology under detente in the 1970s. S3 By
increasing the domestic R&D effort, the Soviet leaders intended to break the cycle of
domestic stagnation, reduce dependency on outside infusions of equipment and
technology, and rejuvenate Soviet production of high-quality goods.
D. THE PROBLEM OF RESOURCE CONVERSION
The question of transferring large quantities of resources from defense industries to
the civilian sector is apparently complex and uncertain. Author Alan Sherr has found
several factors which may explain some of the difficulties already encountered by the
Soviets. First, these two spheres of economic activity have in the past operated under very
different rules and conditions. Western economists have long described the Soviet system
as a "dual economy" featuring tight controls on defense-related items and virtually no
quality controls on other products. Second, a possible implication of the present split
system is that the part of the machine-building sector dedicated to serving defense needs
has become so specialized that it could not easily transfer its services to the civilian sector
if ordered to do so. M Over time, this changeover could be accomplished, but time is a
precious commodity' to Gorbachev. Alan Sherr reports that an even more compelling
implication is that the defense sector is designed to take advantage of high-quality
machinery and equipment when, in general, the civilian sector could not efficiently absorb
53Alan B. Sherr, The Other Side of Arms Control: Soviet Objectives in the Gorbachev
Era (Boston: Unwin Hyman, Inc., 1988), 51.
^Ibid., 52-53.
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such resources. 55 It is evident that merely shifting even huge amounts of resources from
the defense sector into the civilian economy will not guarantee the improvements which
Gorbachev desires.
E. THE ROLE OF ARMS CONTROL
Another facet of Gorbachev's strategy to reinvigorate the economy—as well as his
campaign to improve international relations—lies in the area of arms control. A hallmark
of Gorbachev's foreign policy to date has been his vigorous arms negotiations and
streamlining and enervation of the arms control process. Success in arms negotiations
brings multiple benefits to Gorbachev's reform program. Achievements in negotiations
such as the signing of the 'Treaty on Intermediate and Shorter-Range Missiles" with the
U.S. in December 1987, increase Gorbachev's prestige and his political capital at home and
abroad. Arms negotiations not only help to stabilize the international climate, but also
secure for Gorbachev badly needed time for his domestic reforms to take effect. (In
addition, a not insignificant factor is that successful arms agreements and other foreign
policy victories tend to divert Soviet public attention away from troubles at home.)
Improved international relations engender a spirit of cooperation and encourage foreign
investment in the Soviet Union. New business ventures inside the USSR deliver badly
needed technology and additional capital to the country. Finally, any resources freed from
defense commitments—such as monetary outlays, equipment and manpower—subsequently
become available for use in the civilian economy.
However, just as there are complications in transferring technology from the defense




reductions of offensive nuclear missiles, for example, will automatically invigorate the
Soviet civilian economy. Alan Sherr has extensively researched the issue of what impact
freeing large amounts of such resources will have upon the Soviet civilian sector. He has
determined that the amount of resources dedicated to strategic nuclear weapons amounted
to only slightly more than ten percent of total defense spending. After extensive
calculations, Sherr projected that a total elimination of the entire Soviet ICBM force, and
the shutting down of all existing ICBM production facilities, would result in a savings
equal in magnitude to nearly one percent of Soviet GNP. **
Since a total elimination of all Soviet ICBMs is highly improbable, Sherr also
computed the savings made available if only fifty percent of those nuclear missiles were
eliminated. At first glance, the result would appear to amount to one-half of one percent
of GNP; however, actual savings would be even less, because they would be realized
largely in the forms of operational and maintenance costs of older weapon systems rather
than in the research, development, procurement, and operating costs for new missiles. In
the final analysis, Sherr estimates that a fifty percent reduction in missiles would yield an
overall savings of substantially less that one-fourth of one percent of GNP. w In strictly
monetary terms, then, Sherr declared that resource allocations based on this magnitude of
savings in defense would have almost no impact on overall economic growth in the near
term.
Alan Sherr then took his analysis one step farther; he examined the hypothesis that




through strictly monetary considerations, but if the resources freed in this manner were
the same ones most crucial to relieving bottlenecks in the Soviet civilian sector. In this
regard, Sherr sought to determine resources that were currently consumed by the military
sector which:
• are sorely needed for machine-building;
• are not readily available from sources outside the machine-building sector, and
• would be used in civilian applications sufficiently similar to the military applications
to hold out high prospects of successful transfer.58
As it happened, a joint analysis by the CIA and DIA in 1986 had identified a set of
resources which conformed to Sherr's criteria. These resources included: engineering
fibers; microelectronics, microelectronic components and microprocessors; engineering
plastics; computer programmers; electronics technicians, and software engineers. " A
comparison of the resources described in the CIA-D1A repoi t with those required in the
production, acquisition and operation of nuclear missiles revealed that many of the same
resources determined as crucial to revitalizing the Soviet civilian economy are heavily
absorbed in the deployment of nuclear missiles. As a result, Alan Sherr declared that
nuclear weapon systems "...are positioned at a crucial juncture of the [Soviet] economy
where bottlenecks will almost inevitably develop..." and that "...deep reductions in nuclear
58
Ibid., 57-58.
"U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and Defense Intelligence Agency, Gorbachev's
Economic Program: Problems Emerge, a report to the Joint Economic Committee, U.S.
Congress, 13 April 1988. Quoted in Alan Sherr, The Other Side of Arms Control: Soviet
Objectives in the Gorbachev Era (Boston: Unwin Hyman, Inc., 1988), 57-58.
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weapons spending could have a significant impact on the implementation of civilian
economic modernization." *°
A second point given less emphasis by Alan Sherr is the savings in defense resources
which could be garnered through significant reductions in conventional, rather than
nuclear, forces. The large-scale conventional forces of the Soviet military establishment
absorb a proportionately much larger share of GNP than do the nation's nuclear forces.
For this reason, Gorbachev stands to gain far more from the ongoing unilateral force
reductions in Eastern Europe than simply lessening international tensions. The amount of
resources which can be saved through these unilateral reductions is, I believe, a very
important factor in Gorbachev's decision to cut back Soviet defense commitments abroad.
Furthermore, it is likely that the USSR would significantly reduce conventional forces
stationed abroad even in the absence of conventional arms talks now under way. The far-
reaching implications of this point will not be addressed in this thesis, but should have an
important bearing on U.S. decisionmaking in such forums as START, CFE, etc. For the
purposes jf this study, it is sufficient to note that Gorbachev will likely continue to draw
down the USSR's bloated conventional forces in order to divert greater amounts of
resources into the civilian sector.
F. HUMAN RESOURCES
Gorbachev's proposed military reductions could have yet another highly significant
impact on the economic modernization process—the freeing up of manpower. In December
1988, in a speech to the United Nations in New York City, Gorbachev announced huge
^Alan B. Sherr, The Other Side of Arms Control: Soviet Objectives in the Gorbachev
Era (Boston: Unwin Hyman, Inc., 1988), 58.
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future unilateral troop reductions. The Kremlin leader declared that the Soviet Union
would soon reduce Soviet active duty forces in Eastern Europe by 500,000 troops, or almost
fifteen percent. 61 It is unclear at this time what percentage of these forces will be
disbanded once they return to the USSR, but a significant percentage likely will be. The
question arises of how easily this freed-up manpower can be absorbed into the Soviet
economy.
At least one prominent Soviet official has expressed concern in this regard. Victor
Gelovani, a member of Moscow's Institute for Systems Studies in the Soviet Academy of
Sciences, foresees difficulties as the Kremlin's planned military cuts become a reality.
Gelovani predicts "...a big problem of conversion arising from bringing into the Soviet civil
service [sic] half a million people from the military." 62 Many of these young men, as
Gelovani points out, will have to be retrained before they can enter the civilian economy.
Many articles expressing similar concerns on the separation of thousands of young men
from the Soviet military, have continued to appear since 1988.
Another matter further complicates this situation. Since the USSR has until very
recently denied that unemployment even existed there, the nation has never developed any
sort of referral system for unemployed workers. It seems that now a move is under way
to set up just such a service. In May 1989, the deputy director of the Soviet Union's USA
and Canada Institute revealed Soviet action in this area. Andrei Kokoshin, testifying before
the U.S. House Armed Services Committee in May 1989, announced that he would soon
"Robert Legvold, "The Revolution in Soviet Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs 68 (Winter
1988/89): 95.
"Rushworth M. Kidder, "Consumer Needs Challenge USSR," Christian Science Monitor.
28 July 1989, 12.
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chair a commission which will help monitor the upcoming troop cuts and direct
government efforts to find adequate housing, jobs and schools for the families of soldiers
returning to civilian life. 63 A flood of new labor into the Soviet Union is not necessarily
a boon to the economy; if Gorbachev's moves to increase labor productivity through
increased mechanization and use of robots is successful, a significant percentage of the
work force already in place may lose their jobs. Five hundred thousand more young men
entering the work force in a short period of time could have severe consequences and
further complicate the already tenuous situation.
G. SOME INITIAL FAILURES
This chapter has so far described how Mikhail Gorbachev intends to divert resources
from the military-industrial sector in an attempt to revitalize the Soviet civilian economy.
As previously mentioned, some aspects of Gorbachev's original programs have already
been scrapped. One example is the plan to dramatically upgrade product quality by using
military industries as a model for the civilian sector. This scheme ultimately failed, but a
close examination of this program is very instructive and helps us comprehend some of
the immense obstacles faced by Gorbachev in implementing "perestroika."
As described by author Anders Aslund, this program (which became known as
"gospriemka," or "state acceptance") was originally promoted by Lev Zaikov, Central
Committee Secretary for Economic Affairs and for Military Machine-building.64
"Gospriemka" was actually a governmental organ founded to enforce qualitative standards
"Jeffrey Smith, "Soviet Analyst Predicts Military Production Cut," Washington Post, 10
May 1989, A34.
"Anders Aslund, Gorbachev's Struggle for Economic Reform (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1989), 77.
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at state enterprises producing the most important commodities and consumer goods. The
body was established on 12 May 1986 when the Central Committee and the Council of
Ministers adopted a decree "On Measures to Fundamentally Raise the Quality of
Production." 65 Launched in November 1986, "gospriemka" was intended to be a harsh
measure, with inspectors mercilessly reducing the wages of workers and the earnings of
enterprises whose products failed to achieve the required high standards of quality. Effects
of this program were far-reaching because it was extended to include 1500 enterprises in
28 different ministries. According to Anders Aslund, the problem with this system was
that it worked too well; in the first months of the program, from 15-18 percent of all
products failed to pass initial inspection and, in 1987, outputs nominally worth about six
billion rubles were rejected altogether. 66 The impact on output volumes was dramatic.
In January 1987, the production of civilian rnachine-building fell sharply by 7.9 percent.
Production recovered slightly in the following month, but overall outputs remained very
low. "Gospriemka" was the obvious villain. Alarming reports appeared about controllers
who stopped production for days at a time. In many places, output targets were not
reached and workers were refused their standard bonuses. Enterprise bosses scrambled
to attribute the shortcomings to various culprits: they complained of bureaucratic "red
tape" and unjustified production delays, unreasonably high standards, and defective inputs.
Even equipment captured from Germany in the form of war reparations after World War
Two, was blamed as being obsolete. "Gospriemka" was the dominant economic theme




as Zaikov and Gorbachev. In the wake of such tremendous production shortages,
however, the publicity ceased and the controls eased. 67
Although it was reduced in profile, "gospriemka" was not discarded. Instead,
inspectors began to concentrate not on the quality of final products but on that of designs,
organization and inputs. In 1988, "gospriemka" was expanded to include over 700 more
enterprises, and Gorbachev and Zaikov continued to endorse the program. However,
Anders Aslund writes that the quality control system had already been perceived as a
failure, although its sponsors were unwilling to give it up entirely.68 The program was
ultimately quashed not because it did not work, but because it pointed out just how
corrupt and inefficient the rnachine-building sector was. However, the resulting declines
in gross output and the accompanying cuts in workers' bonuses were deemed politically
unacceptable. Aslund speculates that workers' strikes which erupted in the wake of the
denied bonuses became widespread enough to threaten paralysis of the overall economy,
and, in this scenario, the program's sponsors relented. By the end of 1988, "gospriemka"
passed from the jcene. 69
The case of "gospriemka" highlights many of the systemic weaknesses which have
so far proven so damaging to Gorbachev's plans for economic recovery. The program
produced the results which its designers intended. The inspectors were conscientious and
effective in their work, and their reports pointed out many enterprises and enterprise
divisions which were grossly mismanaged or corrupt. Ultimately, the public outcry of






leadership chose to condemn the quality control system rather than to correct the
shortcomings which the inspectors uncovered. This case points out in dramatic fashion
some of the deep-rooted problems of the present Stalinist economy. For example, it reveals
that mid-level bureaucrats are well-entrenched, that the leadership deeply fears unleashing
widespread worker strikes, and, most importantly, that a great inertia exists to resist any
reforms to the present system. In Aslund's words, "...the system itself rejected the new
quality control as an alien body, since it endangered plan fulfillment on a large scale." n
Gorbachev's backing of this particular scheme failed, but one failure should not be
interpreted to mean that the overall rationale of economic reform is faulty. Under closer
scrutiny, the selection for improvement of the machine-building sector as a means to
stimulate the overall Soviet economy is very logical and practical. Indeed, although its
analysts have continually criticized Gorbachev's overall reform program, the U.S. Central
Intelligence Agency has credited Gorbachev as having correctly selected the machine-
building sector as the area most crucial for significant expansion of capital productivity.
In essence, the CIA found that only great progress in the machine-building and other high-
technology sectors can reinvigorate the USSR's economy. n However, the CIA predicted
that even these measures would ultimately fail since simply investing more heavily in the
maclune-building sector to speed production of new equipment does not come to grips
with the basic problem, the failure of the Soviet system to foster sufficient innovation and
risk-taking. n Producing more high-technology machinery and equipment will not be an
^Ibid.
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effective solution if plant managers are not given the time, training and incentive to use
them efficiently. And even spectacular successes in the vital madhme-building sector will
not alone guarantee survival for the overall economy.
H. A 'TERESTROIKA" REPORT CARD
Initial indications for the first full year of Gorbachev's tenure revealed an upturn in
economic performance and gave hope that "perestroika" might be working. The GNP grew
by more than four percent in 1986, with agriculture and industry leading the way to the
best showings in almost a decade. 73 Another key point is that machine-building grew
by 4.4 percent in 1986; that was, however, only slightly higher than the rate of 4.2 percent
in 1985, and was almost certainly a disappointment to Soviet economic planners. Probably
the single most important factor in the growth of industrial output (which amounted to
3.6 percent) was a sharp rise in labor productivity which was thought to be due to the anti-
alcohol campaign and a toughening of labor discipline. 7* However, some western
economists were unconvince d of Soviet successes; they attributed these dramatic statistics
to "...a lot of luck and perhaps a little sleight of hand..." n Suspicions to that effect grew
even more when 1987 statistics revealed an economic growth rate of only one-half of one
percent; the Five-Year Plan had called for a growth rate of a minimum of 4.1 percent. 76
Initial indicators for 1988 only added to the confused picture. In the continuing
economic roller coaster, Soviet data for 1988 revealed that GNP had dramatically improved
73
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over the figures for 1987; GNP in 1988 had grown by five percent. n This reportedly
marked the strongest economic showing in ten years. In the two critical areas of retail
sales and consumer savings, the growth rates were seven percent and eleven percent,
respectively. Even more impressive—and absolutely essential to civilian economic
revitalization—the critical rnachine-building sector grew by 6.3 percent. n
A published Soviet report released in July 1989 initially seemed to provide some
evidence that "perestroika" had still yielded marginal progress in the first half of that year.
As described in an article by economist John Tedstrom, the report stated that there had
been some growth of economic output during the first half of 1989. The USSR State
Committee for Statistics (Goskomstat) claimed that a good deal of that growth resulted
from reducing military expenditures and converting military production capacity to civilian
purposes. n Although that may be true, according to John Tedstrom some of the
statistics revealed in this report were highly inflated to support Soviet claims of continued
economic success. For instance, Tedstrom notes that the favorable increases in national
income contained in the report were based on the official inflation rate of two percent,
while the actual inflation rate was more on the order of seven to ten percent. Tedstrom
claimed that "real economic growth so far this year is much less than reported and could
even be negative." M He concluded that the Soviet economic situation as of mid-1989
seemed to be worsening, with inflation accelerating rapidly. Tedstrom's findings would
^Richard Parker, "Assessing Perestroika," World Policy Journal 6 (Spring 1989): 277.
""Ibid.
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seem to reinforce the claims of other western economists that actual Soviet economic
performance under "perestroika" has been significantly worse than that claimed by the
Kremlin. Furthermore, according to the author, the Soviet government throughout this
period continued to postpone enacting the revolutionary steps required to salvage the
lagging economy and improve the lot of the Soviet consumer.81
This latter predicament was described in some detail in a highly acclaimed article
written by "Z" in late 1989. K According to the author, the Soviet leadership has
continually postponed sweeping economic reforms because to do so would entail running
a high risk of unleashing social chaos and perhaps even revolution. One of the most
difficult obstacles faced by the Kremlin leadership is the question of reducing or
eliminating entirely heavy state subsidies on basic consumer goods and housing, which the
government has financed for decades in order to help pacify the Soviet populace. The
dilemma which confronts the Kremlin leadership is this: heavy state subsidies cannot be
abolished without drastically increasing prices and risking rampant inflation. But unless
these subsidies are abolished, or at least reduced, the economy cannot move to real prices;
and without real prices there can be no dilution of the Stalinist system by marketization
or privatization. 83 "Z" asserts that the end result of over four years of "perestroika" has
been that the half-reforms introduced so far have unsettled the old economic structures
without putting new ones in their place. The author concludes that "...Gorbachev is left
81
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with the worst of two possible worlds: an old one [system] that refuses to die and a new
one without the strength to be born." M
I. PROGNOSES FOR "PERESTROIKA"
The findings of John Tedstrom and "Z" fall into step with those of many other
western economists. Another analyst, Gertrude Schroeder, characterizes Gorbachev's
economic reforms through 1988 as half-measures which will achieve at best only partial
success. She states, "In the long run, Gorbachev will be disappointed in the present
package of reforms, which do not go nearly far enough to achieve his ambition of creating
a dynamic, self-regulating 'economic mechanism' capable of narrowing the technological
gap with the West." 85 Dr. Steven Rosefielde of the University of North Carolina concurs
with Gertrude Schroeder that the prospects for the current Stalinist economic model are
hopeless and that the USSR has no choice but to radically alter the present system.
Rosefielde believes, moreover, that the USSR's economy faces so many obstacles that even
abandonment of the current system in favor of a rapid transition to market commi Jiism
is almost certainly destined to fail. He terms the chances of significant economic reform
in the USSR as "extremely bleak." 86
Anders Aslund reports that the Soviet leadership has been well aware of the poor
showings of "perestroika" all along. For example, at the 19th CPSU Party Conference in
June 1988, Deputy Prime Minister Leonid Abalkin soberly sized up the situation: "...a
M
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radical breakthrough in the economy has not occurred and [the economy] has not departed
from its state of stagnation."87 Faced with continued lackluster progress, Abalkin and
Gorbachev's other economic advisers continued to search for alternate means of improving
the system According to Anders Aslund, three possible scenarios most likely will serve
as future Soviet economic models. The first is "radicalized economic reform with far-
reaching democratization," a model which would press ahead farther toward a market
economy and incorporate such features as ownership of private property and increased
democratization. A second scenario provides for a "reactionary or neo-Stalinist system"
which would improve economic performance marginally by employing repressive
measures, greater discipline and increased centralization, most likely in the wake of
Gorbachev's ouster. Finally, a third model, called "Brezhnevite," would "muddle through"
using reforms already introduced without much more repression and without major
economic or political reforms. 88 Aslund believes that one of the first two scenarios will
most likely be chosen by the Soviets to alter the existing system.
Indeed, during the fall of 1989, Deputy Prime Minister Abalkin appeared to be
promoting a more radical reform plan which would move quickly toward a market
economy and allow true market regulation of prices and allocation of resources through
supply and demand. 89 This push toward more radical economic reform increasingly
came under fire, however, due to continued poor performance by those programs already
in place. According to the results of a public opinion poll administered in the autumn of
87Pravda, 30 June 1988. Quoted in Anders Aslund, Gorbachev's Struggle for Economic
Reform (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), 178.
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1989, Soviet citizens have become increasingly pessimistic about the prospects for
"perestroika" and are uncertain whether implementation of the program should continue.
Results of the poll were mixed, and demonstrated-more than anything else-a complete
lack of understanding of basic economics by the average Soviet citizen. Some of the more
meaningful results included bad news for Gorbachev. Of those polled, 52 percent said the
country's economic situation has grown "significantly worse" in the last three years. w
Invited to assess blame for the state of the economy, 13 percent said the fault lay mostly
with "mistakes of the period of perestroika," while some 46 percent more said that current
and past mistakes were "equally to blame." 91 According to this poll then, some 59
percent of Soviet citizens placed at least partial blame for the current economic crisis on
the measures introduced under "perestroika." Although I believe these statistics to be
inconclusive, they do seem to support the claims of many western economists that the
majority of the Soviet public now blames the Gorbachev administration for the country's
economic woes. **
J. DECEMBER 1989: PERMANENT SETBACK OR MERELY A TACTICAL
RETREAT?
Against this background, the Soviet leadership in December 1989 faced a crucial
decision-whether to slow down or accelerate the transformation of the centrally
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administered economy into a market economy. The announcement on 14 December 1989
of the nation's Thirteenth Five-Year Plan revealed that a high-level decision had been
made to at least temporarily postpone more radical economic reforms. This announcement
by Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov followed closely on the heels of a Central Committee
meeting on 9 December. In the earher meeting, a more radical economic plan—proposed
by Abalkin and reportedly sponsored by Gorbachev—was soundly defeated by conservative
members who then embraced the alternative, more conservative, model announced by
Ryzhkov. 9? In his public statement, Ryzhkov listed four main reasons for the country's
poor economic condition which he said determined the nature of the adopted plan. Those
reasons were: underestimation of the scale and complexity of problems encountered in
heavy industry coupled with a low level of innovation; insufficient elaboration of the new
economic mechanism and its lack of proper economic controls; basic "mistakes" in the
reform plan, such as the anti-alcohol campaign and the "inconsistent" fight against
unearned income, and industrial disruption caused by strikes, interethnic conflicts and
other civil unrest. 94 As described by Ryzhkov, the new plan is divided into two phases.
In the first phase, from 1990-92, a significant shift is envisioned for the transfer of large
amounts of resources into the production of consumer goods and to improve the financial
standing of the country. Only after 1993, during the second phase, would more radical
reforms such as market-driven prices be employed. Ryzhkov's description of those
measures and how they would be implemented seemed extremely vague. 95
93Anders Aslund, "The Soviet Economy: From Bad to Worst," Washington Post National
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Interpretations of the results of this recent defeat of "perestroika" have varied widely
among a number of authorities. John Tedstrom sees the December maneuver as a decided
setback for Gorbachev's reforms. He predicts that a failure to employ more radical reforms
in the next year will strengthen the position of more conservative forces who favor a
complete abandonment of "perestroika." 96 In a recent article, economist Anders Aslund
also interprets the results of the December announcement as a significant defeat for
Gorbachev, and foresees an increasingly bleak economic situation for the USSR with the
ouster of Gorbachev very likely. 97 To avoid an ultimate political defeat, Aslund predicts
that Gorbachev may give up his post as CPSU General Secretary but stay on as President
of the USSR, a position whose powers were considerably broadened after Gorbachev was
elected to the office in March.
There are growing signs that such a move may be exactly what Gorbachev has in
mind. The shrewd Kremlin leader seems to be distancing himself more and more from a
Communist Party which he may view as increasingly discredited in the eyes of the Soviet
populace. For instance, in his acceptance speech after being elected to the office of
President in March, Gorbachev made only one fleeting reference to the CPSU, a move very
much out of character with typical official statements. My own interpretation is that
Gorbachev will abandon the party only if he believes that he has sufficiently strengthened
the new "executive presidency" into a position more powerful than that of the general
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K. A NEW SPRING OFFENSIVE?
Events in the last weeks of March 1990 seemed to indicate that Gorbachev was
planning once again to renew his push for radical economic reform. Despite the setback
in December, Gorbachev apparently decided that radical reform cannot be forestalled until
the mid-1990s, as envisioned in the conservative five-year plan. On March 27, Gorbachev
declared, "It is obvious that new approaches and decisive steps in the economy are needed
today." w This call by Gorbachev was probably spurred on partly by even gloomier
economic reports from December-February, which revealed that overall production had
slumped more each month due to mass absenteeism, work stoppages, and ethnic
conflicts"
An earlier report, described in the New York Times on 20 March, stated that
Gorbachev has submitted a new package of seventeen emergency economic plans with the
aim of enacting those measures no later than July 1, 1990. The author, Francis Clines,
interprets this move as an indication that Gorbachev wants to quickly assert his new
executive powers to aid the ailing economy. 10° According to Clines, the initial Soviet
report did not indicate the timetable for enactment of these measures, nor did it explicitly
state that all central planning would be curtailed. Very interestingly, the report did
indicate that the Soviet Government was closely monitoring the economic progress of
Poland, where economist Jeffrey Sachs has advised that country to enact swift adoption of
market-style reforms which have already caused great economic hardships for the Polish
""Linda Feldmann, "Gorbachev Outlines Urgent Economic Reforms," Christian Science
Monitor, 29 March 1990, 3.
"Ibid.
100Francis X. Clines, "Moscow Is Said to Consider Urgent Economic Measures," New
York Times, 20 March 1990, A7.
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people. Clines reports that Interfax, a Soviet press agency, claims that an economic plan
similar to that already adopted in Poland has been determined to be "most fitting for our
country at this moment, when the time for more mild reforms has expired." 1(n
Here, again, the Kremlin leadership faces a cruel dilemma. As mentioned previously,
salvaging the Soviet economy requires introducing new and, by Soviet standards,
revolutionary, market mechanisms, but unleashing these mechanisms will lead to a further
erosion of the Soviet people's already meager standard of living. The Polish government
under the leadership of Prime Minister Mazowiecki and with the help of Lech Walesa will
likely be able to salvage that nation's economy by introducing very harsh market forces
which at least in the short term will cause great deprivations for the Polish people. Such
a system will probably work in Poland, if for no other reason than the Polish people have
a great deal of trust in the government's leadership, which translates into considerable
legitimacy for the Mazowiecki government. The Soviet government has no such legitimacy
with its people, and as time goes on, their patience wears thinner. This conclusion is one
of several themes highlighted in the famous "Z" article of late 1989. According to the
author, the faith of the Soviet people has been steadily eroded as Gorbachev's reform
programs, especially "glasnost," or "openness," has exposed more and more of the evils of
the Stalinist system and its history. "Z" writes that, despite Gorbachev's herculean efforts,
the entire Soviet system has reached an impasse, and that it "...cannot be restructured or
reformed, but can only either stagnate or be dismantled and replaced by market
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Despite such ominous assessments, throughout March and early April, rumors
circulated in Moscow that Gorbachev was planning just such a form of "shock therapy" to
energize the lagging economy. And then, without warning, the Kremlin seemed again to
lose its collective nerve. After a two-day Cabinet meeting where the new proposals were
aired, President Gorbachev and his advisers announced that the transition to a market
economy would take place gradually, and only after "painstaking public discussions" were
held. ,03 During the next month, Gorbachev seemed to sharply contradict himself
regarding his economic policy. On the second day of a whirlwind trip through the Urals—
which reportedly was an attempt to drum-up public support for "perestroika"—the Soviet
president sounded a note of alarm: "If we do not get out of the system we're in—excuse my
rough talk—then everything living in our society will die..we will begin to asphyxiate." 104
Yet, at another stop on the same trip, Gorbachev took a much more conservative position,
and obviously distanced himself from the more radical economic proposals which would
be necessary for marked economic reform. He stated, "I cannot support such ideas, no
matter how decisive and revolutionary they might appear. These are irresponsible ideas,
irresponsible." 105
The path toward economic recovery has almost always been very troubled and the
issues sometimes hard to sort out, but the reports which have emerged in the past few
months are, quite frankly, baffling. It now appears that an intense debate is under way
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between those who contend that a great leap toward implementing market forces would
create chaos and possibly bring down the government, and those who argue that the
nation's economic woes will only worsen if true market measures are delayed further.
Where Gorbachev stands in this controversy remains unclear.
The leadership's decision on this latest round of economic policymaking will hold
many profound implications for "perestroika" and for Mikhail Gorbachev. If Anders
Aslund is correct, Gorbachev may soon shift his base of power from the CPSU to the
newly strengthened presidency. A renewed strong show of support for these latest
measures by Gorbachev would also almost certainly lead to a showdown between him and
more conservative forces, including Yegor Ligachev. Above all, I would interpret a
renewed push by Gorbachev to mean that the Kremlin leader has decided that dramatic
systemic reform can no longer be postponed. This is certainly not the only reason why
Gorbachev would make such a move now, but it seems to me that Gorbachev would
ordinarily be far more concerned with more immediate issues like the threat of secession
from the Baltic states and rising nationalist movements elsewhere. Using the terminology
proposed by Gertrude Schroeder, I would rate those measures implemented so far by
Gorbachev as "half-measures," and the provisions of the newest economic package do not
seem to be any more decisive. But the Kremlin leadership, including Gorbachev,
dreadfully fears that the implementation of true market forces will unleash civil unrest, and
I do not believe they will introduce radical reforms unless they feel compelled to do so.
If in the near future Gorbachev decides to risk far-reaching economic changes, it would
indicate to me that he feels he must take drastic steps to improve the economy now, or risk
losing the very base of Soviet power. That would only reinforce my conviction that the
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central driving force to all of Gorbachev's reforms has been, and remains, economic in
nature.
L. 'TERESTROIKA"-THE DANGER FROM WITHIN
In my estimation, the single greatest danger to "perestroika" and to its godfather,
Gorbachev, lies in the very reforms which the Kremlin leader unleashed to reinforce his
own reform program. In an effort to increase public support and encourage greater
productivity and labor discipline, Gorbachev instituted a sweeping array of democratic
measures, allowing, for example, public protests and the first semi-legitimate legislative
elections since 1917. Over the last three years, the relaxation of coercion has encouraged
not only the desired public interest, but also has brought on dreaded nationalist uprisings
and paralyzing worker strikes. In early 1990, Mikhail Gorbachev has seemingly painted
himself into a policy corner, having denounced the very use of military force to which he
may have to resort if he is to preserve what remains of the crumbling Soviet Empire. True,
Gorbachev did order limited military sctions against Lithuania, but he has so far showr
great restraint in comparison to measures which any of his predecessors would certainly
have resorted to by now. Gorbachev is walking a shaky political tightrope. He
desperately wants to avoid widespread violence and bloodshed which would wreck his
plans for economic interaction with the West. But if he allows actions which further
destabilize the country's political situation or increase the economic suffering of the
populace, he risks losing all control. It is precisely this loss of control which could lead to
Gorbachev's ouster or, in the least, convince him to abandon his reform programs and
order a crackdown on the troubled Soviet populace. For the West, a miscalculation in
foreign policy regarding Eastern Europe could mean increased tensions with Moscow or
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perhaps even a renewal of the Cold War. For Gorbachev, a miscalculation in dealings with
any one of a number of troublesome issues—mainly nationalist uprisings like that in
Lithuania-could mean a total disintegration of Soviet power or even civil war. If
Gorbachev reaches a point where he is convinced that further political and economic
reforms pose an undue risk of widespread popular unrest or civil war, let there be no
doubt, he will abandon "perestroika."
M. THE QUESTION OF MILITARY SUPPORT
As the Kremlin continues to divert precious resources into the civilian sector, the
continued support of the Soviet military will remain very important to Mikhail Gorbachev.
But as he continues to chip away at the military's stockpiles, Gorbachev is certain to
encounter mounting opposition. As early as 1986, there were rumblings of discontent in
military circles against forthcoming military budget cuts. Those rumblings grew steadily
in 1987-88 and some senior officers openly voiced their concerns over the announced cuts.
Gorbachev's announcement in December 1988 of his intention to withdraw 500,000 troops
from Eastern Europe was followed almost immediately by a second announcement of a
fourteen percent reduction in the USSR's military budget and a nineteen percent cut in
weapons procurement. 106 According to one news story, even Army General Dmitri
Yazov, generally a supporter of Gorbachev's reforms, subsequently had misgivings on the
policies of his commander-in-chief. 107
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Late in 1989, General Yazov and other military leaders began to voice their objections
more loudly. For example, in September 1989, Yazov stated,
It is economically groundless and politically shortsighted.. .to try to make
reduction of defense expenditures the sole means to liquidate the budget deficit and
resolve all of today's social problems. 108
The defense minister's comments, though qualified somewhat, are nonetheless quite critical
when compared to earlier statements. It is likely that the military's leadership is becoming
more alarmed over defense reductions amidst the wave of nationalist uprisings which have
erupted across the USSR in the last year. Another cause for the rising hostility, according
to author Stephen Foye, is the military's growing perception that conversion of resources
from the defense sector into the civilian economy, is meeting with only minimal successes. 1OT
This apparent mounting opposition to "perestroika" within military circles adds one more
problem to the sea of hostility besieging the Kremlin leader.
Gorbachev has warned his military leaders all along that they will have to, in
essence, do more with less, in order to preserve the Soviet economic base. Senior Soviet
military leaders continue to support a large military establishment and will in the short run
attempt to preserve a sizeable military budget. However, they will eventually be forced
to accept increased reductions in spending and perhaps even a drastic alteration of the
military establishment. Even if Gorbachev's plans for economic recovery succeed, the
accompanying political reforms unleashed under "new thinking" will subject the heretofore
108Army General D. Yazov, "Armed Forces: How the Reductions Are Going," Izvestiya,
17 September 1989, 2. Quoted in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (henceforth cited
as "FBIS") FBIS-SOV-89-179, 18 September 1989, 2.
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sacred cow of the Soviet military budget to greater scrutiny from civilian "think tanks" and
a more aware and educated public. On the other hand, if the economy does not improve,
the military budget will be further reduced in order to divert more and more resources to
salvage the civilian economy. In sum, although some of his original programs for
diversion of resources from military stocks into the civilian economy foundered, Gorbachev
has and will continue to reduce military expenses in favor of improving the civilian sector
and to promote better international relations. His success in influencing western opinion
will be the subject of the next chapter.
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IV. WHAT THE WEST THINKS ABOUT "NEW THINKING"
The mass of new policies evolving from Mikhail Gorbachev's program of "new
thinking" is immense and the pace at which they have been proposed has been dizzying.
Previous chapters have reviewed specific military and economic policies and their likely
implications for the Soviet domestic situation. This chapter will briefly analyze western
reaction to Gorbachev's overall program of "new thinking." In these pages, I will review
what I consider to be a representative sampling of western opinion taken from a variety
of books, journal articles and newspaper accounts from 1986 to the present. I have
arranged the surveyed writings into three groups. Viewed as a continuum, the groups
represent a broad spectrum of opinions on the motives for, and veracity of, Gorbachev's
revolutionary programs.
A. THE NON-BELIEVERS
Perhaps the darkest interpretation of Gorbachev's initiatives is summarized in an
article entitled "New Soviet Thinking Is Not Good News." The author, a Frenchman
writing under the pseudonym of Jean Quatras, paints a gloomy picture of Gorbachev's
programs and his motives in offering compromises to the West. Quatras portrays
Gorbachev as a wolf in sheep's clothing. According to the author, the new Soviet
proposals are not new, but are now being restated in terms more pleasing to western ears.
Quatras dezlares, "Gorbachev's skill lies in his ability to present traditional doctrine in
appealing terms..." He states that, in all likelihood, "...there has not been a real turning
point in Soviet thinking; instead, observers see a new subtlety of language for strictly
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tactical purposes." "° The author points out that Gorbachev's escalation of rhetoric on
such issues as "mutuality" and "globalism" closely coincided with successive Soviet
campaigns against nuclear modernization and INF deployments, and especially against
President Ronald Reagan's proposed Strategic Defense Initiative. Quatras believes that the
Soviets plan to "...consecrate a decoupling between Europe and the United States ...to lead
the Europeans...into a kind of political complacency vis-a-vis Moscow." m Quatras
counsels extreme caution in reading and acting upon Gorbachev's proposals. He sums up
his own opinion of the new Soviet proposals on a somber note: "The Soviets offer bait in
the form of great institutional schemes or huge programs that are essentially
declaratory." 112
Another Frenchman offers a slightly less pessimistic appraisal of Gorbachev's
reforms. Pierre Hassner, research director at Paris's Fondation Nationale des Sciences
Politiques, concludes that Gorbachev's reforms reflect past Soviet proposals cloaked in
more western-sounding terms. He characterized "new thinking" as being reactive in
nature. Hassner says of the new Kremlin leader:
Gorbachev is neither an anonymous product of an unchanging system nor a
heroic reformer secretly won over by liberal values. Above all, he ought to be seen
as 'the great co-opter,' concurrently the agent and the instrument of a dialectic
mixing both adaptation and manipulation. 113
Hassner is especially distrustful of Soviet motives in the military sphere; he states,
"°Jean Quatras (pseud), "New Soviet Thinking Is Not Good News," Washington
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Whether Gorbachev's intentions are defensive or offensive, the USSR certainly has
an interest in blocking new strategies for NATO as well as European military
cooperation so as to emerge as the dominant power on a demilitarized continent. 114
The author sternly warns that the West should remain firm and offer compromises of its
own "...only when concrete actions follow Soviet promises and when structural changes
follow gestures or good graces." 115
A fear that the West is being lured to compromise its security by a Gorbachev siren
emerges as a prevalent theme among a number of prominent and respected western
authorities. In a 4 August 1989 interview on Cable News Network's program "Crossfire,"
former American Secretary of State Alexander Haig was outraged that the U.S. Congress
had during the previous week slashed several major U.S. defense programs in light of
Gorbachev's promise of forthcoming defense reductions in Europe. Haig complained
bitterly that the U.S. was "...making concrete cuts based on Gorbachev's mere promises of
cuts."
m Granted, Secretary Haig is famous for taking a hard-line stand on almost any
issue, but we can easily find other prominent Americans who share his doubts on the n .'w
Soviet reforms. In a 10 May 1989 Washington Post article, Rowland Evans and Robert
Novak described how President Bush's deputy national security adviser, Robert Gates,
warned of quick and ill-considered western responses to Gorbachev's proposals. Gates
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foreign assistance each time the [Soviet] system has hovered on the brink of catastrophe." 117
Former director of the U.S. National Security Agency, General William Odom, also remains
skeptical of Gorbachev's proposals. He advises a cooperative, but carefully considered U.S.
response to tangible Soviet progress. The general states,
It would be a grave error for the new administration to relax all the competitive
pressures the Soviet Union feels from the sustained U.S. military buildup and from
U.S. assertiveness in regional conflicts. An equally grave error would be tc offer
massive credits and economic assistance without a political quid pro quo. 118
A resistance to offer lucrative economic incentives and western credits is evident in
many writings. Some refusals of economic aid to the Soviets are based purely on
ideological or geopolitical concerns, with the idea that a failure of the Soviet system will
simply remove a thorn from America's side. Others argue against aid to Gorbachev's
programs on more pragmatic grounds. For example, Dr. Steven Rosefielde of the
University of North Carolina believes that the Soviet economy is so hopelessly mired down
that no amount of western aid will improve the situation. 119 Dr. Rosefielde's dreary
assessment of the Soviet system is also shared by the author of the highly acclaimed "Z"
article from December 1989. As previously noted in Chapter Three, that author believes
that any further efforts by Gorbachev to salvage the existing system and any aid rendered
by the West would be futile. "Z" concludes that the present Soviet system cannot be
u7Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, 'Is Bush Being Taken In By Gorbachev?"
Washington Post, 10 May 1989, A15.
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manuscript. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina, November 1989.
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reformed, and that it will either stagnate or be dismantled and replaced eventually by
market institutions over a long period of time. 120
This section has presented a sampling of highly pessimistic views of Gorbachev's
proposals. Except for Dr. Rosefielde and "Z," the authors cited here either doubted the
veracity of Soviet reforms or at least were suspicious of the Kremlin's motives. A second
group of writers views Gorbachev's program as genuine, and in general sees Soviet
motives as less menacing to the West. We will now turn to this second group.
B. THE MODERATES
Dr. Graham Allison, Dean of Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, declares that
Gorbachev's reforms are authentic, and views them as a desperate attempt to salvage the
Soviet economy. Allison concedes that Gorbachev's reforms could produce a more
formidable adversary in years to come, but he believes that the USSR by that time will not
be the same dangerous entity which we know today. He suggests Gorbachev's main
objective in granting foreign policy concessions is to secure a breathing spell to rebuild the
Soviet economy. Short of trusting the security of the West to Gorbachev's word alone,
though, the author advocates formulating a set of carefully considered bilateral agreements
which, if fulfilled, would reflect good Soviet intentions. Allison closes by urging NATO
to assume a proactive, or more vigorous, posture; he states, "The United States and its
allies must now reach beyond containment to aggressive engagement of the Soviet Union
in ways that encourage Gorbachev's reformist instincts to restructure Soviet external
relations and internal institutions." 121
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Professor Mark Katz, of Virginia's George Mason University, also finds an economic
impetus for the Soviet overtures. He submits that Gorbachev's military reforms came
about because the Kremlin could not keep pace with President Reagan's military buildup
without sacrificing badly needed economic improvements. Although he maintains that
Soviet military doctrine now poses much less danger to the U.S., he urges that America
must still not let down her guard. Katz warns,
Should the Bush administration not support a strong defense policy or should the
American public, Congress and the allies again reduce their support for one, Soviet
efforts to seek concessions from the United States...may well expand. 122
Like Professor Katz, Andrew Goldberg of the Center for Strategic and International
Studies finds the rationale for Gorbachev's military reforms originating from Soviet
economic constraints. Katz declares that not only were military expenditures diverting
badly needed resources from the civilian economy, but an offensive strategic orientation
was frustrating good relations with the West which were in turn so vita, to Soviet
economic development. The author is very pragmatic in his outlook on future U.S.-Soviet
relations; he predicts, "Even in the best of expected futures, the U.S.-Soviet relationship will
remain adversarial." 123 To him, the most important question is how the West will take
advantage of Soviet policy changes. He urges the NATO allies to agree upon a common
defense agenda and then to aggressively challenge the Kremlin in pursuing military
122Mark N. Katz, "Evolving Soviet Perceptions of U.S. Strategy, Washington Quarterly
(Summer 1989): 166.
123Andrew C. Goldberg, "The Present Turbulence in Soviet Military Doctrine,"
Washington Quarterly (Summer 1988): 168.
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reductions in Europe. Dr. Goldberg closes by observing, "What is unquestionable is that
Gorbachev's new thinking demands new thinking of our own." 124
C. THE OPTIMISTS
The following, and final, group surveyed includes four authors who are decidedly
more favorable in their opinions of Soviet reforms. To one degree or another, they believe
the West should pursue a cooperative strategy with the USSR to reinforce Gorbachev's
reform movement.
Michael MccGwire of the Brookings Institution does not view the new Soviet reforms
as economically oriented. Instead, he suggests that Gorbachev's new approach to national
security lies at the heart of the "new thinking." He refers to Soviet agreements for intrusive
on-site arms verifications and inspections, along with offers of unilateral force reductions,
as concrete proof that changes have already occurred in Soviet foreign policy. The author
sternly demands action from the West: "NATO must avoid self-righteousness and
recognize the radical nature of the doctrinal change underlying the Soviet proposal for a
new security regime." 125 MccGwire believes it imperative for NATO to carefully review
its own forces and policies in light of the new Soviet proposals and then to work closely
with the Warsaw Pact to lessen tensions in Europe.
The very title of Michael Mandelbaum's article—"Ending the Cold War"~reveals his
impressions of Gorbachev's reforms. Mandelbaum states, "Mikhail Gorbachev has
launched the most ambitious, sweeping and, from the West's point of view, promising
124
Ibid.
125Michael MccGwire, "A Mutual Security Regime for Europe?" International Affairs 64
(Summer 1988): 377.
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program of reform in the history of the Soviet Union." 126 He believes that, for the first
time in forty-five years, there is a real chance to end the most serious of East-West
differences. Professor Mandelbaum cautions that the nationalist uprisings within the Soviet
Union, if they become violent and uncontrollable, could force Gorbachev to use coercive
force and abandon his reform program. Although he does not advocate economic aid or
other assistance to encourage Soviet reforms, Mandelbaum thinks we should carefully
avoid taking advantage of any weakened Soviet position. Such actions on our part could
give Gorbachev's rivals the ammunition they need to halt the reform movement which
they view as destabilizing to the Soviet empire.
The final two authors surveyed present the most positive analyses of Mikhail
Gorbachev's reforms. In '"New Thinking' and Soviet Foreign Policy," Dr. Seweryn Bialer
points to the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, a lessening of Soviet incursions
in the Third World, and dynamic movement in arms negotiations as incontrovertible proof
that Gorbachev's reforms are real. Dr. Bialer believes that NATO should act quickly to
encourage reforms that are to its advantage. In contrast to the failed detente of the 1970s,
Dr. Bialer states, "The new detente holds the promise of being deeper and much longer
lasting than the old." 127
Finally, Dr. Robert Legvold of the Harriman Institute at Columbia University,
declares not only that sweeping changes have occurred inside the USSR but that those
changes have altered "...the very assumptions by which the Soviets explain the functioning
of international politics and from which they derive the concepts underlying the deeper
126Michael Mandelbaum, "Ending the Cold War," Foreign Affairs 68 (Spring 1989): 16.
127rSeweryn Bialer, '"New Thinking' and Soviet Foreign Policy," Survival (July/August
1988): 309.
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pattern of their actions." 128 Dr. Legvold highlights two significant and innovative
principles which Gorbachev has repeatedly stressed: the insufficiency of military power as
the way to national security and, second, the link between national and mutual security
The author states that Soviet foreign and security policy have changed substantially on
three different levels: basic concepts, policy concepts and fundamental assumptions. Citing
Soviet moves previously referred to by Dr. Seweryn Bialer, as well as Gorbachev's offer
to unilaterally cut active Soviet military forces by 500,000 troops, Dr. Legvold claims that
the very basis of Soviet foreign policy decisionmaking has changed. The author describes
western responses so far to Gorbachev's initiatives as cautious. In his prescription for
future western actions, he minces no words: "This time, caution is the enemy of the
sensible." 129 Dr. Legvold believes that the goal of U.S. foreign policy for over four
decades--an end to the Cold War—is now within reach. Hesitation on the part of the West
may rob it of this fleeting opportunity.
D. SUMMARY OF OPINIONS
A review of this survey reveals the broad range of western opinion regarding the
veracity and extent of Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev's "new thinking." Those analyzed in
this chapter fell into three groups. Members of the first group were largely skeptical of the
true extent of Gorbachev's reforms with some finding sinister motives behind the Kremlin's
overtures. Those who made up the second group were moderates who generally thought
the reforms authentic but had differing opinions as to how the West should respond. The





final group offered what they claim is substantial proof of genuine reforms and advocated
a vigorous and positive western response to Gorbachev's initiatives. Of all those surveyed,
the majority believed that Gorbachev's reforms are real and generally found an economic
basis as the core rationale for the Soviet reform program.
Several members of this survey still have serious doubts about the military objectives
of Gorbachev and question the validity of the "defensive doctrine." In the following two
chapters, I will examine some of the central issues surrounding the debate over this
concept, and describe some changes now under way in Soviet forces in Eastern Europe as
well as possible future deployments of Soviet forces on home soil.
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V. THE CONTROVERSY OVER SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE
A. TWO "NEW1 ' SOVIET SECURITY POLICIES
Gorbachev's efforts to deemphasize the role of the military in Soviet foreign policy
have centered around two security policies in particular, "reasonable sufficiency" and the
"defensive doctrine" or "defensive defense." Like many other aspects of Gorbachev's
reform programs, these two concepts have stirred-up intense controversy. They will have
a profound effect on the future of western security and East-West relations. When these
new concepts became known in the West, the common perception was that Gorbachev
himself had introduced them and that they were dramatically different from anything seen
before. This chapter will analyze those issues and attempt to shed more light on the true
content of these concepts. Finally, it will highlight some of the main points in the
controversy surrounding these new principles and review the likely implications they will
have for western, especially American, security.
1. "Reasonable Sufficiency"
In 1985, during a visit to France, Mikhail Gorbachev unveiled a new concept
which he called "reasonable sufficiency." This announcement spurred a great deal of
discussion not only in the West, but in the USSR as well. In short order, a flurry of articles
was published in the military press debating the meaning of the term and its implications.
The issue produced sharply differing opinions among top military officials. Some, such
as Lt Gen of Aviation V. Serebryannikov and First Deputy Minister of Defense, Army
General P. Lushev, took a more conservative line; they suggested that the current concept
of strategic parity meets the requirements of "reasonable sufficiency" as defined in Warsaw
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Pact announcements. Others, such as Minister of Defense, Army General D. Yazov, took
a more progressive approach and emphasized that military potentials must be reduced to
a point where, in the future, neither the Warsaw Pact nor NATO will possess forces
enabling them to mount offensive operations. Some scientists, retired military personnel
and researchers assigned to civilian "think tanks" sided with the progressives. The impetus
generally cited for this new doctrine was a reduction of defense expenditures, savings from
which would be diverted into the faltering civilian economy. One of the keynote articles
on the topic was published in New Times in December 1987. In "Reasonable Sufficiency:
Or How To Break the Vicious Circle," authors V. Zhurkin, S. Karaganov and A. Kortunov
defined "reasonable sufficiency" as being determined "...not by the ability to win a large-
scale regional conflict, but by ensuring an adequate defense potential so that the aggressor
should not be able to count either on a 'regional blitzkrieg' or on escalating such a conflict
with impunity." 13°
Western analysts also struggled with the new Soviet terminology. According
to Mary Fitzgerald, formerly of the Center for Naval Analyses, the concept of "reasonable
sufficiency" exists on two levels, nuclear and conventional. At the nuclear level, the
concept results from the Kremlin's acceptance of the principle of "mutual assured
destruction." Fitzgerald points to Leonid Brezhnev's 1977 Tula speech—in which he
affirmed that the Soviet Union was not striving for superiority in nuclear armaments or
in any other category of military power—as the first watershed event indicating Soviet
130V. Zhurkin, S. Karaganov and A. Kortunov, "Reasonable Sufficiency: Or How to
Break the Vicious Circle," New Times 40 (December 1987): 13.
62
acceptance of MAD. 131 She also associates this evolution in Soviet doctrinal thinking
with the Kremlin's adoption of a policy of "no-first-use" of nuclear weapons. (Although
Fitzgerald interprets Brezhnev's 'Tula line" as a Soviet declaration of "no-first-use" of
nuclear weapons, the reader should note that the Kremlin did not publicly proclaim such
a policy until it was announced in a statement by former Foreign Minister Andrei
Gromyko in June 1982. 132 ) Fitzgerald maintains that the Kremlin adopted a philosophy
of "mutual assured destruction," probably in the mid-1970s, after judging that the military
utility of nuclear weapons had declined drastically at the same time that combat
capabilities of advanced conventional munitions, or ACMs, had expanded. During the
1970s, the Soviets showed increasingly greater interest in ACMs versus nuclear weapons.
Soviet military writings in that decade and in the early 1980s noted a qualitative
transformation in conventional weapons flowing from combinations of technological
advances in improved electronics, electro-optical components, computers, and improved
munitions. These advances marked the onset of what the Soviets called a new "revolution
in military affairs.
'
Mary Fitzgerald goes on to point out that the new interest in ACMs has
stimulated a reevaluation of the role of the defense in modern warfare. This emphasis on
the expanding role of ACMs links the nuclear level of "reasonable sufficiency" to the
conventional level. The Soviets view ACMs as weapon systems capable of accomplishing
131Mary C. Fitzgerald, "Gorbachev's Concept of 'Reasonable Sufficiency.'" A paper
presented at the Annual Convention of the American Association for thf Advancement of
Slavic Studies in Boston, MA, 5-7 November 1987. Citation is from p. 3.
132See David S. Yost, Soviet Ballistic Missile Defense and the Western Alliance
(Cambridge, MA. Harvard University Press, 1988), 112. Dr. Yost also presents an excellent
analysis of the much disputed 'Tula line" in pp. 187-92 of the same book.
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some tasks formerly given to nuclear weapons. According to Fitzgerald, the Soviets now
believe that the potential of ACMs to deliver decisive strikes throughout the enemy's depth
has dramatically increased the capabilities of the defense, causing a reevaluation of the
previously held conviction that only a decisive offensive leads to victory. That
reevaluation in turn altered the perceived relationship between the roles of the offense and
defense in war, after their respective advantages and disadvantages were transformed in
the nuclear age. 133
2. "Defensive Doctrine"
The new emphasis on the role of the defensive in warfare was also reflected in
a series of articles reexarnining more closely the 1943 Battle of Kursk, and Soviet analyses
of U.S. and NATO defensive strategies. In 1986, Maj Gen A. Maryshev argued that the
modern Soviet military should strive to create precisely such an intentional defense as was
demonstrated in the Battle of Kursk. 134 Mary Fitzgerald views this article as having been
a litmus test to judge the likely reception of the Warsaw Pacfs newly declared "defensive
doctrine." This new doctrine, announced in May 1987, has also incited considerable debate.
According to the official Warsaw Pact announcement, the essence of this principle is the
reduction of conventional forces in Europe to a level "...where neither side, in ensuring its
defense, would have the means for a surprise attack on the other side or for mounting
general offensive operations." 135
133
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B. ARE THESE CONCEPTS REALLY NEW?
Although the name of Mikhail Gorbachev is now popularly associated with the two
"new" Soviet military concepts, a search of the available literature reveals that he did not
originate either of these two principles. I will now describe the origins of each of these
two concepts, in turn.
1. Origin of "Reasonable Sufficiency"
Looking first at the origin of "reasonable sufficiency," we find that, ironically
enough, the concept was "borrowed" from American pronouncements from as far back as
the Eisenhower, Kennedy and Nixon administrations. Even more ironic, as Ambassador
Raymond Garthoff notes, is the fact that Soviet commentaries historically roundly criticized
American allusions to "sufficiency" as "vague and intended to mask a pursuit of
superiority." 136 It seems also that Gorbachev was not the first Soviet official to advance
the idea of "sufficiency." The late Leonid Brezhnev stated, as far back as 1982, "...we have
not spent, nor will we spend, a single ruble more for these [defensive] purposes than is
absolutely necessary for assuring the security of our people..." because defense
expenditures "...require diverting considerable resources to the detriment of our plans for
peaceful construction." 137 Ambassador Garthoff also points out that a prominent Soviet
spokesman had directly referred to "sufficiency" as a principle for regulating defense
outlays before Gorbachev came to power; Lt Gen Dmitri Volkogonov wrote in January 1985
136Raymond L. Garthoff, "New Thinking in Soviet Military Doctrine," Washington
Quarterly (Summer 1988): 138.
137
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of the USSR," Pravda, March 17, 1982. Quoted in Raymond Garthoff, "New Thinking in
Soviet Military Doctrine," Washington Quarterly (Summer 1988): 138.
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that, "...the Soviet Union, proceeding from the principle of sufficiency, does not strive to
compete with the United States and NATO over the whole span of the arms race." 138
Finally, Gorbachev himself had declared in 1983 that arms reductions should be based on
"...preserving the overall balance, but at the lowest possible levels." 139
2. The Case of the "Defensive Doctrine"
As in the case of "reasonable sufficiency," we find that the idea of a "defensive
doctrine" also preceded the new Kremlin leader. Official Soviet pronouncements as far
back as 1955 depicted the Warsaw Pact as a defensive alliance, founded to "...defend the
gains of socialism." 140 And, as already mentioned, the early 1980s witnessed a new
emphasis on the role of defensive combat in Soviet military planning. Many scholars
pointed out that traditional Soviet military thinking concentrated almost solely on the role
of offensive actions with a resulting virtual exclusion of studies of defensive missions. As
indicated by Mary Fitzgerald's description of changing Soviet views on warfighting, many
western analysts believe that the "defensive doctrine" is related to evolving Soviet concerns
on war prevention, especially the prevention of an accidental nuclear war. This assertion
seemed to be confirmed in part by a statement made in 1989 by Army General Petr
Lushev, Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Forces of the Warsaw Pact:
138Lt Gen Dmitri A. Volkogonov, "Political Lessons of the Victory and the Present Day,"
Questions of Philosophy, No. 1, 1985: 39. Quoted in Raymond Garthoff, "New Thinking
in Soviet Military Doctrine," Washington Quarterly (Summer 1988): 138.
'"Mikhail Gorbachev, "Leninism is a Living, Creative Teaching and Correct Guide to
Action," Pravda, 23 April 1983. Quoted in Raymond Garthoff, "New Thinking in Soviet
Military Doctrine," Washington Quarterly (Summer 1988): 139.
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What is new and most important here is the fact that whereas military doctrine
was previously defined as a system of views on preparing for a possible war and
how to fight it, the key point in the definition now is the prevention of war. The
task of preventing war is becoming the highest goal, the nucleus of our military
doctrine and the main function of our states and their joint Armed Forces. 141
C. THE RELATIONSHIP OF "REASONABLE SUFFICIENCY' TO THE "DEFENSIVE
DOCTRINE"
The two concepts of "reasonable sufficiency" and "defensive doctrine" are key to
Gorbachev's plan for military reform; they are also closely linked to one another.
"Reasonable sufficiency" is intended by Gorbachev to be used as a yardstick by which to
measure the level of forces needed for the "defensive doctrine." This position is confirmed
by Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, former chief of the Soviet general staff. He noted in 1987
that
The defensive character of Soviet military doctrine manifests itself in the fact that
the Soviet Union resolutely advocates maintaining the balance of military forces at
the lowest possible level, reducing military potentials to levels of sufficiency
necessary for defense. 1 *2
More recently, Army General A. D. Lizdchev discussed what he termed "certain
nuances" of the defensive doctrine:
Defensive doctrine. ..is a principle of reasonable sufficiency. What does it consist
of? It consists of. general purpose forces being maintained at the minimum level
which will enable us to preserve political stability and make our country safe from
141Army General Petr Lushev, "Soviet and Warsaw Pact Goals and Developments," RUS1
lournal (Autumn 1989): 4.
142Marshal S. Akhromeyev, "The Glory and the Pride of the Soviet People," Soviet
Russia, 21 February 1987. Quoted in Raymond Garthoff, "New Thinking in Soviet Military
Doctrine," Washington Quarterly (Summer 1988): 139.
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the strike of an aggressor. Insofar as the strategic nuclear forces are concerned, we
have been maintaining them at a level equal for us and the United States. We will
maintain that parity in nuclear missile forces and that equilibrium... 143
D. THE CONTROVERSY
Our research so far indicates that the two "new" military doctrines predated
Gorbachev. If the ideas manifested in these two concepts are not new, then why are many
western authorities so concerned? In my judgement, the controversy surrounding the new
Soviet proclamations centers around three main points:
• To the West, there seems to be a conflict in definitions between the formally declared
Warsaw Pact "defensive doctrine" and the apparent very offensively-oriented nature
of its military forces.
• Many authorities fear some sort of a Kremlin trick, a foreign policy 'Trojan Horse."
• Finally, many observers claim that, as of late 1989, the West had seen little concrete
evidence of a change in the Warsaw Pact force structure.
Let us briefly analyze each of these points.
1. A Contradiction Between Claims and Reality?
a. Clues in Soviet Terminology
A close reading of Soviet military literature gives some valuable insights
into the apparent duality of their new doctrine. "Military doctrine," as defined by the
Soviets, has two levels or dimensions: the socio-political and the military-technical. 144
143Army General A. D. Lizichev, in a statement aired on Radio Moscow on 12 February
1989.
'
"Dictionary of Basic Military Terms: A Soviet View, (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1965), 37.
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The socio-political aspect establishes the political objectives in war and the economic, social
and legal basis for the fulfillment of these objectives. The military-technical aspect
encompasses problems of force development, technical equipping of forces, and forms and
methods by which peacetime operations and warfighting would be conducted. ,45
Author Stephen Covington aptly describes the differences in the two aspects as follows:
the socio-political aspect establishes the political rationale for possessing armed forces,
while the military-technical establishes requirements for war preparation. 146 Historically,
the socio-political aspect has been deterrnined almost solely by the party leadership,
whereas the military-technical area has traditionally been the domain of the military.
A second point crucial to understanding Soviet thinking is that stated
military doctrine is intended only as a general guideline for the conduct of war; in a war,
doctrine is largely overshadowed by the immediate requirements of military strategy. As
outlined in the Soviet Officer's Handbook , this principle is defined as follows:
In wartime, military doctrine drops into the background somewhat, since, in
armed conflict, we are guided primarily by military-political and military-strategic
considerations, conclusions and generalizations which stem from the conditions of
the specific situation. Consequently, war and armed conflict is governed by strategy,
not doctrine. u7
Considering the 1987 Warsaw Pact "defensive doctrine" in this regard, the socio-political
aspect of the doctrine would provide for a stated non-offensive and non-provocative
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peacetime doctrine which, in war, would be immediately superseded by a military strategy
which would not fail to employ offensive thrusts against the enemy. What appears to the
western reader as a misleading if not duplicitous conflict between the stated policy and the
factual force structure therefore represents no controversy whatsoever to a Red Army
steeped in the tenets of traditional Soviet military terminology. Soviet Minister of Defense
Yazov himself has declared, "There is no contradiction between the adoption of a defensive
doctrine and the combination of offensive and defensive operations in the defeat of the
enemy." 148
b. Soviet Differences of Opinion
Adding to western confusion and suspicion is the existence of great
differences of opinion among various Soviet officials as to the meanings of "reasonable
sufficiency" and "defensive doctrine." I have already described the debate over the
meaning of "reasonable sufficiency;" the concept of "defensive doctrine" has sparked an
equally vigorous debate. There are even cases where the same official gives differing
opinions on the issue. For instance, in June 1987 Colonel General Gareyev stated that
"...the basic method of action of the Soviet Armed Forces for repelling aggression will be
defensive operations and combat actions." 149 In his book published during the same
year, however, Gareyev wrote that a decisive defeat of the enemy can only be attained by
148Army General D. Yazov, On Gua^d for Socialism and Peace (Moscow: Voyenizdat,
1987), 33.
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CA: The RAND Corporation, 1989), 25.
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conducting decisive counteroffensive operations. 15° Granted, Gareyev's book may
represent views which he held previous to the May 1987 declaration of the "defensive
doctrine," and he may now have changed his opinion on the matter. There have been
many pronouncements since 1987 which tend to indicate a decided shift in Soviet doctrinal
thinking. Representative of these views is one posited by Colonel G. Ionin in 1988:
Soviet military doctrine ...is thoroughly defensive in nature. This means that we
will not begin military operations if we are not subjected to armed attack. If the
imperialists unleash war, we will be forced from the very outset to repel the invasion
of the aggressor, and only after that will we transition to a decisive offensive. 151
The Minister of Defense himself, Army General Yazov, has added to the confusion by
publicly supporting the new defensive doctrine while at the same time appearing to
denounce a strictly defensive doctrine in his 1987 book. In the book, he stated that "...it
is impossible, however, to smash the enemy with defense alone. Therefore, after the
repelling of the attack, land and naval forces must be capable of conducting a decisive
offensive." 152
Although the foregoing discussion of the definition of "military doctrine"
and its various aspects explains to some degree the perceived contradiction between
declared Warsaw Pact doctrine and actual force levels and structure, there remains a great
deal of evidence that the Soviets themselves have not resolved exactly what is to be made
150M.A. Gareyev, Soviet Military Science (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1987), 36. Quoted in
Josephine J. Bonan, The Current Debate Over Soviet Defense Policy, P-7526, (Santa Monica,
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Voyenizdat, 1987), 33.
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of the new "defensive doctrine." This suspicion was confirmed in a December 1989 lecture
by Soviet Lt General S. Starodubov, of the Voroshilov General Staff Academy, in a visit to
the West German Bundeswehr's Staff Academy in Hamburg. In that lecture, Starodubov
admitted that there had been a contradiction in the past between the defensive nature of
the socio-political side of Soviet military doctrine and the military-technical side which had
previously emphasized offensive actions to defeat an aggressor. Lt Gen Starodubov
declared in that lecture that the previous contradiction has been overcome and that both
the theory and the practical part of military art are now determined by the concept of a
defensive strategy. 153
The existence of major differences of opinion inside the USSR is especially
evident between the aforementioned military officials and members of the new civilian
"think tanks" which, although not formally a part of the military policymaking process,
seem to be having an ever greater impact on the thinking of senior officials. Civilian
defense analysts largely echo Gorbachev's contention that the security of the USSR is best
guaranteed through political means rather than by a continued military buildup. Valentin
Falin observed that Soviet security has become "...mostly political, and its military solution
is becoming increasingly inappropriate." 154 Writers V. Zhurkin, S. Karaganov and A.
Kortunov were even more forceful in advocating political rather than military means in
preserving Soviet national security; they said that "...by relying exclusively on military-
technical means a state [the USSR] inevitably set its own security against international
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security..." 155 This statement hearkens to Mikhail Gorbachev's 1987 pronouncements that
the USSR could no longer ensure its own security at the expense of other countries,
especially the United States. 156
2. A Soviet 'Trojan Horse?'
Even more vitriolic than the internal Soviet debate over terminology is the
western debate on these concepts. Although many in the West accept as valid Soviet
claims of military reforms, a number of very respected observers still distrust Soviet
motives under "new thinking." According to Josephine Bonan of the RAND Corporation,
a vocal minority of western analysts views recent Soviet proposals as merely temporary
changes instituted to gain a breathing space during which the USSR can concentrate on
resuscitating its lagging economy. These analysts fear that, once the Soviet economy is
back on track, the West will face a heightened threat characterized by three conditions:
• The USSR will no longer be constrained by an unwieldy economy.
« The West will have been lulled into a false sense of security.
• The USSR will have used the resulting breathing space to develop a new generation
of high-technology weapons that would pose a serious threat to the U.S. and its
allies.
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The worst fears of this group are perhaps best summed-up by Mr. James McConnell of the
Center for Naval Analyses; Mr. McConnell notes,
A government [of the USSR] able to impose a real burden of defense on its own
people two to three times more onerous than its capitalist competitors is not likely
to forget where its competitive advantage lies. If Gorbachev is proposing that the
USSR retire from the military competition today, that is probably only so it can
return with a greater effectiveness tomorrow. 15B
Those who remain unconvinced of Soviet good will are increasingly finding
themselves ignored or shunned amidst the celebration of the purported ending of the Cold
War. Despite the prevailing spirit of euphoria, many noted western authorities remain
skeptical of the apparently slumbering Soviet bear. Mr. Leon Goure, for one, is deeply
suspicious of Soviet motives. Goure claims,
...the putative 'new' Soviet military doctrine is not a military doctrine at all, but
rather a political propaganda statement primarily intended to reinforce the image of
the Soviet Union's peaceful intentions A careful reading of Soviet sources reveals
considerable confusion and controversy... but no real substance. It remains to be
seen whether Gorbachev's enthusiasm for change will also give rise to a really new
and different Soviet military doctrine...159
Former French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac also remains unconvinced of Soviet sincerity.
While acknowledging that more time needs to elapse before final judgments can be made,
Chirac remarks, "As far as Moscow's strategic objectives are concerned, nothing to this day
indicates that they have been drastically modified." 16°
158James M. McConnell, "Reasonable Sufficiency" in Soviet Conventional Arms-Control
Strategy (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 1987), 12-13, (CNA) 87-1918.
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Other authors do not buy the idea of a 'Trojan Horse." Although uncertain of
what will ultimately transpire, these writers point to contemporary Soviet doctrinal
statements and arms control initiatives as proof that a significant shift is occurring in Soviet
military doctrine and military affairs. Writers Phillip Petersen and Notra Trulock, for
example, believe that Soviet political leaders are attempting to acquire more control over
the formulation of military doctrine; in return, they have gained the military's cooperation
with the promise of future dividends in the form of improved technologies provided by
a revived and more vigorous Soviet economy. Petersen and Trulock state that, most
importantly,
It is in the linkage between the military's forecast of [a revolution in military
affairs] and the positive political developments in the Soviet Union where a new
basis may emerge for a potentially more stable East-West security relationship.161
3. Changes Noted As of the End of 1989
Let's now review some factors which may indicate the validity of claimed Soviet
military reforms. One clear indication of Soviet sincerity would seem to be iOund in
Kremlin adherence to its promised unilateral force reductions announced by Secretary
Gorbachev in December 1988. The essential points covered in those reductions were:
• the size of the Soviet armed forces will be cut by 500,000 men;
• six tank divisions will be withdrawn from Eastern Europe and disbanded;
• 50,000 men and 5,000 tanks will be removed from Eastern Europe; and
1M
Phillip A. Petersen and Notra Trulock III, " A 'New' Soviet Military Doctrine: Origins
and Implications," Strategic Review (Summer 1988): 21.
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• Soviet forces in the western USSR will be reduced by 10,000 tanks, 8,500 artillery
pieces, and 800 combat aircraft. 162
How have these cutbacks proceeded so far? According to Army General Moiseyev, Chief
of the Soviet General Staff, as of 1 October 1989, the following forces had already been
withdrawn from Eastern Europe into the USSR:
• 3 tank divisions;
• 3 tank training regiments;
• 2 SAM training regiments;
• 1 air regiment;
• 1 helicopter regiment;
• 2 SAM brigades;
• 4 assault battalions;
• and 2 assault river crossing battalions, along with "other special troop units."163
In addition to the above cuts announced by Army General Moiseyev in the
closing weeks of 1989, talks are under way to provide for the withdrawal of additional
Soviet forces from Eastern Europe, and ii\ fact agreements have already been reached to
withdraw all Soviet forces from Czechoslovakia and from Hungary. The implications of
the specific agreements in Eastern Europe will be addressed in greater detail in the
following two chapters.
162James A. Thomson, Implications of the Gorbachev Force Cuts, P-7533, (Santa Monica,
CA: RAND Corporation, 1989), 1.
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"Moisevev Details Armed Forces Cuts," lane's Defense Weekly, 11 November 1989,
p. 1050.
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Another gauge of Soviet intentions being closely scrutinized is the Kremlin
defense budget. Despite Gorbachev's pledge in early 1988 to reduce military spending,
some sources until recently maintained that the USSR had in truth not cut spending at all.
In May 1989, the Committee on the Present Danger released a lengthy report stating that
"...the Soviets continue to produce military equipment and hardware at a rapid pace..." and
that "...the problems of the Soviet economy have not forced a significant shift in resources
away from the military to the civilian sector." 164 One would naturally expect a highly
conservative viewpoint from this particular source, but until the Bush administration on
13 November 1989 issued a report favorable to Soviet claims, the preceding view was the
commonly held western opinion. The November 1989 government report indicated that
the Soviets had indeed reduced their military spending in 1989. Final figures for the year
have not yet been tabulated, but the report indicated that "...Soviet military spending as
a percentage of the Soviet GNP would slip to between 14-16 percent," as compared to
between 15-17 percent for 1988. 165 Although this news was received with great
enthusiasm in Washington, initial reports of only a one- or two-percent decrease left ample
room for doubt regarding a hoped-for more significant reduction.
Reports in the closing days of 1989 gave additional reason to believe in Soviet
good intentions. In a 16 December 1989 Izvestiva article, the Soviet Ministry of Defense
announced that its total defense budget in 1990 will amount to 70,975.8 million rubles, a
'"Committee on the Present Danger, Soviet Defense Expenditures . A report released
on 16 May 1989 (Washington, D.C.: Committee on the Present Danger, 1989), 1.
165Thomas L. Friedman, "U.S. Says Soviets Apparently Cut Arms Spending,"
Washington Post, 14 November 1989, A9.
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figure which the Kremlin claims is 8.2 percent lower than total defense outlays for
1989. 166
The last figures, if verified, would indeed provide a hopeful sign that the
Kremlin leadership is taking concrete steps to reduce the Soviet threat to western nations
and lend greater credibility to Soviet claims of "defensiveness." However, a firm appraisal
of real reductions in Soviet defense spending is made difficult due to disagreements over
the true extent of total Soviet defense expenditures and even the true size of the Soviet
GNP, which serves as the basis for the overall comparison. For instance, Leon Goure
points to a series of confusing statistics on the USSR's defense budget released last year in
the Soviet press. On May 30, 1989, Secretary Gorbachev stated that the Kremlin's defense
budget for 1989 was 77.3 billion rubles. Gorbachev also alluded to defense spending in the
previous two years. According to Goure, claimed Soviet defense spending based on these
figures is sharply at odds with most U.S. estimates. 167 Granted, the U.S. still has a lot
to learn about Soviet defense budgets, but a lack of "openness" in the realm of defense
spending is making a belief in Soviet pronouncements all the more difficult.
Despite the doubts engendered by such varying indicators, more and more
western authorities are now becoming convinced of dramatic shifts in Soviet military
doctrine and military policy. One such expert, Mr. Robert Bathurst, a former U.S. assistant
naval attache to Moscow, has drawn some dramatic conclusions from recent events in the
USSR. Bathurst believes that the new "defensive doctrine" or "non-provocative defense"
166
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is real, and that it results directly from the Soviet military failure in Afghanistan. Its
inability to win a decisive victory against a Third World power at its very doorstep, when
combined with previously mentioned evolving Soviet conceptions about modern war, has
robbed the Soviet military of its credibility with the CPSU and with the Soviet people.
According to Bathurst, the Soviet leadership views the Brezhnev Doctrine as outdated and
impotent, but they are unsure of what should replace it. The new "non-provocative
defense" has been adopted in an attempt to avoid starting a war which the Soviets may not
be capable of winning. 168 Mr. Bathurst believes that the Warsaw Pact military doctrine
has been altered not only due to Gorbachev's desire to divert more resources into the
domestic economy, but also because the very conceptual basis of the Soviet military
doctrine has changed.
While evidence does exist that Soviet thinking may be changing, what proof
have we seen of a lessened military threat from Moscow? In a lecture presented in
November 1989, Mr. Andrew Marshall, the Pentagon's Director of Net Assessments, said
that limited evidence then existed indicating possible changes in Warsaw Pact doctrine find
force structure, but that the results were inconclusive at that point. Specifically, Marshall
noted that the Soviets have modified their recent military exercises to increasingly
emphasize defensive actions. Also, some changes had been noted in the last eighteen
months which indicate a more limited Soviet naval deployment. Asked to name other
factors that would to him be substantial proof of actual doctrinal changes, Mr. Marshall
outlined the following: a withdrawal of all Soviet forces to home soil, a reduction of
forward-deployed offensive forces, and the preparation of fortifications or static defensive
168Robert Bathurst, in a lecture presented to the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School,
Monterey, CA, on 7 December 1989.
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positions within the borders of the USSR. (These indicators will be discussed in greater
length in the next chapter.) Mr. Marshall stated that "...we have seen none of the latter
changes..." and indicated that he was as yet unconvinced of a real change in Soviet military
doctrine. 169
This chapter has explored the origins of the "defensive doctrine" and the
principle of "reasonable sufficiency" and has described the intense debates surrounding
these issues in both East and West. Much of the research represented in this chapter was
completed before the onset of the democratic revolutions which swept over Eastern Europe
in the final weeks of 1989; as will be depicted shortly, these dramatic events have already
had a profound effect on the Soviet military establishment and on the western perception
of the Soviet threat. The following two chapters will discuss the impact of force structure
changes under way in Soviet forces in Eastern Europe and how these issues will affect the
future security environment in Europe.
lwAndrew Marshall, Director of Net Assessments, U.S. Department of Defense, in a
lecture presented at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, on 29 November
1989.
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VI. THE EVOLVING SOVIET FORCE STRUCTURE: PROSPECTS AND POTENTIALS
The political tidal wave which cascaded over Eastern Europe in the closing months
of 1989 poses critical new questions regarding the future of Soviet and Warsaw Pact
military forces. In this chapter, I will examine some of the mounting evidence of
significant changes under way in the force structure of Soviet forces deployed in Eastern
Europe and will also describe some possible scenarios for the future deployments of those
forces. Taking the analysis one step farther, I will then review a number of Soviet
proposals concerning forces stationed in the USSR. The latter issue will increase in
importance as more and more Soviet forces are withdrawn from Eastern Europe into the
Soviet Union. All of the ideas presented in this chapter are highly speculative in nature.
They involve questions which may not have been decided yet even by the Soviets, and
which will certainly not be readily apparent to the West for months or years to come.
They are, however, issues which must be thought out by western analysts.
A. A CONTINUING PATTERN OF CHANGE
The changes apparently under way in Soviet force structure were reviewed by
Colonel David Glantz of the U.S. Army's Soviet Army Studies Office in an article
published in the September 1989 edition of the [ournal of Soviet Military Studies . 170
Colonel Glantz places the ongoing force changes in context by demonstrating that this is
not the first, but the fifth time, since 1945 that the Soviets have restructured their forces in
Europe.
17DDavid M. Glantz, "Soviet Force Structure in an Era of Reform," journal of Soviet
Military Studies, No. 3, 1989: 361-93.
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The first post-World War II conversion occurred in 1946 when the Soviets
transformed their tank armies, tank corps and mechanized corps into mechanized armies,
tank divisions and mechanized divisions. The resulting forces were better balanced
combined-arms units which could serve as counterattack forces and at the same time
provide a defensive dimension. in The second transition was undertaken in 1956 when
the Soviet High Command replaced their large mechanized armies and mechanized and
rifle divisions with smaller tank armies and motorized rifle divisions. The Kremlin
considered this structure to be less susceptible to atomic attack while it still possessed
sufficient strength in infantry, tanks and artillery to provide a strong conventional
capability. After about 1960, the Soviets decided that any future war would be fought with
nuclear weapons, and the force structure was again altered to reflect the new strategy
This time, the tank and combined-arms armies and the motorized rifle divisions were
decreased in manpower and the tank forces were restructured. Following Khrushchev's
ouster in 1964, Soviet thinking turned once more to a more conventional posture, but the
transition took several years to complete. The ground forces gradually expanded and,
although remaining armor-heavy, added to their strength additional mechanized infantry
and artillery. The force became more mobile and better streamlined for sustained, deep
conventional operations. 172
Since the late 1960s, the Soviets have retained the theme of deep conventional
operations while experimenting with a wide variety of force mixes. They have introduced






situation, placing great emphasis on the lessons learned vicariously from Vietnam, the
Arab-Israeli Wars, and the Falklands. 173 Advanced weapon systems, including antitank
guided missiles, new armored vehicles, tanks, self-propelled artillery, and mobile bridging
equipment, were added to the inventory. These features gave the Soviet and Warsaw Pact
forces tremendous new offensively-oriented capabilities. And, in a move that gave Pact
forces a more menacing offensive capability, the Soviets experimented with corps- and
brigade-size elements designed to conduct deep operational maneuver, the so-called
"operational maneuver groups." 174 These and other structure modifications created more
flexible forces capable of performing the critical functions of tactical and operational
maneuver in theater war. 175
Since 1982, writes Colonel Glantz, Soviet recognition of new realities—some political
and economic and some related directly to evolving weapons technology-has prompted
a new wave of even more fundamental changes. The most recent series of changes appears
intended to further streamline Soviet forces to make them less offensively-oriented, or to
at least appear less menacing within the context of more peaceful Soviet overtures to the
West. Specifically, Colonel Glantz feels that the Soviets have begun to replace the old
"tank-heavy" structure with a more balanced combined-arms force which can better cope
with warfare in an age of high technology weaponry on an increasingly urbanized and










B. DEFINITION OF "REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS"
Soviet military thinking is pervaded with the idea that all military issues can be
quantified in a scientific way along the dialectical lines of Marxist-Leninist principles.
According to this rationale, the level of Soviet military art and the international security
environment at any chosen time results from the "means of material production" or the
state of technological advancement. At different stages in history, advancements such as
the introduction of firearms and nuclear weapons so drastically alter the level of military
technology that they cause a revolutionary, rather than evolutionary, shift.177 Such
momentous changes are termed by the Soviets as "revolutions in military affairs," which
in turn spur a change in basic military doctrine and strategy. According to Soviet military
writings, such a revolution in military affairs occurred during the 1970s and early 1980s
with the introduction of advanced conventional munitions. As described in the last
chapter, the Soviets reevaluated such basic principles as their policies toward "mutual
assured destruction" at the strategic nuclear level and the prevailing attitude that a decisive
offensive was superior to defensive actions. One product of this reevaluation was the May
1987 declaration of the Warsaw Pact's new "defensive doctrine." The tangible results of
even such a dramatic doctrinal shift do not appear overnight, but require as much as
several years to "trickle down" to the operational and tactical levels. 178 In accordance
with this view, the changes in Soviet force structure resulting from the May 1987 doctrinal
shift may only now be coming into evidence.
177See for example Colonel General F. Gayvoronskiy, The Evolution of Military Art:
Stages, Tendencies, Principles (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1987). Translated and published in
English by Joint Publications Research Service, JPRS-UMA-89-012-L, 12 October 1989. See




C. EVIDENCE FROM SOVIET MILITARY WRITINGS OF A POSSIBLE
STRUCTURAL CHANGE
Quite often, hints of changes in Soviet doctrine and force structure can be gleaned
from debates on Soviet military science which are published from time to time in the
military press. Colonel Glantz believes that one such clue on the evolving force structure
can be found in the republication in September 1985 of a speech made by Soviet General
P. Rotmistrov in 1945. In the original speech, General Rotmistrov, Commander of the
Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, had analyzed the operations of the 1 st Byelorussian
Front in the Second World War, along with the storming of Berlin. The general concluded
that the Soviet force structure was too "tank-heavy" and that it lacked the combined-arms
balance necessary to fight successfully in a more heavily forested, urbanized, and hilly
central Europe. 17g Colonel Glantz conjectures that the republication of this article in 1985
indicates that the changeover to a new force structure was already well under way.
D. THREE POSSIBLE STRUCTURAL MODELS POSED BY COL GLANTZ
One future model of Soviet force posturing envisioned by Colonel Glantz involves
the conversion of front operational maneuver units into a corps configuration. Dr. Daniel
Goure, Director of Soviet Studies at SRS Technologies, provides additional evidence of such
a transformation in the Fall 1989 issue of Strategic Review . Dr. Goure describes
experiments conducted in 1987 by the Soviets and Hungarians in which brigades and corps
replaced the traditional regimental and division structure. This new structure, according
179
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to Goure, would offer a more flexible design for controlling forces on the battlefield,
offensively as well as defensively. 18° Author John Lough provides more evidence of these
alterations in a January 1989 issue of Soviet Analyst . According to Lough, the Hungarian
Army's spring 1987 reform involved modernizing its force structure by strearnlining five
previous divisions into three corps, making it better equipped overall to face potential
enemies on a variety of terrains. Notes Lough,
The Warsaw Pact is too integrated for the Hungarian move to be seen as an
isolated case. This has been confirmed by similar reorganizational changes afoot in
at least two significant divisions in the West of the Soviet Union. Similar changes
are certain to affect the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSFG) and are,
probably, already underway. 181
Finally, author Graham H. Turbiville declares that there are indications that the Soviet
divisions being reorganized will become combined-arms corps, with each division's
regiments restructured as brigades. These brigades may consist of combined-arms
battalions with motorized rifle and tank companies.182
Currently, the Soviet wartime force structure, as postulated by David Glantz, would
consist of fronts containing three or four combined-arms armies and two to four tank
armies. Under a corps configuration, tank armies, for example, would consist of a
combination of tank and mechanized corps, with tank corps being "tank-heavy" and
mechanized corps being balanced combined-arms forces. In a second possible model, the
Kremlin could convert the entire force structure into a corps configuration, rather than just
180Daniel Goure, "A New Soviet National Security Policy for the 21st Century," Strategic
Review (Fall 1989): 43.
181John Lough, Soviet Analyst, 11 January 1989, 3.
182Graham H. Turbiville, "Soviet Troop Reductions in Europe: Changing the Engineer
Force Structure," The Military Engineer (March-April, 1989): 11.
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the front operational forces. According to the author, such a new corps structure would
allow the Soviets to conceal operational and tactical maneuver elements within their force
structure. This would also blur distinctions and comparisons between NATO and Soviet
forces and possibly give the USSR an additional advantage in ongoing conventional arms
talks. Finally, a third option open to the Soviets would call for drastically reducing the size
and offensive capabilities of most or all units. In this model, throughout the entire force,
the most offensively-oriented elements (e.g., armor, air assault and assault bridging) would
be severely curtailed or even abolished altogether.183
An interview with USSR Defense Minister D. T. Yazov in February 1989 confirms
Colonel Glantz's contention that some sort of restructuring is occurring in Soviet groups
of forces. In the interview, Yazov described how the Soviet unilateral withdrawal from
Eastern Europe will consist of two phases. In the first phase, a number of measures will
be implemented to give the forces a more defensive orientation. One such measure will
include "...converting combined-arms formations to a new organizational structure."184
Judging from this interview, the announced Soviet force alterations appear to be
conforming more along the lines of Colonel Glantz's third, most defensive, model.
According to Yazov:
Tank regiments will be removed from the motorized infantry divisions of the
Group of Soviet Forces in Germany and the Central Group of Forces. They will be
left only with motorized infantry regiments, and the number of tanks will fall by 40
percent. The number of tanks in tank divisions will fall by more than 20 percent as
a result of excluding one tank regiment from them. In the reorganized divisions
183David M. Glantz, "Soviet Force Structure in an Era of Reform," Journal of Soviet
Military Studies, No. 3, 1989: 361-93.
184Army General D. T. Yazov, "In the Interests of Universal Security and Peace,"
Izvestiva. 28 February 1989, 3. Quoted in FBIS-SOV-89-038, 28 February 1989, 3.
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there will be an increase in the number of antitank and antiaircraft means, means for
creating obstacles and laying minefields, and also engineering position camouflage
equipment. As a result, these formations and units will acquire a qualitatively
different structure, namely a defensive one.185
E. "OFFENSIVE" VERSUS "DEFENSIVE" SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT
In a related article, Colonel Glantz again focuses on the ongoing restructuring of
Soviet forces in Europe.186 In that piece, Colonel Glantz discusses the debate now under
way between two schools of thought in the Soviet military, one school arguing that the
traditional offensive posture is still valid, and the second group favoring a more defensive
posture. The author posits that adoption of a lighter force structure, whose forward-
deployed elements lack components critical to conducting large-scale maneuvers, may
indicate that the defensive school predominates. The adoption of a heavier force structure,
in terms of armor and mobility assets, would conversely indicate that the old school still
prevails. Colonel Glantz believes that development of a lighter force structure is reflected
in recent Soviet pronouncements concerning the reorganization of tanks and motorized rifle
formations, the creation of artillery/machine gun formations and the reductions of tank
strength in these formations. 187
F. A SOVIET MODEL: FROM THE KOKOSHIN-LARIONOV ARTICLE
Assuming that the Soviets are indeed transforming their European force structure,
what form is the resultant force expected to assume? Once again we look to Soviet
185
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military literature for clues. An extremely interesting article appeared in the June 1988
edition of World Economics and International Relations . In it, the authors Andrei
Kokoshin and Maj General (Ret.) V. Larionov discussed four hypothetical variants of force
deployments that might be assumed by both NATO and Warsaw Pact forces under the
newly declared "defensive doctrine." 1W In the first variant, each of the sides is oriented
in a heavily offensive mode with the goal of conducting "...rapid counteractions, toward
the conduct of strategic offensive operations." Under this scenario, the opposing sides
would each attempt to shift combat operations into enemy territory as soon as possible.
The writers depict these conditions as highly unstable, giving the opposing sides' political
authorities a minimum of control, which, in extreme cases, "...can take the shape of an
irreversible escalation of military activities, right up to the use of tactical nuclear weapons." 1W
The authors note that this first variant is a traditional one which predominated in both
world wars. This particular model is also the one assumed by Soviet forces at least until
May 1987.
Whereas the first variant envisioned by the authors provides for each side to
undertake decisive offensive and counteroffensive operations at the strategic level, the
second variation assumes that each side would construct deeply echeloned, pre-positioned
defensive lines prepared in advance of the start of war. The attacked side would fight to
bring the invader to a halt, possibly withdrawing and giving-up some territory in the
process. Once the enemy's initial attack is halted, defending forces would then launch
188Andrei Kokoshin and Major General (Ret.) Valentin Larionov, "Counter-positioning
Conventional Forces in the Context of Ensuring Strategic Stability," World Economics and
International Relations, No. 6, 1988: 23-31. This article was translated into English by the




decisive counteroffensives to repel the enemy back to his own territory. This scenario
provides for decisive counteroffensives at the operational and strategic levels. The model
is loosely based on Soviet experiences at the Battle of Kursk in 1943, although the authors
seem to imply that the analogy should not be pushed too far. The threat of escalation in
this second scenario, according to Kokoshin and Larionov, "...remains as high as in the first
variant."
The first two models implied that defending forces might pursue the enemy into his
own territory until a decisive defeat was attained; in contrast, the third version specifically
rules out pursuit of the enemy onto his own territory. Instead, the side attacked would
seek to restore the situation to the original status quo existing at the outset of hostilities.
The authors strongly imply that counteroffensives would be allowable on the operational
and tactical levels, but not at the strategic level; they specifically point out that neither side
would seek to achieve a victory at the strategic level in this scenario. 190 Soviet actions
against the Japanese in the 1939 Khalkin-Gol operations in Mongolia and the combat
experiences of the Korean War are cited by the authors as examples of such a scenario.
Finally, the fourth variant assumes that each of the opposing sides would select,
based on mutual agreement beforehand, to establish a more purely defensive stance.
Decisive counteroffensives would be conducted only at the tactical level (including
battalion, regimental or, at most, division-size units) and the opposing sides would not
seek a decisive military victory at either the operational or strategic level.191 Under these






strike" systems and strictly offensively-oriented units would be severely curtailed or
prohibited.
The authors acknowledge that achieving a more stable and less offensively-oriented
posturing of forces, as well as convincing the other side of peaceful intentions, presents
great difficulty. According to Kokoshin and Larionov,
The most appropriate [variant] for the idea of strengthening strategic stability and
reducing military potentials of each of the sides to the limits of sufficiency, dictated
only by the needs of the defense in its semblance brought to a logical end, is the
fourth variant.192
G. A PROGRESS REPORT BY ANDREI KOKOSHIN IN DECEMBER 1988
Were the Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies to adopt and then clearly implement
a force posture resembling the fourth variant described above, that would go a long way
toward erasing western doubts regarding the validity of the "defensive doctrine." Despite
the recommendations of Kokoshm and Larionov, a purely defensive force posturing may
be under consideration, but was not immediately adopted. This observation was
confirmed by Andrei Kokoshin, one of the two original authors, in an interview published
in Detente magazine in December 1988. 193 The correspondent refers to the previously
cited article and asks Kokoshin to confirm that, of the four variants of force deployments




193Interview with Andrei Kokoshin, Deputy Director of the USA and Canada Institute,
by an unnamed correspondent: "Rethinking Victory. An Interview with Andrei Kokoshin,"
Detente, No. 13, 1988. Quoted in FBIS-SOV-88-238, 12 December 1988, 13.
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That assessment could have been regarded as accurate even three months ago, but
is already out-of-date. Things are moving very quickly here. There is now a real
possibility that the USSR will adopt the third model as its goal. We shall see what
are the results of the current major review of military strategy.1**
Kokoshin does not explicitly deny the interviewer's presumption concerning the current
Soviet force posturing, and his wording clearly implies that the USSR at that time had not
adopted the third model. They also clearly had not yet adopted the fourth. Through
elimination, we can probably assume then that Kokoshin believed the force structure at
that time to be in a period of transition between the second and the third models.
Unfortunately, the precise date of the interview is not annotated in the FBIS translation.
I can only tell the approximate date of the interview as being after the publication of the
Larionov-Kokoshin article in June 1988 and before the date of publication of the follow-up
interview in November of that year. Kokoshin referred to some sort of change occurring
some "three months ago..." This indicates a transition of some form that must have fallen
between March and September of 1988.
The November interview with Kokoshin is notable for its validation of other points
as well. For instance, Kokoshin reveals that the military department of the USA and
Canada Institute was then conducting a discussion on the changing meaning of the term
"victory." This would influence the Soviet view of the necessary military force
deployments since the leadership must determine at what point in a conflict to end
hostilities; this would also define whether Soviet forces would pursue an enemy into his
own territory and whether this would be accomplished at the strategic, operational or




Second, Kokoshin stated that "...the main obstacles to implementing non-offensive
defense in practice are material, not doctrinal, ones." For example, Kokoshin explained that
the USSR had encountered complex problems in withdrawing forces and removing
installations from East Germany. In explaining the sort of problems to be surmounted
before the "non-offensive defense" can be implemented, Kokoshin tacitly admits that the
"defensive doctrine" had not then been fully implemented. This reinforces western claims
that, regardless of the Warsaw Pact declaration of May 1987, the defensive doctrine had
not yet taken effect.
Third, Kokoshin states that Maj Gen Larionov's colleagues at the General Staff
Academy felt that the four-model scheme presented by the two authors provides a good
framework within which to consider current issues. I would interpret this to mean that
the four models presented by Larionov and Kokoshin bear a reasonable approximation to
the variants then under consideration by others in the Soviet military leadership. Finally,
the interviewer asks Kokoshin to confirm whether it is true that "...only a narrow circle of
specialists like yourself fully appreciate the meaning of the non-offensive defense."
Kokoshin again does not directly answer the question, but states, "We are making efforts
to correct that situation." 195 By admitting that such a situation exists, Kokoshin is
indirectly verifying another suspicion of western analysts: that there is (or at least was in
late 1988) still a great deal of confusion even within Soviet circles concerning the meaning
of the "defensive doctrine."
Most important to our current discussion, though, is Kokoshin' s belief that the USSR




counteroffensive phase follows an initial defensive phase on the part of both sides, but the
objective of the counteroffensive is limited—such attacks would be allowable only at the
tactical and the operational levels, but not at the strategic level. Furthermore, the side
attacked would not seek total annihilation of the enemy, but only to restore the original
status quo which existed before the war. While an understanding of the rough outlines
of likely future Soviet defense deployments is important, it remains difficult, if not
impossible, to speculate exactly how such a structure will appear. Furthermore, it is hard
to imagine that either side would be able to limit counteroffensives strictly at or below the
operational level, especially in the confused environment of a modern war. Some clues to
future force dispositions may be gleaned from Soviet actions in demobilizing some of their
forces in Eastern Europe.
H. ONGOING SOVIET REDUCTIONS: REASONS FOR CONCERN?
The unilateral Soviet troop reductions have been under way in Eastern Europe since
1988. An accurate assessment of the deactivation and demobilization of Soviet forces
withdrawn from Eastern Europe is of great concern to western analysts. In an interview
published in Izvestiva in February 1989, Minister of Defense, Army General Yazov was
emphatic concerning the ultimate disposition of the units being withdrawn:
The six tank divisions that are being removed from the GDR, the CSSR, and
Hungary are being disbanded. I repeat: disbanded, not deployed elsewhere. The
divisions remaining on our allies' territory are being reformed and given a clearly
marked defensive structure.19*
196Army General D. T. Yazov, "In the Interests of Universal Security and Peace,"
Izvestiva. 28 February 1989. Quoted in FBIS-SOV-89-038, 28 February 1989, 2.
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Despite General Yazov's assurances, Mr. Graham Turbiville believes that the
demobilization process bears close watching. He points out many parallels between
today's reforms and force reductions implemented in the Red Army's post-World War Two
demobilization between 1945-48. This historical precedent may provide some insights into
the current reduction process. It may also give us some clues regarding what pitfalls to
avoid. Turbiville is particularly concerned with the demobilization of the six divisions
commented upon by General Yazov, which are due to be withdrawn by the end of 1990.
Turbiville explains his concerns as follows. After World War Two, several Soviet units
ostensibly slated to be disbanded were in fact preserved by being scaled down in size and
incorporated into existing military units. For instance, divisions often became brigades
while many regiments were reduced to the status of a battalion. ,97 Instead of being
dismantled, these smaller units were designated to form cadre bases for rapid expansion
of each unit back to its full wartime capacity, if necessary. According to Turbiville, many
of these cadre bases were later fleshed-out once the Cold War intensified and the USSR
increased the number of divisions opposing NATO.
The concerns expressed by Mr. Turbiville are supported by scattered evidence from
Soviet military literature. There have been calls in the Soviet military press to preserve
several of the units being withdrawn within existing organizations. 198 If the Soviets
follow the course of the post-World War Two demobilization, at least some of these units
will be preserved as cadre nuclei. Turbiville declares that preserving these units as cadre
197Graham H. Turbiville, Jr., "Restructuring the Soviet Ground Forces," Military Review,
No. 12, 1989: 21-22.
198Several examples are cited in Graham H. Turbiville, "Restructuring the Soviet Ground
Forces," Military Review, No. 12, 1989: 23-24.
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nuclei would allow the Soviets to rapidly remobilize these units should they decide to do
so. His concerns are reinforced by Mr. Christopher Donnelly of the Soviet Studies
Research Centre, Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst. Mr. Donnelly believes that "...a full-
strength [Soviet] division can be reduced to anything between 15 and 50 percent strength,
safe in the knowledge that, in the event of crisis, it can be reformed effectively in about 3
weeks." 199 If the Soviets do preserve some of their original divisional cadres within
existing units—and we manage to substantiate this point—then some in the West will
undoubtedly "cry foul." Such a matter will have to be addressed within the context of the
overall East-West force reduction process. Nonetheless, while I would agree with
Turbiville that the West should closely monitor the demobilization this time around, I
would also hasten to point out how events of early 1990 demonstrated that the Soviet
mobilization process suffers from a number of deficiencies.
In an interview published in Krasnaya zvezda. Chief of the General Staff, Army
General M. Moiseyev disclosed that, in the USSR's semiannual call-up for the draft last fall,
over 6,000 draftees failed to even show up. Moreover, when the Soviet military leadership
ordered a partial mobilization to provide forces to quell the nationalist uprisings in
Azerbaijan, protests erupted and many recruits simply failed to report for duty. Moiseyev
states that at least 1,200 deserters fled the army, many of them to join up with their
respective ethnic armed groups. 200 There were reports that some Soviet soldiers of
Armenian and Azeri descent simply deserted to fight for their respective sides. Some
'"Christopher N. Donnelly, "Gorbachev's Military Doctrine: Implications for Arms
Control Negotiations," in Beyond Burdensharing: Future Alliance Defense Cooperation
(Brussels, Belgium: The United States Mission to NATO, 1989), 94.
^ill Keller, "Session Called on Soviet Chiefs Role," New York Times, 11 February
1990, A4.
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unsubstantiated reports evert surfaced of entire Armenian and Azeri units—which had been
mobilized by local authorities without permission from Moscow—clashing in open warfare,
although their intention may originally have been merely to halt the bloody fighting under
way between civilians. M The resulting disorder was so great that the mobilization
order was rescinded by Moscow within a week. 2CB
Christopher Donnelly highlights another factor which the West should consider
regarding Soviet motives in pursuing troop reductions in Europe. Donnelly states that
current Soviet assessments demonstrate that a fully deployed NATO can establish a
defense so effective that it will resist attempts at breakthrough with conventional weapons
alone. Success in a Soviet conventional offensive requires that they achieve a rapid
destruction of NATO forces and prevent the war from escalating to the nuclear threshold.
But a rapid victory, according to Donnelly, is inconsistent in conventional conditions in the
presence of a dense defense. Therefore, the density of an opposing conventional defense
must be reduced, and this is best accomplished either by achieving surprise in launching
a war, or through negotiations before the onset of hostilities. Donnelly states that the
Soviets have calculated that a 25 percent reduction in force densities on both sides will
prevent the defender from fielding an impenetrable defense. Therefore, according to the
stated Soviet calculations, a mutually-balanced force reduction at moderate levels actually
^"This information was related in an UNCLASSIFIED lecture presented by Lt Col
Donald Vik, USA, on 7 February 1990 at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey,
CA.
^Michael Dobbs, '"Afghanistan Syndrome' and Ethnic Strife Ambush the Army,"
Washington Post National Weekly Edition, 5-11 February 1990, 18.
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acts in the Soviets' favor. M What Mr. Donnelly perhaps does not consider in this case
is that significant force reductions could also rob Soviet forces of the overwhelming
offensive edge which they now enjoy; simply put, below a certain threshold, Soviet forces
would themselves be forced to take a more defensive stance, especially if deprived of their
current overwhelming tank superiority and other offensively-oriented units.
I. SPRING 1990: AN ENTIRELY NEW PICTURE FOR THE KREMLIN
All the previously mentioned force structures and demobilization plans were
developed under very different circumstances than where the Soviets find themselves
today. Soviet war planners now face a drastically different scenario than they did only a
short time ago. In early 1990, the Warsaw Pact appears to be in shambles. The Soviets
have for years had doubts regarding how well their allies would fight alongside them in
combat; now, no Kremlin planner can assume that any of them would fight, period. Now
it is variously speculated that all Soviet forces in Eastern Europe will soon be withdrawn
to the USSR. In this dramatically altered situation, we must ask a new set of questions:
If most or all Soviet forces are withdrawn to the USSR, what sort of defensive stance
would the Soviets then assume? What will be the future character of the Soviet Armed
Forces?
J. EVIDENCE OF MOUNTING INTEREST IN "FORTIFIED REGIONS"
First, what structure will the Soviet Armed Forces assume inside the USSR? In an
article in International Defense Review last summer, Charles Pritchard presents one idea.
^Christopher N. Donnelly, "Gorbachev's Military Doctrine: Implications for Arms
Control Negotiations," in Beyond Burdensharing: Future Alliance Defense Cooperation
(Brussels, Belgium: The United States Mission to NATO, 1989), 95.
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According to Pritchard, there is mounting evidence to indicate that the Soviets will soon
begin to construct a system of fixed, defensive fortifications in so-called "fortified regions"
along the Soviet frontier. Specifically, Pritchard cites a February 1989 speech in which he
claimed that Army General D. T. Yazov declared that the USSR would compensate for its
large defensive reductions in Eastern Europe by constructing fortifications in the western
USSR and converting motorized rifle divisions into "machine gun /artillery divisions" for
defensive purposes in the eastern and southern USSR. "* A close inspection of that
article, however, revealed that Yazov made no specific reference to constructing fortified
regions, but that he did refer to the conversion of "machine gun/ artillery divisions" as Mr.
Pritchard claimed Although the Soviets as far as I know have not officially acknowledged
that such "fortified regions" will be constructed, I agree with Mr. Pritchard that the Soviets
have shown increased interest in such structures and that the subject therefore merits
serious consideration by western analysts.
Pritchard demonstrates that the idea of "fortified regions" has received an unusual
amount of attention in the Soviet military press in recent years. Among the works cited
were: a book entitled Fortification, Past and Present, written by V.I. Levykin in 1987, and
an article entitled "Fortified Regions in the Western Borders of the USSR," in the December
1987 issue of the Military History Tournal . 205
In the cited magazine article, Colonel AG. Khorkov describes a "fortified region" of
the Great Patriotic War era.
204Army General D. T. Yazov, "In the Interests of Universal Security and Peace,"
Izvestiva, 28 February 1989. Quoted in Charles G. Pritchard, "Soviet Fortified Regions: A




A fortified area was a strip of terrain equipped with a system of permanent and
field fortifications and prepared for extended defense by specially assigned troops
in cooperation with the combined-arms units and formations.206
Between 1928 and 1941, a series of three different lines of defensive fortifications was built
along the western Soviet frontier. Similar positions were also constructed in the eastern
USSR to protect against a Japanese attack. According to Charles Pritchard, the western
defensive lines lacked sufficient depth and frontage, advanced forward posts, all-around
defense and defensive lines connecting the major positions. 7a As a result, despite
desperate Soviet defensive actions, these positions quickly fell victim to the Nazi onslaught
in the summer of 1941. In the initial border battles, several "fortified regions" did hold
sizeable German forces at bay long enough to buy time for the Red Army to frantically
establish other defensive lines. So-called "field fortified regions"—brigade-strength units
made up of machine gun, mortar and artillery battalions—were also used as anchors on
hurriedly constructed defensive lines in front of Moscow and other major cities. 20B Due
to poor preparations, however, the "fortified regions" did little to halt the advancing
German armies.
Given that the "fortified regions" of the Great Patriotic War fared so poorly, why
would the Soviets again be interested in constructing such a system? Charles Pritchard
speculates that two factors—the advent of nuclear weapons and the vicarious combat
experience of the Korean and Vietnam wars—convinced the Soviets to again investigate the
206Col A. G. Khorkov, "The Fortified Areas on the Western Frontiers of the USSR,"
Military History lournal. No. 12, 1987: 47-54. Quoted in JPRS-UMJ-88-006, 14 June 1988,
25.
^Charles G. Pritchard, "Soviet Fortified Regions: A New 'Cult of the Defense?'"




idea of "fortified regions." The advent of nuclear weapons led to the construction of many
hardened command and control bunkers, missile silos and fallout shelters of various sorts.
The conflicts in Korea, Vietnam, and to a lesser extent in the Middle East, witnessed the
employment of extensive field fortifications for defensive purposes. According to
Pritchard, adopting such a defensive system would allow the Soviets to protect border
regions with small standing forces which could be reinforced by local reserve units. 209
Charles Pritchard speculates that the new "fortified regions" would consist of state-of-the-
art fortifications with sophisticated sensors, minefields, remotely-controlled automatic
weapons (including mortars and artillery) and air defense systems. The facilities would
also be sufficiently hardened to withstand the overpressures experienced in any attacks
using nuclear weapons or fuel-air explosives. 210
Author Graham Turbiville has also extensively studied the question of Soviet interest
in "fortified regions." In an April 1989 report, Mr. Turbiville outlines an impressive array
of evidence from recent Soviet writings which does reveal a growing interest in the
construction of "fortified regions." In addition to citing some of the same sources d ascribed
by Charles Pritchard, Mr. Turbiville calls our attention to a series of articles discussing
Soviet perceptions of the events occurring within the initial period of a war. These articles
appeared during 1988 in the USSR's Military History Journal . Prominent among these





211Yu. Perechnev, "On Several Questions of Preparing the Country and Armed Forces
to Repel Fascist Aggression," Military History Journal, No. 4, 1988: 42-50. Quoted in
Graham H. Turbiville, Emerging Issues of Soviet Strategy in an Era of Reform: Preparing
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More pertinent to the current debate over force deployments, Mr. Turbiville calls our
attention to what he believes is a direct tie between recent interest in the historical models
of World War Two "fortified regions" and the current Warsaw Pact "defensive doctrine."
Notably, in the 1988 book Engineer Support of Combat, author Ye. Kolibernov writes,
In May 1987 at the Berlin Conference of the Political Consultative Committee of
the member states of the Warsaw Pact, a military doctrine having a defensive
character was accepted. In this connection, the defensive actions of forces and their
engineer support in the initial period of war acquired important significance. Special
attention to preparing for such actions must be made in regard to the advance
fortified equipping of positions, and the execution of preparatory measures for
obstacle emplacement, the equipping of crossings and routes, water supply, and
troop camouflage. 2U
Mr. Turbiville also points out that Kokoshin and Larionov took special note of
preparing field fortifications in their 1988 article discussing four possible deployments of
general purpose forces. 213 Specifically, the authors noted,
As for the very nature of an organization for combat, the engineer preparation of
defensive lines must become the subject of more detailed comparative research and
joint discussions by representatives of each side. Questions on the degree of thinning
out the defense and arraying forces according to depth may be examined in this
regard, as may questions on the nature of the relationship of a positional defense to
its activeness, etc. 2U
for a New Military Posture for Theater War (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Soviet Army Studies
Office, 1989), 18.
2UYe. Kolibernov, Engineer Support of Combat (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1988), 6-7.
Quoted in Graham H. Turbiville, Emerging Issues of Soviet Military Strategy in an Era of
Reform: Preparing for Theater War (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Soviet Army Studies Office,
1989), 26.
213A. Kokoshin and V. Larionov, "The Counterpositioning of General Purpose Forces





Mr. Turbiville's impressive study largely echoes the findings of Charles Pritchard.
Turbiville admits that efforts to predict future Soviet construction of "fortified regions"
simply on the basis of the scattered literary evidence is clearly tentative. Still, he suggests
the historical precedent cannot be ignored and that it is consistent with Soviet thinking on
the "defensive doctrine" as highlighted in recent declarations by Soviet Defense Minister
Yazov. 215 Furthermore, Turbiville speculates that the "fortified regions" may serve to
cover the deployment of combined-arms forces positioned immediately to the rear, and
provide time required for mobilization and movement of reinforcements from rear areas.
These fixed fortified regions could pin down and channel any penetrating attackers and
serve as cover and support areas for the launching of offensive or counteroffensive thrusts.
This system would be compatible with combined-arms offensive operations by a force
structure that was smaller and more mobile than the current Soviet structure. 216
Although the evidence indicating Soviet adoption of a system of "defensive regions"
is still very sketchy, it is a tantalizing concept which deserves western attention. Exactly
what is going on is uncertain, but changes are definitely occurring in the military's
organizational structure inside the USSR. In 1989, two of the major defense administrative
regions-the Central Asian and Ural Military Districts—were abolished and merged into
215Graham H. Turbiville, Emerging Issues of Soviet Military Strategy in an Era of
Reform: Preparing for a New Military Posture for Theater War (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Soviet
Army Studies Office, 1989), 23. Turbiville cites as evidence the same Yazov speech
referenced by Charles Pritchard: "In the Interests of Universal Security and Peace,"
Izvestiva, 28 February 1989.
216/Graham H. Turbiville, Emerging Issues of Soviet Military Strategy in an Era of
Reform: Preparing for a New Military Posture for Theater War (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Soviet
Army Studies Office, 1989), 23-24.
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neighboring districts. 217 Any connection of this administrative reshuffling to the
construction of the new "fortified regions" or adoption of a new military structure, if there
is any, remains unclear.
K. A TRANSITION IN THE OVERALL SOVIET ARMED FORCES STRUCTURE?
If the Soviets do build a new version of the system of "fortified regions," it will mark
a historic shift in their post-World War Two military strategy. It will also be a convincing
step toward actual implementation of the declared "defensive doctrine." Finally, such a
move would fit into Gorbachev's plans for a huge drawdown in military manpower, since
it would allow the Soviets to man these frontier defenses with a relatively smaller force
which could be rapidly reinforced in times of crises by territorial militia or reserve units.
Mikhail Gorbachev's planned cuts of more than half a million troops from the Red
Army will, in the least, cause a major restructuring of that force, and may make necessary
the transition to an entirely new force concept. In fact, the future structure of the Soviet
Armed Forces has been the subject of a major debate both between military officials and
civilian analysts, and within military circles. One fascinating glimpse into the military
debate is described by Alex Alexiev. Alexiev writes of a roundtable discussion involving
seven officers from the Main Political Administration and a like number of civilian
researchers and journalists. This forum, which was sponsored by the magazine Twentieth
Century and Peace, took place in 1988. Perhaps the most intriguing statement emerging
from the conference was made by Maj General N. Chaldymov, the ranking member of the
panel:
217 This information was drawn from two Krasnava zvezda articles of the same title ("In
the USSR Ministry of Defense") printed on 3 June and 2 Sept 1989, as cited in Graham H.
Turbiville, Jr., "Restructuring the Soviet Ground Forces," Military Review, No. 11, 1989: 27.
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Such an army as we have today, an army that practically preserves its postwar
structure, is no longer needed. The new circumstances require a radical restructuring
of all army structures. The contemporary army must be built on different
principles.218
The participants of the roundtable discussed at length several alternatives to the current
Soviet army structure. Among those discussed were a volunteer army, similar to that of
the U.S., which the Soviets seem to consistently refer to as a "professional army." Two
other variants, one a system of mixed cadre and militia units and the other a military
based on a territorial militia, were also considered. 219 The participants discussed how
the different variants could improve Soviet civilian-military relations as well as present a
less threatening posturing of Soviet forces in the prevailing international environment. One
participant noted that the transition to a cadre-militia system would halt the current Soviet
military buildup and realign the present massive army structure which, despite the
proclaimed Warsaw Pact "defensive doctrine," could be perceived as threatening by foreign
countries. 22D As pointed out by Alexiev, the contents of this roundtable should be noted
but not blown out of proportion by analysts. Only one conclusion can be definitely drawn
from this conference, that being that a debate on the future military structure is ongoing
within the Soviet Armed Forces. However, I believe that one can safely assume that the
views expressed and the variants discussed by the conference attendees reflect some of
those being discussed by other leaders of the Armed Forces.
218
"Army and Society," Twentieth Century and Peace, No. 9, 1988. Quoted in Alex
Alexiev, "Is There a Professional Army in the Soviet Future?" Report on the USSR, 6
January 1989, 10.
219Alex Alexiev, "Is There a Professional Army in the Soviet Future?" Report on the
USSR, 6 January 1989, 10.
"Tbid.,!!.
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The debate over the future force structure first received widespread western attention
in late 1988 when Lt Col Alexander Savinkin called for the military to undergo a transition
into a "professional army," in order to shift additional manpower into the civilian economy
and convince the West that the USSR no longer represented a threat to anyone. Savinkin
maintained that such a transformation would upgrade the "quality and orderliness of the
armed services" and convert them into "perfectly technically equipped, professionally
trained [services]...supported by a vast network of local militia formations."221
In December 1988, the controversy widened as members of some of the emerging
civilian "think tanks" added their voices to the debate. Sergei Karaganov, deputy director
of the Western Europe Institute in Moscow, declared that the future Soviet Army should
consist of a small career force of military specialists who could better handle the
increasingly more technical aspects of modern warfare. 232 In July 1989, another
prominent official announced his support for a volunteer army. Professor Vladimir
Lapygin, chairman of the newly created Committee on the Problems of Defense and State
Security of the Supreme Soviet, stated that he supports the transformation of the force into
a professional army. 223 It should be noted, however, that Mr. Lapygin seemed to modify
his position the following month, as revealed in an interview in the magazine Sovetskiy
224
voin.
221A. Savinkin, "What Kind of Army Do We Need?" Moscow News, No. 45, 1988, 6.
Quoted in FBIS-SOV-88-232, 2 December 1988, 90-91.
^Bernard E. Trainor, "Soviet Leaders Debating Shape of a Future Army," New York
Times, 31 July 1989, A3.
^'"Professional Army' Causes Debate," lane's Defence Weekly, 29 July 1989, 172.
^Interview with V. Lapygin, Sovetskiy voin. No. 19, 1989. Quoted in Robert Arnett
and Mary Fitzgerald, "Is the Soviet Military Leadership Yielding on an All-Volunteer
Army?" Report on the USSR, 30 March 1990, 3.
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Although there have been quite a few lower-ranking military officers who publicly
supported a transition to a volunteer force, most of the senior military leaders still favor
the old conscription system. So far, the only notable exception has been the commander-
in-chief of the Soviet Navy, Admiral of the Fleet \fodimir Chernavin. The admiral's
reasons for favoring a volunteer service seem primarily related to the specific needs of the
navy. In response to a proposal to decrease the current term of service for naval enlistees
from three to two years, Chernavin firmly stated that the navy would be unable to operate
under those circumstances. Using as a vehicle for discussion the investigation into the
April 1989 sinking of a Mike-class submarine, Chernavin publicly revealed that he had sent
to the Minister of Defense a set of proposals for the creation of a volunteer navy. Z2S On
a related note, as pointed out by Dr. Mikhail Tsypkin, political leaders like Vadim
Medvedev and even General Secretary Gorbachev, while keeping out of the fray in the
military, have publicly supported limited reforms of the military, including the
reestablishment of draft exemptions for college students and the early discharge of
currently conscripted students. 226
Those in favor of a new volunteer force—mainly civilian analysts—say that the cost
incurred by such a system may be much less than that predicted by defenders of the old
system, and that a reduction in overall troop strength even beyond Gorbachev's announced
cuts would make it possible to further reduce costs. Another factor that will undoubtedly
figure prominently into the debate—although probably not in open forums—is the political
advantage that could be secured by ethnic Russians in going to a volunteer force. If
^Mikhail Tsypkin, "Will the Soviet Navy Become a Volunteer Force?" Report on the




current demographic trends continue, the Great Russians will soon be a minority within
the USSR. According to the 1989 Soviet census, the Great Russians constitute a slim
majority of the Soviet population at 50.8 percent, down from 52.4 percent in 1979. 227
Although the three Slavic nationalities of Great Russians, Ukrainians and Byelorussians still
together constitute 69.7 percent of the population, Moscow's leadership is alarmed that the
growth of the six Muslim ethnic nationalities ranged from two and a half times to five
times that of the population as a whole. 22B Since the Red Army is a microcosm of the
society at large, it goes without saying that the percentage of non-Russians in the military
is growing as well. Fears of Islamic fundamentalist movements in Central Asia and a
general wariness of "minority" conscripts may make the Army's leadership more receptive
to the idea of a smaller, regular army which could be kept predominantly Slavic. 22P
Except for Admiral Chemavin, the senior military hierarchy seems determined to
maintain the old conscription system. Former chief of the General Staff Marshal Sergei
Akhromeyev firmly opposes the alteration of the current system. He considers such
proposals "...unacceptable for the formation of the Army and the Navy." 23° Even more
bitter was the response of Army General A. Lizichev, chief of the Main Political
Administration. Lizichev rejected the idea of a territorial militia and pointed out that
certain of the proposed variants had already been tested in the history of the USSR and
^Ann Sheehy, "Russian Share of Soviet Population Down to 50.8 Percent," Report on
the USSR, 20 October 1989, 1.
^Ibid., 2-3.
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See, for example, Alex Alexiev's article 'Is There a Professional Army in the Soviet
Future?" Report on the USSR, 6 January 1989, 11.
230Sergei Akhromeyev, "Army and Restructuring," Soviet Russia, 14 January 1989, 3.
Quoted in Stephen Foye, "Debate Continues on the Fundamental Restructuring of the
Soviet Armed Forces," Report on the USSR, 14 April 1989, 13.
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had been found unfeasible. On the other hand, Lizichev cited Soviet victories in the Civil
War and the Great Patriotic War as ample proof that the existing conscription system was
effective. 231 In a more structured rebuttal to calls for military reform, Lt General of
Aviation V. Serebryannikov analyzed why each of the major proposals was not suited for
the modern world. 232 Whereas Lt Col Savinkin had blamed the modern conscript army
as being partly responsible for the early Soviet defeats in World War Two, Serebryannikov
declared that these same defeats were due not to the existence of a large regular army, but
because the USSR had not adopted the conscript system earlier. He pointed out deficiencies
in both the territorial militia and the cadre-militia systems, and stated that these models
"...never have been and could not have been implemented because modern warfare actually
demands mass armies."233 Finally, Serebryannikov warned that, should the USSR
drastically reduce the size of its armed forces, it "...would mean immediate loss of military-
strategic parity." 234
In February 1989, Chief of the General Staff, Army General Moiseyev acknowledged
that the General Staff had received "dozens of proposals" calling for a new force structure.
While Moiseyev noted that some of the ideas were reasonable, most of them he strongly
denounced:
There seem to be widespread opinions that we should unilaterally reduce the
Army by fifty percent, switch to a territorial militia system and create a professional,
231A. Lizichev, "In the Center of Restructuring—the Individual," Krasnaya zvezda, 3
February 1989, 1.
232V. Serebryannikov, "The Army: What Should It Be Like?" Krasnaya zvezda, 12




essentially volunteer, Army. These views ignore the fact that a militia system is
absolutely unrealistic, given today's most complex means of struggle, while
switching to a professional volunteer Army involves a sharp increase—by a factor of
at least 5 to 8-in maintenance costs. Such proposals are naturally unacceptable, and
our attitude toward them must be unambiguous... 235
It is highly unlikely that the senior military leadership is becoming more receptive
to the idea of conversion to a different army structure, but recent statements by a number
of officials would seem to indicate that they are being pressured to consider new options.
In an October 1989 interview, Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev seemed to give some ground
on the issue and admitted that, under some conceivable conditions, a future shift to a
voluntary army was possible. 236 In February 1990, Chief of the General Staff, Army
General M. Moiseyev, highlighted some possible advantages which would be provided by
an all-volunteer army. He even went so far as to state,
...we are studying this problem [the expediency of a professional army]
attentively, and as soon as the international, economic, material, and spiritual
prerequisites are ripe for such a transition, we shall be ready for it. 237
The debate over the future of the Soviet Armed Forces continues today. Some western
analysts, like Robert Arnett and Mary Fitzgerald, believe that the most recent public
statements by senior officials signal a definite shift in their attitude toward the viability of
^Army General M. A. Moiseyev, "From a Defense Doctrine Position, Col Gen M. A.
Moiseyev Meets Communists from the USSR Armed Forces General Staff," Krasnaya
zvezda, 10 February 1989. Quoted in FBIS-SOV-89-028, 13 February 1989, 77-81.
^Interview with Marshal S. Akhromeyev, Krasnaya zvezda, 6 October 1989. Quoted
in Robert Arnett and Mary Fitzgerald, "Is the Soviet Military Leadership Yielding on an
All-Volunteer Army?" Report on the USSR, 30 March 1990, 4.
^V. Litovkin, "Arguments of the General Staff," an interview with Army General M.
Moiseyev, Izvestiva, 23 February 1990. Quoted in FBIS-SOV-90-038, 26 February 1990, 85-6.
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an all-volunteer force. 238 I would agree with the authors that the senior military
leadership is being pressured by their civilian bosses to consider alternatives to the current
force structure, but I do not believe that they will readily agree to such a transition. For
instance, in the interview with Army General Moiseyev on 23 February—which is cited by
Arnett and Fitzgerald as proof of a shift of military opinion in favor of a volunteer army—
the overwhelming majority of the general's comments were in opposition to a force
transition. The military leadership will undoubtedly point to the great uncertainties and
civil unrest in border regions to reinforce their case that the massive military structure
must be preserved in order to safeguard the USSR. Considering all these factors, I believe
that a transition in the overall force structure, although possible, will be strongly opposed
by the senior military leadership. As Alex Alexiev observes,
...genuine reform in the Soviet Armed Forces is neither easy nor certain. What is
clear is that the Red Army finds itself today at a historic crossroads. Which direction
it takes will affect decisively the future of 'perestroyka' and East-West relations
alike 239
L. IMMEDIATE IMPLICATIONS OF THE CONCEPTS DISCUSSED
In early 1990, there is mounting evidence to indicate that Soviet forces in Eastern
Europe are being restructured into a more defensive stance. Granted, the transition in
force structure now under way is the result of decisions which were made years ago, and
plans in place only a few months ago almost certainly will be made obsolete by the
238See Robert Amett and Mary Fitzgerald, "Is the Soviet Military Leadership Yielding
on an All-Volunteer Army?" Report on the USSR, 30 March 1990, 5.
239Alexander Alexiev, "Is There a Professional Army in the Soviet Future?" Report on
the USSR, 6 January 1989, 12.
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political revolutions of late 1989 in Eastern Europe. However, so long as Soviet forces are
stationed in that region, western analysts must be cognizant of the relative capabilities of
those forces. Additionally, some of the concerns expressed by Graham Turbiville on the
withdrawal and demobilization of Soviet forces will remain important in any scenario.
Finally, as more and more Soviet forces are withdrawn to the USSR, the models of force
deployments presented by Larionov and Kokoshin, along with Soviet interest in
construction of "fortified regions" and the possible reorganization of the entire Soviet
military structure, will become increasingly important.
As the Soviets continue to withdraw more forces from Eastern Europe, the threat to
Western Europe decreases proportionately. These and similar future moves by the Kremlin
will provide further evidence that the USSR has indeed adopted a "defensive doctrine."
In the last chapter, I described some of the conditions depicted by Mr. Andrew Marshall,
the Pentagon's Chief of Net Assessment, which to him would indicate serious Soviet intent
in adopting such a "defensive doctrine." Three of the factors he described were:
withdrawal of all Soviet forces to native soil, reduction or removal of forward-deployed
offensive units, and construction of fixed defensive positions along Soviet frontiers. One
of these conditions is already being met, assuming that the USSR fully withdraws all its
forces from Eastern Europe. The second is simultaneously being fulfilled as the USSR
reduces the numbers of tanks and artillery pieces in units still deployed in Europe and
withdraws other offensively-oriented units such as assault-landing units and assault river-
crossing assets. Should the Soviets begin to construct the so-called "fortified regions," they
will have met the third of Mr. Marshall's requirements. I am not sure that Mr. Marshall
would agree with my conclusions, but it is my belief that, based on the conditions which
he described last November, the Soviets are moving farther toward assuming a truly
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defensive doctrine. Furthermore, a future Kremlin decision to reduce its military forces
beyond the levels already announced by Gorbachev, would furnish even more proof of
peaceful Soviet intentions. Adoption by the Kremlin of a much smaller force structure,
under any of the variants described in this chapter, would provide incontrovertible
evidence of a genuinely "defensive" doctrine. While I do believe that the Soviets have
already done much to make their military forces less threatening, the prudent course for
the West at this time is not to rush blindly forward and take too much for granted. In the
wake of the dramatic events of late 1989, however, there can be no doubt that we now face
a less aggressive and somewhat reduced Soviet threat.
M. BLEAK PROSPECTS FOR MOSCOW
The original intent of Mikhail Gorbachev in unleashing the torrent of change which
has swept the USSR and Eastern Europe since 1985, will probably never be known.
Whatever his original intent, Gorbachev has in the past few months been unpleasantly
surprised and disappointed with some cf the fruits of these reforms. Now, in early 1990,
a European security environment once dominated by a Soviet military juggernaut has
crumbled into a very confused scenario which has virtually dissolved the Warsaw Pact and
presents any Soviet war planner with a terribly complicated and bleak prospect.
Already this year, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary have all called on the USSR
to withdraw troops from their soil. The Kremlin announced on 11 February that it was
willing to begin negotiations on the pullout of all the more than 40,000 troops stationed in
Poland. 24° Due to the continued uncertainties over the Polish-German border question,
240
"Moscow Open to Talks on Pullout in Poland," New York Times, 12 February 1990,
A6.
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however, Prime Minister Mazowiecki has requested that Soviet troops remain until the
dispute is resolved. 241 On 26 February, President Vaclav Havel of Czechoslovakia
traveled to Moscow to meet with President Gorbachev. In that meeting, the two leaders
signed treaties providing for the withdrawal of all Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia. All
73,500 Soviet troops on Czechoslovakia soil are to be withdrawn by 1 July 1991. Even as
the two leaders met, Soviet tanks were being loaded onto railcars for the return trip to the
USSR. 242 Hungary also demanded that Moscow withdraw all the 50,000 soldiers on her
soil. However, on 1 March, talks on troop withdrawals were suspended, possibly as a
result of Moscow's displeasure over very shrill Hungarian public pronouncements.2*3
Talks apparently resumed quickly, however, and on 10 March Hungarian and Soviet
officials signed an agreement providing for a complete withdrawal of all Soviet troops in
Hungary no later than 30 June 1991. 244
As mentioned previously, Chief of the Soviet General Staff, Army General M.
Moiseyev, declared that the USSR had by 1 October 1989 already withdrawn the following
forces from Eastern Europe: 3 tank divisions, 3 tank training regiments, 2 SAM training
regiments, 1 air regiment, and other assorted units. 24S Well in advance of Moiseyev's
statements, other Soviet officials had claimed that force cuts had already drastically
241Klas Bergman, "Poland Takes Border Question to the West," Christian Science
Monitor, 6 March 1990, 4.
^Francis X. Clines, "Gorbachev Sees Havel and Agrees to Speed Withdrawal of
Troops," New York Times, 27 February 1990, Al, A8.
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244Colonel Gyorgy Keleti, in a statement aired on Budapest Domestic Service Radio on
11 March 1990. Quoted in FBIS-EEU-90-048, 12 March 1990, 44.
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reduced the USSR's military potential in Eastern Europe, in accordance with the declared
"defensive doctrine." For example, in a January 1989 New Times article, Maj General G.
Batenin noted how the Soviet peace initiatives had already gone a long way toward
providing for the safety of the "common European home." Perhaps most startling in that
article was the general's discussion of Soviet operational maneuver groups, or OMGs,
which had been in place in Eastern Europe, but which now have been reportedly
dismantled due to the unilateral Soviet cutbacks. 246
Although a Soviet/Warsaw Pact attack on NATO was certainly conceivable in the
past, any Soviet plans for an attack now seem almost absurd. Should the Kremlin still
entertain any ideas of launching a conventional attack on Western Europe, the emerging
situation will present Soviet war planners with a nightmarish scenario. NATO now should
have increased warning time of any threatening Soviet moves. (As of April 1990, the U.S.
Central Intelligence Agency had publicly modified its assessment to state that the U.S. and
NATO would have at least one to six months warning of an impending Soviet attack,
given the changed European defensive environment. 247 Other media and even
Congressional sources have since given estimates of warning times up to one year or
more.) Once Soviet troops are withdrawn to native soil, they will face an additional march
of over 300 miles in any advance toward the Rhine. Moreover, the Warsaw Pact, except
for its not inconsiderable Soviet forces, has practically collapsed. Whereas most of
Moscow's allies presented dubious reliability in a war scenario in the past, Soviet troops
246Maj General G. Batenin, "It Takes Two to Build a Bridge," New Times, No. 3, 1989:
10-11.
247Molly Moore and Patrick E. Tyler, "Richard Cheney on the Defensive," Washington
Post National Weekly Edition, 23-29 April 1990, 6.
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would now certainly be on their own. In addition, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary
are all moving rapidly down the path toward becoming western-style democracies, and the
GDR will soon be absorbed into a democratic, unified Federal Republic of Germany. If
these trends continue, an attacking Red Army would face not only the prospect of having
to advance an additional three hundred miles or more through those countries to reach
NATO states; once Soviet troops have been withdrawn from Eastern Europe, they would
almost certainly have to fight their way back in.
While the United States faces certain dilemmas in determining its future military and
foreign policies, the Soviet Union's scenario is drastically more complicated. In sum,
whether this sort of withdrawal of forces from Eastern Europe is what Mikhail Gorbachev
had in mind is well on its way to becoming a moot point. If these reductions and
withdrawals proceed as expected, Kremlin military planners will face a drastically different
and more complicated security situation in Europe, which would certainly make any Soviet
attack toward the West a much more perilous enterprise than before.
The trends discussed in this chapter—changes in the force structure of those Soviet
forces which still remain in Eastern Europe, mounting Kremlin interest in constructing new
"fortified regions," and a possible remodeling of the entire Soviet Armed Forces—will play
a crucial role in the preservation of Soviet military power, which to date has embodied that
country's only true claim to superpower status. With due consideration of all these factors,
the United States must move quickly to construct and propose a decisive but well-
considered and reasonable foreign policy to deal with the new and ever more complex
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security environment. The next chapter will address in some detail how the events of 1989
will alter the US-Soviet relationship in the single most important theater of relations
between the two countries: Europe.
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VII. U.S. RESPONSE TO THE CHANGING EUROPEAN SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
Since the closing days of the Second World War, the United States and the Soviet
Union, along with their respective allies, have faced-off across the borders between Eastern
and Western Europe. This region was armed progressively to the point that it became the
most heavily fortified place on Earth. And then suddenly, the earthshaking events of the
closing months of 1989 ushered in a new era for all the powers involved there. The
apparent dismantling of the Warsaw Pact, or Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), along
with the inevitable reunification of Germany, confronts the U.S. and her NATO allies with
crucial, landmark decisions regarding the future security of the continent. As Ambassador
Jeane Kirkpatrick noted in her recent article in Foreign Affairs, the Cold War may nearly
be over; the postwar era is absolutely finished. 248
In this dramatically new environment, the U.S. and the USSR must both refocus their
foreign policies. Ambassador Kirkpatrick observes that bDth superpowers, after forty-five
years as the undisputed leaders in a bipolar world, now have in common the prospect of
facing an increasingly diminished role in Europe. 249 The object of this chapter will be
to examine some of the most important factors in the new superpower relationship; explore
the crucial issues involved, and analyze some of the approaches which might be available
to both countries. Of central importance in this discussion will be the security environment
in Europe as it affects future US-Soviet relations.




Since 1945, the perceived threat of Soviet domination—if not outright invasion—of
Western Europe, prompted the U.S. to abandon its traditional isolationist policy and
assume a leadership role in the defense of the region. Almost all of the great hallmarks
of U.S. foreign policy over the last four decades—among them the Truman Doctrine, the
Marshall Plan, the policy of containment, and the formation of NATO-were elements of
the American and Western European response to the stimulus of Soviet aggression. Now,
as the Kremlin appears to be releasing its stranglehold on Eastern Europe and the
dissolution of the Warsaw Pact seems every day to be more of a reality, the very existence
of NATO has been called into question and, with it, the need of the continued presence of
the U.S. in Europe.
A. SHARED U.S. AND SOVIET INTERESTS
So far, the Bush Administration has shown great sensitivity toward the decline of
Soviet power in Europe, and President Bush has assured Moscow that Washington will not
seek gams at the expense of Kremlin interests. In May 1989, President: Busr declare that
it was time "to move beyond containment" and to integrate the Soviet Union into the
"community of nations." 2S0 In a series of meetings between U.S. Secretary of State James
Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze throughout the year, the two
countries made substantial progress toward future treaties on both conventional and
nuclear forces. In what was characterized as a successful mini-summit at Malta in
December, President Bush and President Gorbachev agreed to a follow-on summit in 1990,
and also discussed the tremendous changes under way in Eastern Europe.
^Arnold L. Horelick, "U.S.-Soviet Relations: Threshold of a New Era," Foreign Affairs
69, No. 1, 1990: 56.
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B. AMERICA MOVES TO BOLSTER ITS EUROPEAN POSITION
While carefully avoiding stepping on Kremlin toes, the U.S. has moved to bolster its
position in European relations. Ever mindful of the expanding importance of the European
Community (EC), Secretary of State Baker declared that the U.S.-EC link "should become
stronger, the issues we discuss more diversified, and our common endeavors more
important."251 While seeking to strengthen its positions in the EC and other forums, the
U.S. also began promoting the idea that NATO continues to be relevant in Europe's future.
It is the position of the U.S. that NATO should be continued as a multipurpose alliance
and that we will continue to play a large role in that body. In a February visit to Europe,
Secretary of State Baker proposed measures that would establish new functions for NATO.
These new functions would include: formation of a NATO arms verification staff;
expansion of NATO's role in dealing with regional conflicts and unconventional weapons,
and allied cooperation to promote human rights and democratic institution-building in
Eastern Europe under the auspices of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe (CSCE). 252 If given the choice, the U.S. will be reluctant to abandon a policy
which has worked so well for the past four decades. So far, the countries of Europe seem
to desire a continued U.S. presence on the continent, but that situation is likely to change.
At best, the U.S. will be forced to accept a much reduced presence on the continent.
According to British political science professor Ken Booth, support should be given to the
251Amy Kaslow, "European Community Sizes Up Its Growing Voice in Geopolitics,'
Christian Science Monitor, 7 March 1990, 1-2.
^Jeane Kirkpatrick, "Beyond the Cold War," Foreign Affairs 69, No. 1, 1990: 15.
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maintenance of American interests in a reformed NATO, but at the same time the
"European pillar" should be strengthened and the number of U.S. troops reduced. 253
C. DIMINISHING KREMLIN PROSPECTS
While the position of the U.S. in Europe remains quite strong, that of the USSR
appears considerably less certain. In a recent article, Arnold Horelick of the RAND
Corporation examined the future role of the Soviets in Europe. The author presents a
mixed picture of Mikhail Gorbachev's motives for loosening the Kremlin's grip on Eastern
Europe. It is his contention that Gorbachev had hoped to spread "perestroika" to Eastern
Europe and construct a less militarized and more cooperative socialist community which
would still be largely controlled by Moscow.254 Horelick believes that, at some point,
Gorbachev had a "game plan," but that the political revolt of Eastern Europe destroyed the
balance which he had hoped to achieve between a lessening of tensions in the East and
Soviet gains through arms control and trade with the West. According to Horelick, the
democratic genies unleashed by Gorbachev have now far outstripped his "game plan" and
gravely weakened the USSR's position in Eastern Europe.
Ironically, according to Arnold Horelick, Moscow's best—if not its only—hope for
preserving a future role in the continent resides in close cooperation with Washington. In
the events of the past few months, Horelick notes that Washington and Moscow have
demonstrated a strong interest in maintaining stability and working together toward
gradual changes in Europe. The leaders of each side have sought to avoid the perception
^'Ken Booth, "Steps Toward Stable Peace in Europe: A Theory and Practice of
Coexistence," International Affairs, No. 1, 1990: 41.
254Arnold Horelick, "U.S.-Soviet Relations: Threshold of a New Era," Foreign Affairs 69,
No. 1, 1990: 59.
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of taking undue advantage of the other side's weaknesses. Perhaps through cooperation
with Washington in such forums as Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), CSCE and the
"two plus four" negotiations, Moscow can attempt to maintain stability in Europe while
also preserving its own interests in the region. Mr. Horelick writes,
For the Soviet Union there can only be the hope that, by slowing down the
process of change in the East and buying time, Moscow can still keep open the
option for developing some kind of community of interests between a vaguely
socialist Eastern Europe and a reconstructed Soviet Union. On this basis, the Soviet
Union as well as the East Europeans could begin to share in the economic and
technological benefits of closer ties with the West. Being left out altogether is
Moscow's nightmare. 255
In the same issue of Foreign Affairs in which Mr. Horelick's article appeared,
Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick also analyzed the future Soviet role in Eastern Europe. 256
She believes that the USSR is now faced with two alternatives. First, it can try to maintain
the status quo, somehow preserve communist parties and governments, and keep Soviet
troops and the Warsaw Pact in place. This option also requires preserving an East German
state while accepting the continued presence of NATO and U.S. troops on the continent.
Or, second, the USSR could sacrifice the East German state for a unified but neutral
Germany, with the expectation that a neutral Germany would spell the end of NATO and
of the U.S. presence on the continent. This option would also re-create in Germany a major
rival in the heart of Europe. 257
As Communist power continues to decline in most of Europe, the second scenario
proposed by Ambassador Kirkpatrick—Soviet acceptance of a neutral Germany or at least
^Ibid., 61




a considerably less threatening Germany in a modified European security environment-
seems much more realistic. As will be addressed in more detail later in this chapter, even
the idea of keeping Soviet troops in place in Eastern Europe is coming more and more into
question. In many respects, the wishes of Moscow regarding the future of Germany are
becoming less important. In the "two plus four" negotiations, Moscow may try to insist
that a unified Germany be neutral, but is unlikely to win on that issue. As Arnold
Horelick points out, a stated position of German neutrality would probably still amount
to nothing but empty words; Horelick observes,
With West Germany in such a powerful position and still so firmly anchored
economically and politically to the West, even formal neutralization could not
ensure a benign balance for Soviet interests. 258
D. THE DOMINANT ISSUE: GERMANY
In all of Europe, the single most dominant issue is the imminent reunification of East
and West Germany. Now, as the Soviet tide recedes, a fear of Moscow is being -eplaced
with a growing fear of a reunited Germany. It is in the peaceful settlement of the "German
question" where the interests of all countries involved are most concerned. The geographic
position, economic capacity and military potential of a reunited Germany will make it the
keystone in any future security framework in Europe.
The country most nervous about the reunification of Germany is, understandably,
Poland. On February 14, Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki of Poland demanded that
his country be allowed to participate in the negotiations which will decide Germany's
^Arnold L. Horelick, "U.S.-Soviet Relations: Threshold of a New Era," Foreign Affairs
69, No. 1, 1990: 65.
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future. 259 Central to Polish concerns are the questions of state borders which were set
in the Yalta Conference of 1943. In that connection, the Polish prime minister has called
for a treaty to insure the stability of Poland's postwar borders with Germany. 26°
Adding to the problem is Poland's perception that West German chancellor Helmut Kohl
is straddling the border issue. In early March, Kohl's insistence on placing added
conditions on such a treaty visibly rankled Mazowiecki. 261 Under increasing pressure
from several western nations, Kohl on 6 March agreed to withdraw his demands. 262 The
gravity of the border question is reflected in a statement made on 20 February by
Bronislaw Geremek, leader of the Solidarity bloc in the Polish Parliament; Geremek
warned, "The only way to change the border is war, and Germany knows it." 263
Furthermore, the border dispute complicates other matters. Until the border question
flared up, a number of Polish leaders, including Lech Walesa, had called for the immediate
withdrawal of the approximately 40,000 Soviet troops garrisoned in the country; in
February, however, Prime Minister Mazowiecki asked that the Soviet troops remain until
the border dispute is resolved. 264
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Is the concern over a reunified Germany being oversold? The answer to that
question must be seen from a European point of view. In the long historical memories of
European peoples, the days of Hitler were only yesterday. And memories of a leading
German role in both world wars this century only further complicate the issue. The
question remains, though, of just what sort of a threat a reunified Germany will present.
According to many authorities, among them former CIA chief Richard Helms, Poland is
understandably worried that a reunified Germany might assert a claim to such historic
German lands as Silesia and East Prussia, and Czechoslovakia may be similarly worried
about the Sudetenland. 26S Some other nations are reportedly not too comfortable with
the idea, either; as noted by Dean Rusk at an autumn 1989 conference of former U.S.
secretaries of state, "Many people in Western and Eastern Europe would be rather terrified
to see the Germans united and rolling like a loose cannon around the deck." 266
But does Moscow have reason for undue concern over German reunification? The
ghosts of some twenty-seven million dead Russians from the Great Patriotic War still moan
loudly; the USSR has not forgotten and will be reluctant to risk a repeat performance of
1941-45. 267 But unless the Soviets drastically reduce their military and the Germans
greatly expand theirs, the German-Soviet military balance is not even close. With no
265Richard Helms, "What's The Big Rush?" Washington Post National Weekly Edition,
5-11 March 1990, 23.
266Lucia Moat, "Former Secretaries of State Gather," Christian Science Monitor, 31
October 1989, 8.
267Author's note: For years, a figure of approximately 20 million was the commonly
accepted total of Soviet citizens thought to have been killed in World War Two. More
recent Soviet estimates have increased the total to approximately 27 million, and this figure
is now being accepted as genuine by most authorities. Roy Medvedev, has, for example,
estimated a figure between 25-30 million. See Roy Medvedev, Let History Tudge: The
Origins and Consequences of Stalinism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), 770.
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reductions made in either country's troop levels following reunification, the united
Germanys would have available 767,400 troops, versus an estimated 4.2 million for the
USSR. 268 The comparison is made much more lopsided by the awesome nuclear might
of the Soviet arsenal. Soviet fears undoubtedly relate not only to military considerations,
but also to renowned German technology. Germany, if it wanted to, could certainly
acquire nuclear weapons. Although a nuclear-free Germany does not offer a significant
military threat to Moscow, a Germany armed with nuclear weapons would be quite a
different story. Although I believe Germany's intentions for the foreseeable future will
remain peaceful, any acquisition by Germany of nuclear weapons would be viewed with
great alarm in Moscow.
The Soviets have vacillated considerably on their position on the future status of
Germany. In the closing weeks of 1989, Moscow announced that any move toward
reunification must take place over a period of years, not months. (It should be
remembered that most western analysts believed this as well.) However, as the drive for
reunification took on a life of its own in both East and West Germany, the Kremlin has
been forced to modify its position. On February 21, President Gorbachev outlined the
revised Kremlin stance: first, that it is the right of the two Germanys to pursue unification;
and second, that the security issues that unification raises must be settled in the context
of all European states. 2W This reflects Soviet support of the so-called "two plus four"
talks in which negotiations on the future German role will be jointly decided by the U.S.,
268These calculations are based on data from The Military Balance 1989-90 (London: The
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1989).
269Linda Feldman, "Beyond Military Blocs in Europe," Christian Science Monitor, 23
February 1990, 3.
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USSR, Britain, France, and the two Germanys. These states agreed in February to proceed
with the negotiations. 27° Although Gorbachev now seems resigned to accepting a
reunified Germany, he continued until March to vow that a united Germany must be
neutral.271 In early April, however, reports surfaced within diplomatic circles which
indicated that the Soviets may be laying the groundwork for a more conciliatory attitude. 272
Indeed, in an article published on April 11, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze backed
away from the Kremlin's earlier demand for German neutrality and then proposed the
most bizarre idea yet, that being a simultaneous membership of a united Germany in both
the Warsaw Pact and NATO. 273 This latest proposal by Moscow is seen by many western
analysts as a face-saving measure by the Kremlin to allow for an eventual abandonment
of demands for neutrality 274 Other observers perceive, as I do, that Moscow is rapidly
shifting its support toward the abandonment of both NATO and the WTO, in favor of
constructing a new pan-European security structure, probably under the auspices of the
CSCE. 275 The latter model would appear to give the Kremlin the best chance to preserve
a voice in European policymaking, the loss of which is deeply feared by Moscow.
27l
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The U.S. has remained strongly committed to the determination of Germany's future
within the "two plus four" talks. Washington has also backed West German president
Helmut Kohl's position that a unified Germany should be a member of NATO and remain
closely tied to the West. 27e For the U.S., inclusion of a unified Germany in NATO is
necessary for the continued viability of the alliance.
E. THE FATES OF NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT
As has already been implied, hand in hand with the issue of German reunification
goes the question of the continued existence of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. As both
alliances evaluate their future roles, member state support for the respective leaders of each
alliance becomes crucial. In that context, there have been and remain substantial
differences between the opposing alliances. As President Bush observed in his 31 January
State of the Union address, "Soviet forces in Europe are there by occupation; the American
troops are there by invitation." 277 Most of America's NATO allies support a continued
U.S. troop presence on the continent. However, many Europeans do favor a larger political
role for NATO. Unlike its WTO counterpart, NATO does not have to evolve into a
political body; it already is one. In a December 1989 interview, Manfred Worner,
Secretary-General of NATO, strongly characterized the alliance as a political body; he
276R.W. Apple, Jr., "Bush's Fragile Battalions in Europe," New York Times, 12 February
1990, Al.
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stated, "We've spent 80 percent of our time in the last months on East-West relations, and
not only on military matters."278
The nature of the WTO, on the other hand, is almost entirely military. Arnold
Horelick of the RAND Corporation notes several crucial weaknesses in the current WTO
structure: its political infrastructure is poorly developed and its political organs meet only
rarely and are largely ceremonial. Furthermore, its most important political decisions in
the past were made in party, not state, channels—a practice that has been overtaken by the
collapse of ruling communist parties in Eastern Europe. 2" As a result, Moscow is
increasingly forced to deal with her former satellites on a traditional state-to-state basis, in
sharp contrast to the previous relationship wherein orders were virtually dictated from the
Kremlin.
The tumultuous events in Eastern Europe have had some detrimental effects on
NATO. There is some limited talk about abolishing the alliance, and several nations have
spoken of reducing their commitment to NATO. Once more, the case of the WTO is much
worse. Its continued existence is in considerably more doubt than that of NATO. Official
Kremlin statements until only a few months ago called for the eventual dissolution of both
the WTO and NATO, but these amounted only to political propaganda. In the wake of the
dismemberment of one after another of its fellow communist governments, the USSR has
struggled to promote a new role for the future of the WTO. Much as is the case with the
U.S. promotion of NATO, Moscow is calling for an expanded political role for the eastern
278Howard LaFranchi, "NATO Chief Prepares for Tolirical Role' for Alliance," Christian
Science Monitor, 21 December 1989, 3.
279Arnold L. Horelick, "U.S.-Soviet Relations: Threshold of a New Era," Foreign Affairs
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alliance. Such a role for the WTO was the topic for a New Times article in October 1989. 28°
In that article, the authors, Kortunov and Bezrukov, advocated that the WTO be
transformed into a primarily political body. They detailed four reasons for the continued
usefulness of an Eastern European alliance: common economic problems; the need to
ensure stability in the region; existing ties in trade, scientific, cultural and other relations;
and the need for joint action to keep from being left out of an economic environment
increasingly dominated by the countries of Western Europe. m According to the authors,
the "...politicization of the WTO would greatly enhance the stability of the organization,
put its work into a new key, and, most importantly, would make it more receptive to the
qualitatively new demands of the times."282
But, as I described in detail in the last chapter, in all but the most technical sense, the
WTO has already collapsed. Although Poland has temporarily ceased its calls for the
evacuation of Soviet troops until the Polish-German border question is settled, she will
likely press vigorously for a full withdrawal afterward. Treaties have been concluded
which provide for a total evacuation of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia and Hungary.
Besides calling for the withdrawal of all Soviet troops, a growing number of Hungarians
are also demanding that their country withdraw from the WTO. On 13 March, Janos Kis,
leader of the front-running opposition party Alliance of Free Democrats, declared that his
280Mikhail Bezrukov and Andrei Kortunov, "What Kind of an Alliance Do We Need?"




party would ask the Parliament to annul the country's Warsaw Pact membership following
free elections. 283
Although Soviet troops are still in place in these countries, the USSR is for all
practical purposes a lone actor in the WTO. To preserve the pacfs structure and give it
a further chance to salvage Soviet interests in Europe, the Kremlin will continue to try to
make a case for a Soviet/WTO role in such functions as monitoring the reunification of
Germany and involvement in continuing arms control efforts such as START and CFE.
Arnold Horelick writes, "For the Soviet Union, the CFE process provides a vehicle for
securing at least some reciprocal returns from the West for reductions in swollen Soviet
forces."284 He also expresses concern that, while the arms control process gives NATO
further reason for continuation, the same holds true for the WTO. In other words, by
strengthening its own position, NATO will provide a basis for continued Soviet
participation in the affairs of Eastern Europe.
Mr. Horelick's concerns must be considered, but there are other matters at stake as
well. The sudden, virtual collapse of the WTO has spurred new fears of reemerging
traditional international and ethnic strife in Europe, whose submersion under the mantles
of the two alliances have been one irrefutable benefit of the otherwise repressive Cold War.
As the Warsaw Pact evaporates and NATO begins to suffer some disarray, a very real
danger emerges of the resurgence of such rivalries. The best known of these is probably
the age-old bitterness between Hungary and Romania. The dispute over Polish-German
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borders is also fraught with peril. Elsewhere in the region, Slovaks suspect Czech
domination, Slovenes fear domination by Serbia, Serbs fear an expansionist Albania,
Bulgarians struggle with a growing Turkish population, to name just a few. In this very
troubled environment, many argue that a continued presence of NATO, and perhaps even
the WTO, will serve to help police such ill will among peoples.
As previously observed, the two superpowers would also like to maintain prominent
roles in the monitoring of the status of Germany. U.S. support for a Soviet voice in the
"two plus four" negotiations assures the Kremlin a continued role in those affairs. Indeed,
according to some western analysts, in light of the virtual collapse of the WTO, "...a
supervisory role for the Soviet Union in company with the western Big Three may be the
most Mr. Gorbachev could ever expect in the way of a brake on any German expansionary
tendencies." 285
F. TURBULENT TIMES AHEAD FOR WASHINGTON
Jeane Kirkpatrick warns that, with the ending of the Cold War, the U.S., too, wTl
inevitably face a reduced role in Europe. The lessening of the Soviet threat which made
NATO and U.S. military power vitally important to Western Europe, forces a reorientation
of U.S. military policy there. 286 A reduction of U.S. forces is inevitable. During the
recent "Open Skies" negotiations in Ottawa, the USSR agreed to the Bush Administration's
proposal for reduced superpower troop levels in Europe. Under those provisions, the U.S.
and the USSR would each be allowed to maintain a total of 195,000 soldiers in the zone of
^R.W. Apple, Jr., "Moscow Pays the Price," New York Times, 15 February 1990, A9.
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Central Europe, and the U.S. would be allowed an additional 30,000 troops in Europe, but
outside the central zone. 287
Acceptance by Moscow of this agreement was widely interpreted to reflect Moscow's
recognition of the decided geographic disadvantage which the U.S. would face in quickly
reinforcing its allies in Europe, versus the Soviet Union's relative proximity. As Andrew
Goldberg notes, the removal of U.S. forces from Europe entails their relocation 3,000 miles
from the locus of conflict in Europe and even their probable demobilization. In contrast,
any Soviet forces withdrawn would remain within 300 miles of Central Europe.288
Although the chances of Soviet military intervention in Eastern Europe will likely remain
slight so long as the USSR is ruled by Mikhail Gorbachev, we must not forget that past
Soviet leaders have repeatedly intervened militarily in what they considered to be
dangerous situations; Gorbachev's successors might do the same. Until the USSR
completely withdraws its military forces from Eastern Europe, the U.S. must preserve a
military presence on the continent strong enough to offset as much as possible the
Kremlin's tremendous geographic advantage.
However, only a week after they had agreed to a joint US-Soviet troop ceiling in
Ottawa, the Soviets made another proposal which seemed to supersede the earlier
agreement. The Kremlin caught NATO somewhat off guard by proposing that NATO and
the WTO cut their troops in the same zone of Central Europe to meet ceilings of between
287Thomas L. Friedman, "Moscow Accepts U.S. Advantage of 30,000 Soldiers Across
Europe," New York Times, 14 February 1990, Al.
^Andrew C. Goldberg, "Soviet Imperial Decline and the Emerging Balance of Power,"
Washington Quarterly (Winter 1990): 165.
133
700,000 and 750,000.289 According to Soviet negotiator Oleg Grinevskiy, this broader limit
would cover troops from West Germany, Britain, Canada, France, Belgium and the
Netherlands, as well as American troops. 29° Western officials suspect that one motive
for this surprise Soviet move might be Soviet concerns over the military implications of
German reunification. The Soviet Union has previously sought measures that would
indirectly limit the size of the West German military. m I would agree that this move is
an attempt by the Kremlin to make some gains in connection with the U.S. insistence that
a unified Germany be a member of NATO. It is also another avenue of further restricting
the level of U.S. forces which will remain on the continent.
Much to Washington's dismay, the Kremlin is not alone in calling for a reduced U.S.
presence in Europe. For months now, there have been reports that more and more
Germans favor the withdrawal not only of Soviets, but of U.S. troops as well. Then, on 4
April, Premier Walter Wallman of the German state of Hesse formally requested that U.S.
forces be withdrawn from his state as part of any European arms cuts. 292 Although
West German President Helmut Kohl and other leading officials still publicly support a
continued U.S. presence in Germany following reunification, such public appeals as
Wallman' s spell trouble for American policy in the very near future. If most or all
American forces were required to be withdrawn from a reunified Germany, future U.S.
flexibility will be seriously restricted due to the troop ceilings agreed to by the U.S. and
289Michael B. Gordon, "Soviets Now Seeking Broader Troop Limits in Central Europe,'
New York Times, 23 February 1990, A4.
^id.
^Ibid.
^"German State Chief Wants U.S. Troops Cut," New York Times, 5 April 1990, A6.
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Soviets in February. Under that agreement, the U.S. would be allowed only 30,000 military
personnel outside of Germany. This potential situation has many senior U.S. officials
concerned. A recent article by Jeffrey Smith of the Washington Post quotes one senior
American diplomat as stating that, "Once our troops are forced out of central Europe, the
overall political situation will likely.. .[prevent] any other nation from accepting a significant
number of these troops." 293
The final level of U.S. forces to remain in Europe is still uncertain, but what is certain
is that American forces will be reduced. What strategy should the U.S. employ in
withdrawing forces from Europe? In a recent issue of the Washington Quarterly, former
National Security Agency director William Odom outlined his recommendations for U.S.
military actions amidst the changing European security environment. Odom recommends
that, should a withdrawal of significant U.S. forces from Europe become necessary, we
should do things that least restrict our ability to regenerate combat strength. Stating that
the most difficult things to reintroduce into Europe are corps, division, and battalion
headquarters detachments, he urges that cadre battalions capable of being quickly
upgraded to combat efficiency be maintained for each division in question. Even if the
troops are withdrawn, Odom advocates that weapons and vehicles be left forward-
deployed in Europe, and stateside forces should be regularly re-deployed in exercises. To
further reduce costs while not inordinately harming our capability to reinforce European
allies, the author recommends that tactical air force units be withdrawn to the U.S. and
placed in the reserves, and that the Navy decrease deployments to the Mediterranean and
the Baltic regions. Finally, Odom warns that the U.S. should avoid arms control
^R. Jeffrey Smith, "Wearing Out Our Welcome," Washington Post National Weekly
Edition, 19-25 March 1990, 17.
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agreements that provide for U.S. force levels which are either too small or wrongly
structured to retain U.S. operational wartime significance, in comparison with Soviet
forces.2
*4
Besides justifying its continued presence in Europe to the Europeans, the U.S. is also
going to find it increasingly difficult to garner domestic support for the presence of U.S.
forces on the continent. The common perception is that the Cold War is over, that Mikhail
Gorbachev has given an entirely new complexion to the face of European affairs, and that
the Soviet threat is gone. As Bush Administration officials attempt to preserve American
military forces from the budget chopping block, many prominent authorities are calling for
reductions of U.S. forces far below the levels agreed upon in Ottawa. In February, former
American defense secretary James Schlesinger, a renowned hard-line conservative, declared
that the Warsaw Pact's "role as a military alliance and a military threat have been largely
broken" and called for elimination of all but a "residual" American force of perhaps 50,000
troops in Europe. 295 Even within the Bush Administration there are signs of a dispute
regarding the viability of the Soviet threat. Secretary of Defense Cheney, in promoting the
current defense budget, has repeatedly argued that Moscow will pose a potentially serious
military threat for some time, regardless of who is in power. In sharp contrast to Secretary
Cheney's comments, the nation's chief intelligence officer, Director of Central Intelligence
William Webster, testified before the House Armed Services Committee that it is unlikely
^William E. Odom, "Gorbachev's Strategy and Western Security: Illusions Versus
Reality," Washington Quarterly (Winter 1990): 145-155.
295
R. W. Apple, Jr., "Bush's Fragile Battalions in Europe," New York Times, 2 February
1990, Al.
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that the Soviets would pose a major conventional military threat in the foreseeable
future.296
G. THE CRUCIAL QUESTION: IS "THE THREAT' TRULY GONE?
The U.S. and her allies are beginning rapidly to reduce troop levels and military
spending on the assumption that Moscow no longer represents a threat. But has the threat
really gone away? It is true that Gorbachev has entirely revamped the international
situation, in Europe and in the rest of the world. It may also be true that the end of the
Cold War is within sight, but the fact remains that a significant percentage of the Soviet
threat still has not been removed from Eastern Europe. Since the idea of the evaporation
of the Soviet threat is the driving force in most calls for evacuation of U.S. forces from
Europe and cutting of the U.S. defense budget, let us examine just what threat the Soviets
still present in Eastern Europe. Presently, there are about 380,000 Soviet troops still in the
GDR. As already noted, treaties have been signed to withdraw all Soviet troops from
Czechoslovakia. However, most of the 73,500 Soviet troops stationed there are still in
Czechoslovakia. And a total of some 90,000 Soviet troops remain in Hungary and Poland.
In sum, the vast majority of the Soviet portion of the WTO—a force totalling over 500,000
troops—still remains in the middle of Europe. Contrary to popular opinion, the threat is
greatly diminished, but not yet gone. As Jeane Kirkpatrick notes, the Cold War will not
be entirely over until the Soviet Union completely withdraws all its forces from any and
all European countries that request it to do so. 297
^Michael Wines, "Webster and Cheney at Odds Over Soviet Military Threat," New
York Times, 7 March 1990, A7.
^Jeane Kirkpatrick, "Beyond the Cold War," Foreign Affairs 69, No. 1, 1990: 12.
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Many in the West have already declared that the Cold War is over and that the West
won. Although it is true that the forces of democracy have made huge gains in the
political revolution that swept Eastern Europe, the final curtain has not yet dropped on the
Cold War. For four decades, the only way the Kremlin preserved its hegemony in the
region was to amass overwhelming military force and conduct a military occupation.
Although the peoples of Eastern Europe are to be applauded for their bravery in standing
up to Moscow's authority, and democracy has been vindicated as a system truly desired
by people everywhere, we in the West must be careful not to lose our objectivity amidst
the popular euphoria. We should not confuse the disintegration of the non-Soviet portion
of the WTO (whose reliability has been in question for years) with the continuation of the
Soviet portion of the WTO, which remains a viable and potentially dangerous force. The
sole insurance policy of Kremlin domination of Eastern Europe was and is the WTO.
Today, while the Eastern European portion of that force is an empty shell, the stronger
Soviet contingent is still largely intact. A withdrawal of Soviet forces is a prerequisite for
insuring the true and full setf-detenrtination and self-government in the countries of
Eastern Europe. As long as those forces are in place, Moscow will by default still play a
role in the region and true freedom will not exist.
H. CHIEF U.S. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Against this background, what is the proper role for the U.S. in the future of Europe?
Our main objectives are and should be to preserve the maximum level of stability while
working toward true self-determination in Eastern Europe. Of greatest concern is the
determination of the future of Germany and its inclusion in NATO. At the same time, the
U.S. should try to safeguard the rights of other countries in the region. While seeking to
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expand the political role of NATO, we should anticipate that the military portion of NATO
will have to be continually reduced as events prove that the region is indeed more secure.
Although America's formerly preeminent leadership role in Europe will now be
challenged, the U.S. should still work to maintain its stake in Europe's future through an
expanded role in such forums as the CSCE and EC.
I believe that, in the short term, the U.S. should continue to focus upon three main
threats to the security of Europe: the possible breakout of traditional rivalries between
nations and ethnic groups of the region; a limited, but potential threat of conventional
Soviet military intervention into European affairs, and the remaining threat of nuclear war.
Regarding the threat of traditional nationalist rivalries, I assert that the most logical way
to counter such rivalries is to maintain a larger umbrella structure such as NATO or the
EC to arbitrate differences between parties. So far, the U.S. has continued to strongly back
NATO as the most viable vehicle to preserve the security of Western Europe.
The final two issues of conventional and nuclear threats to Europe primarily center
around the USSR. In my estimation, the best way to approach all these situations, but
especially the issue of future U.S.-Soviet relations, is to formulate a dynamic and vigorous
policy to achieve the goals desired and then to work toward these goals in the forums
available. Such a policy was described by Graham T. Allison, Dean of Harvard
University's Kennedy School of Government, in a 1988 Foreign Affairs article.298 As it
regards the USSR, this "proactive" policy, as depicted by Dr. Allison, would seek to rob the
Soviets of the political initiative by carefully establishing a long-term political agenda and
then bargaining firmly with the Kremlin in a virtual "tit for tat" manner. By proposing such
^Graham T. Allison, Jr., 'Testing Gorbachev," Foreign Affairs 67 (Fall 1988): 18-32.
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a stance, I do not imply that the Bush Administration should change its overall objectives,
but that it should press hard for every advantage in ways that will achieve American
objectives while still allowing Gorbachev to reform the Soviet system in ways not
detrimental to his own political standing. It is my belief that we should move aggressively
ahead in pursuing foreign policy objectives now, since there is no possible guarantee that
Gorbachev will still be in power tomorrow. While the Soviets do appear willing to reduce
their conventional force levels, they have shown little interest in doing the same with their
nuclear arsenal. The Bush Administration has established a good starting point to continue
conventional and nuclear force reductions through the CFE and START processes,
respectively. While preserving the security of the West, the U.S. should move aggressively
to drastically reduce these forces while a willing counterpart presides in the Kremlin. The
continuation of Mikhail Gorbachev in power is far from certain, and we should proceed
with the attitude that any forces taken out of Eastern Europe or dismantled in accordance
with treaties today, cannot be magically replaced tomorrow. In this regard, I would
recommend that we approach the Soviet Union with a list of concrete proposals which, if
met, would be reciprocated by us with expanded trade, economic benefits and other
opportunities. While respecting legitimate Soviet national security needs, we should take
a highly aggressive, not reactive stance in such negotiations. The Soviets would respect
us for it. They definitely do not respect those who negotiate from positions of uncertainty
and weakness.
Under Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviets have demonstrated a willingness to play the
game of international relations according to rules more acceptable to other nations, at least
for the time being. As long as they continue to play by those rules, we should respond
accordingly. The USSR seems willing to release its military visegrip on Eastern Europe.
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We should encourage the fastest removal of those forces remaining as is possible. While
the non-Soviet WTO forces are no longer viable, the Soviet contingent is still a potent
threat. However, if those forces are not directly challenged, it is difficult to envision a
Kremlin under Gorbachev ordering those troops into action outside the USSR. The costs
of doing so would be astronomical, and their success would be far from certain. So long
as the Kremlin does not interfere with domestic Eastern European affairs, the West should
not object to a temporary continued presence of those Soviet forces during a limited period
of transition. We should, however, still do everything possible to encourage their rapid
withdrawal.
I. A REDUCED ROLE IN EUROPE: THE REALITY AMERICA MAY BE FORCED
TO ACCEPT
Although it will almost certainly fall far short of our pre-World War Two
isolationism, the U.S. in all likelihood will soon reduce its worldwide commitments and
:oncentrate more on U.S. domestic concerns. Assuming that the Soviet threat to Europe
continues to decline, the Bush Administration will come under increasing pressures from
the American public, from Congress, and from some of our European allies, to significantly
reduce U.S. troop levels in Europe. Barring a radical realignment of American foreign
policy, however, this country will continue to maintain close ties with its European allies,
and America's security will continue to be closely linked with the security of those allies.
As we approach the decision of how far to cut back our presence in Europe, or indeed
whether to withdraw entirely, we should not overlook the fact that we have had to
hurriedly insert forces into the European continent to provide the winning balance in two
world wars already this century. Granted, this country stands to achieve short-term
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economic benefits by drastically cutting our defense spending and withdrawing American
forces to the U.S. But the gains achieved in any reductions of U.S. military forces in
Europe must be weighed against the possible costs. In my opinion, a sharp drawdown of
the number of troops in Europe is inevitable, but a full withdrawal would be highly
inadvisable. The Bush Aclministration is justified in its attempt to preserve America's
position in European affairs, but it will face great obstacles in doing so.
According to some respected authorities, the United States may not be given too
much say in the matter. As previously noted, Jeane Kirkpatrick has asserted that a
reduced voice in European affairs is simply a reality which America is going to have to live
with. In her recent article in Foreign Affairs, she observed that, although most European
leaders and their publics are grateful to the U.S. for its help in a vulnerable period, they
do not now and never will regard America as a European power. They have not invited
the U.S. to join the European Community and are not likely to do so. Ambassador
Kirkpatrick claims that our European allies are not moving blindly ahead, but are willing
to accept the risks of a reduced American presence in Europe, namely, that the USSR will
be left as the strongest power on the continent. On the other hand, she feels that Western
European nations probably will not try to quickly expel the U.S. from Europe and are
unlikely to seek mutual withdrawals of U.S. and Soviet troops as an acceptable security
arrangement. 2"
As President George Bush reaffirmed in his State of the Union message on 31 January
of this year, there have been and remain marked differences between the Warsaw Pact and
NATO. Chief among those differences is th ; fact that NATO is a voluntary alliance among
29Q
Jeane Kirkpatrick, "Beyond the Cold War," Foreign Affairs 69, No. 1, 1990: 16.
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partners of equal sovereignty. The U.S., in accordance with the spirit of this partnership
and its democratic principles, must accept the wishes of its allies. As a voluntary contract,
NATO can rightfully be abolished at any time. Although not advisable in the immediate
future, that may happen someday. As a guest in Europe, we will have to act accordingly.
While maintaining political and economic ties for our own good, we should continue to
assist in the defense of the European members of NATO to the extent they will allow us.
After 1945, we decided to stand beside our European allies and secure their way of life.
The events of the last ten months have vindicated our policies over the last four decades
and reflect the lightness of our decision. Now, much as a senior partner must eventually
surrender some of his own power and responsibilities to an aspiring junior partner, the
U.S. must surrender its dominant position as the "Chairman of the Board" and take its
place as more of a "first among equals." Our policies in Europe have proven successful;
we must now learn to live with that success, along with its possible consequences.
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS
This work has presented a general overview of a variety of issues surrounding
Gorbachev's policy of "new thinking," with a particular emphasis on how these matters
have altered Soviet military doctrine and will continue to affect the future U.S.-Soviet
security relationship. This chapter will attempt to briefly synopsize the major findings of
this study under the three headings of "Economic Factors," "Western Reaction," and
"Military Factors."
A. ECONOMIC FACTORS
Mikhail Gorbachev's "perestroika" faces a series of hurdles which individually could
severely hamper success and, when taken together, seem almost insurmountable.
Gorbachev's attempts to divert high-technology equipment, manpower and other resources
from the military-industrial sector into the lagging civilian economy, appear to have
achieved only marginal gains. As he continues to chip away at the military's stockpiles,
he is certain to encounter mounting opposition from the defense establishment. Military
support for Gorbachev's reforms is certainly important, but this alone will not make or
break Gorbachev's reform program. As previously observed in Chapter Three, in my
estimation, the single greatest danger to "perestroika" and to its godfather, Gorbachev, lies
in the political tumult which has erupted inside the USSR. Ironically, this same wave of
political unrest came about largely as a result of political reforms enacted by Gorbachev
to reinforce his own program.
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What then, is the likely outcome of Gorbachev's economic modernization program?
Gorbachev's "perestroika," as it stands now, will achieve some limited successes but will
not accomplish most of Gorbachev's goals. I do not foresee how the Soviet economy can
be transformed without totally abandoning the centrally-planned Stalinist system and
erecting in its place a true market-oriented economy. There is mounting evidence to
indicate that Gorbachev may, in early 1990, be planning yet another push toward radical
economic reforms which could transform the present system. Such a move, even given his
greatly strengthened political position, will be fraught with many perils. Granted, Mikhail
Gorbachev is a highly pragmatic statesman—one of the greatest statesmen of this century--
and he continues to amaze the world with his political acumen and daring. If the Soviet
economy can ever be successfully transformed, if given enough time, he is probably the
one man who can do it. However, so long as the Stalinist economic system is preserved,
the Soviet Union will continue to be a one-dimensional superpower and an economic
cripple.
With this in mind, any and all considerations by the West to grant economic aid to
the Soviet Union should be subjected to intense scrutiny. If Dr. Stephen Rosefielde of the
University of North Carolina is correct, no amount of western aid can help to salvage the
hopelessly swamped Soviet economy. If this is true, any economic aid whatsoever to the
USSR will only be wasted.
B. WESTERN REACTION
What general conclusions can be drawn from this study regarding future western
actions toward the USSR? In my judgement, a realistic approach demands that we not be
naive and take Soviet proclamations as gospel. On the other hand, we must not ignore the
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fundamental changes that we are witnessing regarding the Kremlin's approach to
international relations. We have seen tangible evidence in the form of Soviet troop
withdrawals from Afghanistan and from Eastern Europe. We have observed fundamental
political alterations inside the Soviet Union. Democratic and nationalist movements,
although not unprecedented, have arisen on a scale never before seen in Soviet times.
Moscow's tolerance to this point of the astounding political revolutions in Eastern Europe,
along with Gorbachev's apparent intent to avoid military intervention in that region, also
present very heartening evidence that the USSR has dramatically altered its foreign policy
away from a heavy dependence on the Soviet military. On the other hand, the Kremlin's
recent use of military force in Lithuania, however limited in scale, serves as a stark
reminder that Moscow is still willing to use its military fist to settle important issues. On
the whole, though, the positive gains for international security under Gorbachev's
leadership have far outweighed any negative results.
In return for visible and authentic reforms in the East, the West must also do some
rethinking of its own doctrine and policies. For over forty years, many in the West have
viewed U.S.-Soviet relations largely as a zero-sum game, believing that any gain by
Moscow was to the detriment of Washington. If we continue to see positive, tangible
overtures from Moscow, common sense dictates that we must now acknowledge that
cooperation can produce mutually beneficial results. We must, however, be realistic in our
own expectations. We should not expect the USSR to transform into a western-style liberal
democracy; that simply is not going to happen. Many of the reforms evolving inside the
USSR and in Eastern Europe have resulted directly because of Gorbachev or are strongly
connected with him. We must remain aware that certain events such as strong or violent
nationalist uprisings—such as those occurring now in the Baltic states and in Soviet Central
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Asia-may yet induce the Kremlin to resort to large-scale military force. Inside the USSR,
the fate of Gorbachev's economic reforms is still very uncertain. A dramatic failure in
either of these sectors could easily lead to Gorbachev's ouster or convince him to withdraw
to a more centrist position, resulting in a sense of "muddling through" much as happened
during the years of Brezhnev. Gorbachev has already remained in power longer than most
experts had predicted; some very highly respected authorities two years ago gave
Gorbachev at most a year in office. At this writing, his grasp on power still seems far from
secure.
After almost five years of closely following the actions of Mikhail Gorbachev, I am
still unsure of his ultimate objectives and motives. Quite simply, we cannot be certain of
what those objectives are. Too many positive changes have occurred to dismiss all of what
Gorbachev has done as being part of some sinister plot. Despite the remaining
uncertainties, the West should cooperate and negotiate with a responsive Kremlin while
the opportunity presents itself. While I believe it premature now to declare that the Cold
War is completely over, today we definitely have that objective within our grasp. Over
forty-two years ago, George Kennan noted in his legendary "X-article" that the U.S. had at
its disposal the ability to force a "gradual mellowing of Soviet power." Gorbachev seems
to have gone a long way toward accomplishing that goal himself, and much quicker than
anyone would have ever thought possible. It is in our interest to aggressively continue this
process, to further reduce the already lessened Soviet threat to American and western
interests. In doing so, however, the U.S. and her allies must preserve defenses sufficient
to combat any Soviet backtracking which may occur in the future.
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C. MILITARY OBJECTIVES-A FRAMEWORK FOR FUTURE ANALYSIS
There is already mounting evidence to indicate that the USSR has indeed modified
its military doctrine and is reducing its annual military spending. Chapters Six and Seven
described the great changes under way in Soviet forces stationed in Europe and examined
possible future force deployments which, if adopted, will further decrease the threat to the
West. As previously observed, the non-Soviet portion of the Warsaw Pact has collapsed,
and the democratic political reforms now being enacted in the former Soviet satellites will
only serve to strengthen western security and further complicate any Soviet incursions in
the region. However, we cannot ignore the potential threat which will exist so long as the
approximately 500,000 Soviet soldiers remaining in Eastern Europe, stay in place. The
removal of these forces, I believe, should be the single greatest objective of future U.S.-
Soviet negotiations. Only when those troops are removed will Eastern Europe be truly free
of Soviet domination. And only then can the U.S. safely contemplate significantly reducing
its military forces in Europe.
Although it is impossible to know Gorbachev's ultimate military objectives under
"new thinking,'' I am convinced that the USSR has indeed begun to adopt a less offensive
military doctrine. In assessing future Soviet intentions, we must look past the rhetoric and
consider what is really important to western security—the degree of threat offered by
Moscow to western interests. I therefore offer the following as factors which the West
should look for in determining future Soviet sincerity in adhering to its declared defensive
stance. Some of those measures outlined by Mr. Andrew Marshall and detailed in Chapter
Five included: the withdrawal of all Soviet forces to home soil, a withdrawal from forward
deployments of more offensively-oriented units, and preparation by the USSR of defensive
positions along Soviet national borders. As described in Chapter Six, the first two of these
148
conditions are already being met as Soviet forces continue to be withdrawn from Eastern
Europe. Construction by the USSR of the so-called "fortified regions" would satisfy the
third requirement outlined by Mr. Marshall. Additionally, we must closely monitor the
continuing Soviet troop withdrawals to preclude any possible deceptions such as those
warned about by Mr. Graham Turbiville. The specific forces and types of armaments
withdrawn will help to reveal the true nature of Soviet intentions. If the equipment and
troops withdrawn come from combat units, this would lend credence to the idea that a
true restructuring of forces is under way. If, on the other hand, these resources are
withdrawn from storage facilities and the troops are taken from rear echelon units or from
security forces, the significance of the reductions will be greatly diminished. In contrast,
continued withdrawal of offensively-oriented units from Eastern Europe will decrease the
threat to NATO of a short-warning Warsaw Pact attack. Furthermore, deep cuts made in
the Soviet military under Mikhail Gorbachev will not be instantly reversible if Gorbachev
decides to abandon his current policies or if he is ousted from power. In the meantime,
while respecting justifiable Soviet concerns for their own national security, we should
require that the Kremlin furnish some proof that forces withdrawn to the USSR have
indeed been disbanded. We also should not hesitate to require Soviet cooperation in
dissipating the mysteries of the USSR's defense budget. Within limits, a Kremlin genuinely
interested in peaceful reforms will respond to reasonable requests for clarification.
D. SUMMATION
In the closing months of 1989 and the first half of 1990, we have witnessed
miraculous political breakthroughs in Eastern Europe. We have been promised that
military reforms are under way and that more reductions are imminent. Soviet officials
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have repeatedly assured us that the Kremlin no longer poses a threat to the security of
Europe-Western or Eastern—or to the United States. But the key term here is "promise."
While we cannot expect Mikhail Gorbachev to continue to make substantive, unilateral cuts
with no quid pro quo from the West, NATO states could be risking disaster by reducing
defense capabilities solely on the basis of Gorbachev's promised reductions. The USSR is
indeed reducing some of its forces in Eastern Europe and at home. These actions, if
continued, should be matched with equivalent actions on the part of the West, while
mamtaining a reasonable balance of force capabilities in Europe. However, until ample
evidence is available that the Soviets are indeed withdrawing and/or disbanding the forces
they have promised to, the West would be foolish to proceed with substantial cuts of its
own. The security of the West, particularly of the U.S., is not something that can ever be
trusted to the mere words of Mikhail Gorbachev or anyone else.
After carefully researching the available sources of information, a still murky picture
emerges of Kremlin intentions under "new thinking." In trying to make some sense of
contemporary events, I often look to the writings of great leaders of the past. In the dark
days of October 1939, Sir Winston Churchill spoke to a grim British people concerning the
German invasion of Poland and the treachery of the Soviet Union in signing a pact with
Hitler. In that address, the British prime minister coined a phrase often used since then
by Sovietologists; he said, "I cannot forecast to you the actions of Russia. It is a riddle
wrapped in a mystery inside of an enigma..." Most writers quoting Churchill often
overlook the last-but highly significant-portion of his statement, which continues, "...but
perhaps there is a key. That k«iy is Russian national interest." 30°
'"'Sir Winston S. Churchill, The Gathering Storm (New York: Houghton-Mifflin, 1948),
449.
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While interpreting the newest watershed events in Soviet policy, we must not forget
the lessons of fifty years ago. We must look past both pro-Soviet and anti-Soviet rhetoric
to discern the important facts at hand. Today, as in 1939, the Kremlin has acted and will
continue to act, in a manner which it views as furthering Soviet interests; if in doing so,
it happens to also help the West, then so much the better for Soviet propaganda purposes.
But anyone who believes that Gorbachev is acting solely to further the cause of world
peace is kidding no one but himself. Whether present Soviet actions are part of some long-
term scheme or are desperate moves foisted upon a weakening Kremlin, will not be
quickly discernable. My own feeling is that Gorbachev embarked upon his daring course
of reforms in 1985 because he was convinced he had no choice but to take desperate
actions or lose his empire. Still, what matters most in the immediate future is for the West
to look for concrete indications that the USSR no longer represents an overwhelrning threat
to western security. Now is not the time to be crying wolf without ample proof, but it is
imprudent and dangerous to rush blindly ahead and deprive ourselves of our defenses
without sufficient evidence of Soviet fair play. What is called for is a carefully thought out,
businesslike approach of dealing with Moscow in ways that produce mutually beneficial
results while not unduly risking the security of America or her allies. In light of
Gorbachev's "new thinking," I agree that we must do some new thinking of our own. It




Anyone who followed the rapidly unfolding events inside the Soviet Union in 1989-
90 can appreciate the difficulty encountered by one attempting to analyze or forecast
events during that period. In the few short weeks which have elapsed since the majority
of the research on this work was completed, several important events have already had a
tremendous impact on some of the key observations made in this thesis.
Without doubt, the most dramatic of these events was the agreement reached on 16
July between Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and West German Chancellor Helmut
Kohl. In that meeting, Gorbachev told Kohl that the USSR would drop its objection to a
united Germany's membership in NATO. The two leaders also announced that
negotiations would soon begin on the complete withdrawal of the approximately 380,000
Soviet troops which still remain in what is now East Germany. Those troops should be
withdrawn in three to four years, perhaps sooner. In return, Kohl agreed that the army
of a united Germany, during the same period, will be reduced to 370,000 men, and that no
NATO forces will be stationed on the territory of eastern Germany so long as Soviet troops
remain there. M1 Chancellor Kohl also did much to alleviate Kremlin worries about a
possible resurgence of German militarism by agreeing that a united Germany would
renounce the right to manufacture and possess nuclear weapons and would sign the
nuclear nonproliferation treaty. West Germany presented Gorbachev with another sought-
^Mark J. Porubcansky, "Soviets Agree to NATO Role for Germany," Monterey Herald,
17 July 1990, 1,4.
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after concession by formally backing a $3 billion loan to the USSR. 302 On 17 July, West
German leaders also agreed to give up any claim to territory absorbed by Poland at the
end of World War Two. The latter decision paved the way for a breakthrough agreement
among the seven nations now participating in the "two-plus-four" talks, removing the last
big obstacle in the path to German reunification. xa
The Gorbachev-Kohl agreement and the resolution of the Polish border question
together will greatly accelerate the Soviet military pullout from Eastern Europe. The WTO
is now clearly defunct, and events have moved so far that Soviet Defense Minister Dmitri
Yazov announced in July that a joint commission of the WTO would formally submit a
proposal this fall to consider dissolving that organization. 30* Although these events bode
well for Eastern Europe, they will only fuel the opposition to Gorbachev at home.
Divisions are clearly emerging within the Soviet officer corps and military officials are
more openly criticizing the Kremlin leader, accusing him of moving too quickly with his
reform program and consenting to a humiliating Soviet military retreat from Eastern
Europe. 305 The military's reaction is likely to be even more negative to Gorbachev's
stunning announcement on 17 August that he is appointing a commission to go ahead with
a formal transition of the Soviet military into an all-volunteer force. These reforms could
include abolition of the mandatory draft and creation of "national-territorial units," but
^Daniel Sneider, "Gorbachev and Kohl Agree On Terms for German Unity," Christian
Science Monitor, 18 July 1990, 1-2.
^Barry Schwied, 'Talks Resolve Dispute Over Polish Border," Monterey Herald, 18 July
1990, 1, 4.
^Marshal Dmitri Yazov, in an interview in Rabochnaya tribuna . Quoted in Report on
the USSR, 6 July 1990, 30.
^ee, for example, Stephen Foye, "Gorbachev and His Generals," Report on the USSR,
18 May 1990, 15, 16.
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would leave strategic weapons tinder central Kremlin control. 306 The reforms, if
implemented, will clearly signal a bold departure from recent Soviet military doctrine and
strategy. These events point out the increasing importance of research into the various
military structures under consideration by the USSR and the Kremlin's interest in such new
developments as construction of "fortified regions" which were highlighted in Chapter Six
of this thesis. Finally, these reforms, if they come to fruition, will provide proof that the
USSR is indeed adopting a truly defensive military posture.
Gorbachev's readiness to take bold steps on the international scene reflects his
strengthened confidence in his own political position following the conclusion of the
tumultuous 28th Communist Party Congress. Although he was strongly challenged on a
number of key issues, Gorbachev managed to achieve all of his major goals in that
congress. This followed his consolidation this spring of tremendous political powers in
the new Presidential Council, which left the historically all-powerful Politburo virtually
impotent. The shifting of all important leadership positions into the Presidential Council
allows Gorbachev to not only consolidate the most crucial governmental powers under
those men loyal to him, but it also strips the CPSU of much say-so in the country.
Furthermore, Gorbachev's position of President is independent of the CPSU, and offers him
an alternative base of power should he choose to leave the Communist Party, which is now
in total disarray following the resignations of RSFSR President Boris Yeltsin and the
mayors of Moscow and Leningrad and the continuing exodus of thousands of party
members.
^Bill Keller, "Gorbachev Vows to Reorganize Military," New York Times, 18 August
1990, 3.
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In sharp contrast to his strengthened position within the Soviet political structure,
Gorbachev seems absolutely unable to control other events inside the USSR. He is
everywhere beset by a bewildering array of problems. Republics clamoring for greater
independence threaten Moscow's central authority. Hundreds have died in ethnic clashes
in Kirghizia and the bloody fighting continues between Armenians and Azeris. The
country's crime rate is skyrocketing. Worker strikes are widespread. Five years after
Gorbachev set out to resuscitate the USSR's sluggish economy, he is still unable to halt the
economic collapse. This spring, it seemed that the country's downward economic spiral
had hit rock-bottom; somehow, it has plummeted even lower. Recently, shoppers in the
Siberian city of Krasnoyarsk, seething over the lack of basic foodstuffs, angrily ransacked
the market square and sent shopkeepers running for their lives. 307 And while many store
shelves lay empty, this year's bumper crop harvest may rot in the fields due to fuel and
worker shortages and the collapsed supply system. 308 Official Soviet statistics for the
first quarter of 1990 verify that economic output is down by 1.6 percent relative to the
same period last year. Furthermore, many Soviet and western specialists estimate that the
country's inflation rate is now running between 10-15 percent. *" Despite these grim
statistics, the Kremlin has repeatedly drawn back from enacting true price reforms, the
cornerstone of any successful transition to a market economy. In April, Gorbachev's top
economic adviser, Nikolay Petrakov, conceded that the Soviet government lacks the
^Celestine Bohlen, "Some Soviet Items Aren't Scarce: Crime, Strikes, Fighting,
Pollution," New York Times, 18 August 1990, 1,3.
^Daniel Sneider, "Bumper Soviet Crop Rots in Fields," Christian Science Monitor, 6
August 1990, 3.
^ohn E. Tedstrom, "First Quarter Economic Results: Can It Get Any Worse?" Report
on the USSR, 1 June 1990, 5.
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political legitimacy needed to implement harsh economic measures, in contrast to Poland's
Mazowiecki government which has apparently successfully implemented far-reaching
reforms in that country. 31° The Kremlin's latest plan to implement price reforms was
shelved in June after it sparked a wave of panic buying from Moscow to Vladivostok. 3n
The economic situation has now become so desperate that a coalition effort is said to be
in the works between advisers of Mikhail Gorbachev and those of Boris Yeltsin, men whose
political outlooks often differ sharply. 3U Recent reports indicate that Gorbachev is once
again seeking to implement more radical economic reforms and may be using Yeltsin to
push forward reforms that have been repeatedly blocked by conservative opponents in his
government. 313 Kremlin leaders have repeatedly hesitated to go forward with such
radical reforms for fear of unleashing nationwide political chaos; whether they will be able
to successfully implement such measures now is highly doubtful.
There has been much speculation over ultimate Soviet objectives within "new
thinking" and over whether Mikhail Gorbachev is operating based upon some "master
plan." These questions will remain a mystery, and no longer matter much. These days,
Gorbachev has no time for long-term planning; he is merely reacting to an unending series
of problems in a herculean struggle to salvage not just the Soviet economy, but to save the
Soviet Union itself. Against this background, the ultimate success of "perestroika" is far
31 New York Times, 26 April 1990. Quoted in Aurel Braun and Richard B. Day,
"Gorbachevian Contradictions," Problems of Communism (May-June 1990): 45.
311Michael Dobbs, "The Amazing, Death-Defying Mikhail Gorbachev," Washington Post
National Weekly Edition, 23-29 July 1990, 18.
312LeMonde, 6 June 1990. Quoted in Elizabeth Teague, "Gorbachev Advisers Meet
Secretly with Opposition Leaders," Report on the USSR 22 June 1990, 1-2.
313Daniel Sneider, "Gorbachev-Yeltsin Pact Shifts Political Balance," Christian Science
Monitor, 14 August 1990, 4.
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from certain and frankly seems more doubtful with each passing day. Regardless of the
ultimate outcome of "perestroika," Mikhail Gorbachev has irreversibly altered the modern
Soviet state; he has also had a tremendous impact on reorienting the world political order.
It is entirely possible that the political revolutions which erupted in Eastern Europe in 1989
would have eventually occurred without the influence of Gorbachev, but without him they
would likely have been delayed for many years to come. For four decades, the United
States and the Soviet Union icily stared at each other over the immense fortifications
erected during the Cold War. Now, in August 1990, Gorbachev himself has declared that
the Cold War is over, and that his country and all others must move to reorient their
international policies.314 The two superpowers seem increasingly less worried about the
other's intentions, and more and more preoccupied with domestic political matters. One
of the starkest indications of the impact of Gorbachev's reforms is the newfound
cooperation which has emerged in most matters between the United States and the Soviet
Union in a manner unprecedented in the post-World War Two era. No matter what one
thinks about Gorbachev as a man or as a leader, the impact he has had on international
affairs is indisputable. Even if he were to be ousted from the Kremlin tomorrow, Mikhail
Gorbachev's first five years in office will forever stand out as a watershed period in world
history.
3uMichael Dobbs, "The Amazing, Death-Defying Mikhail Gorbachev," Washington Post
National Weekly Edition, 23-29 July 1990, 18.
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